Go big like this couple — receiving millions of TL in cash and kilos of gold — and you might just keep pace with the iPhone's exponentially rising price here. Most expensive in the world. Naturally.

In this week’s edition:

• Unpacking July’s CPI data

• Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement reached

• International cash flow monitor

• This week’s stat round-up

Inflation, had to get away: Unpacking July’s CPI data

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In this week’s recap:

• Peace process draft law submitted

• New party hit with old judicial pressure

• Ankara seeks security role in Lebanon

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Mohamed Salah joins Trabzonspor

Also from us this week:

• Diego Cupolo on the risks and opportunities posed by Beylikova’s rare earth reserves

It came, they signed, they concurred. The Jenga tower of conditionalities that is Turkey’s much-awaited peace process “framework law” was submitted to parliament Wednesday with at least 360 signatures—just don’t ask lawmakers if they understand it.

Many AKP members allegedly signed blank documents after months of secretive negotiations, the result of which is a draft law proposing conditional amnesty for eligible PKK militants if the organization dissolves and surrenders all its weapons.

Officially known as the ‘Draft Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Cohesion’ (full text here), the legislation provides a framework to guide the rest of the Turkey-PKK process. Remember, this is step one.

The proposal is expected to be discussed in the parliamentary Justice Commission on Friday before getting sent to the General Assembly (possibly on Sunday), where opponents will likely aim to slow down deliberations next week.

What happened: On Aug. 2, a DEM Party delegation visited Imrali island to convey the details of the draft law to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

The next day, DEM Party released a positive statement from Öcalan, who said “not everything has been resolved,” but the law would contribute to regional peace and fully open the door to “a democratic republic.”

MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli, who initiated this process with a handshake nearly two years ago, was among the first to sign the draft law Tuesday.

Reactions: After it was submitted Wednesday, Erdoğan shared a post on X, stating:

“I hope this step, which aims to permanently rid Turkey of the threat of terrorism, … will lead to auspicious outcomes.”

AKP Spox Ömer Çelik spoke directly to press, saying the framework law is:

“Actually, one of the greatest responses given to the imperialist and Zionist aggression that harbors ill intentions towards our region,” he said, meaning that by engaging with the PKK, Ankara can prevent adversaries from using the militants against Turkish interests.

Among opposition parties, Yeni Party will review the draft law today before publicizing its stance. Meanwhile, Yeniden Refah and IYI Party are more critical, often portraying the process as a betrayal of the soldiers and citizens who died in the more than 40-year Turkey-PKK conflict.

A separate law proposal amending the rights of “martyrs’ families and veterans” was approved by the parliament’s National Defense commission Wednesday.

What’s in the framework law: Article 1 of the draft proposal states the actual peace process begins only after the National Security Council (MGK) confirms—and publishes in the Official Gazette—that the PKK has completely ended its existence and handed over all weapons and ammunition.

Articles 3 and 6 suspend judicial proceedings—rather than issue immediate pardons—for eligible individuals who, depending on their charges, can see active trials put on hold or prison sentences suspended for a probationary period.

Crucially, Articles 3 and 6 state people charged with murder and other crimes requiring life imprisonment committed before Jun. 1, 2005, cannot benefit from the proposed measures—including Öcalan and the PKK senior leadership.

Article 5 establishes conditions for probationary periods while Article 7 calls for a board chaired by the vice president to track and evaluate the process activities.

Of course, there are many more details, but these are the core concepts of a self-proclaimed “Turkish model” for eliminating terrorism. However, some legal definitions remain overly broad, argues lawyer Gulcin Avsar, which risks leaving the application of the law to “the mercy of the judicial bureaucracy.”

Analysis: In written responses to Turkey recap, Özge Genç, a visiting fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs who was involved in civil society work during the 2013-2015 PKK-Turkey peace process, cautiously said the draft law represents progress after months of negotiations.

While the proposal was repeatedly postponed this summer, requiring parliament to extend its legislative session into the August recess, Genç wrote:

“The [delay] reveals the government’s caution, its concern about electoral and nationalist reactions, and its preference for security verification before legal concessions. But it also appears to have allowed the parties to construct a negotiated minimum that is substantially more protective and workable than many expected.”

Genç also noted that public opinion surveys consistently show strong support for ending the conflict, but much weaker support for concessions associated with Öcalan.

So, the fact that PKK leadership was excluded from the current framework opens the legal avenues to address lower-level offenses, like membership, assistance and propaganda, which impact a larger share of people criminalized or jailed by anti-terror laws.

Next up: After the bill is adopted with ruling bloc and DEM party votes in parliament, the next phase will determine whether the proposal can become sustainable.

Because the draft law primarily focuses on criminal files and prosecutions, Genç said the bill cannot be expected to regulate every aspect of militants’ return and reintegration.

“These issues may, however, be taken up in the next phase through the Board’s coordination role, its subcommittees and the further administrative or legislative measures it is authorized to request,” she wrote.

Looking ahead, Genç said potential reintegration issues to be discussed include:

• How PKK returnees will be identified in administrative and social security systems

• Whether they will be protected from reprisals or repeated investigations

• How they will access housing, income, employment and healthcare

• How families will reunite

• And whether they can participate in lawful political and civic life without being re-criminalized.

Yeni way you slice it: New party hit with old judicial pressure

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ESKIŞEHIR—On an eastbound railway from Istanbul, past a series of narrow mountain valleys, the Anatolian plateau opens wide, inviting Turkey’s high-speed trains to zip by the town of Beylikova.

Apart from its farmers’ market on Fridays, this enclave of about 6,000 residents draws little attention from outsiders beyond the occasional glance from a train passenger. However, beneath Beylikova’s soil lies the fuel for a 21st-century geopolitical rivalry, placing this region on the front lines of the US-China race for resources.

Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Ministry estimates Beylikova’s untapped reserves hold up to 694 million tons of rare earth elements (REE)—critical minerals used in modern electronics and defense systems. If confirmed, the region would hold the world’s second-largest known deposits behind China.

Looking to secure Turkey’s spot in the supply chains of the future, the ministry launched a pilot program in 2023 to begin developing the Beylikova mines while courting international partners in the US and China.

At the same time, Washington has sought to counter Chinese dominance in global REE production. US Pres. Donald Trump is increasingly working to wean American supply chains away from Beijing, which has used export controls on REEs as leverage in the rivals’ intermittent trade wars.

Most recently on Jul. 20, Trump signed an executive order designed to encourage American defense industries to source critical materials “domestically or from allied nations” like Turkey.

This confluence of interests in REEs between Washington and Ankara could soon reverberate through the hills of Beylikova. Yet, while Turkish officials tout the new mines as an economic boon, locals and environmentalists remain unconvinced that the promise of new jobs will outweigh the radioactive risks and ecological degradation inherent to REE extraction.

“We don’t know what to expect if they make more mines, but we know it’s usually not good for the people living near the mines,” said Ruşen, a resident of Kızılcaören, a village of mostly retired farmers adjacent to the REE reserve area.

Speaking by a community fountain while soaping his car’s back window with a broom, Ruşen explained how the village used to get water from a spring up the hill, but that water source dried up when a rock quarry opened nearby.

“Now we pump our water from down the hill,” Ruşen said, as other villagers emerged from their hobby gardens and joined the conversation, nodding silently as he listed off the new mines operating in the area.

Eti Maden’s pilot project

Down the road from Kızılcaören is the Beylikova Fluorite, Barite and REE Mining Directorate, a facility operated by the state-owned mining company Eti Maden. Inside, about 60 Turkish researchers study mineral isolation techniques, according to Beylikova Mayor Hakan Karabacak.

Meanwhile, work crews outside build a new complex to expand operations. When Turkey recap visited the site in July 2026, the foundation was laid for a new industrial facility that will house additional equipment for the ore refinement process.

Local mining samples have found REEs like lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, samarium, gadolinium, europium and neodymium. Extracting such minerals often produces thorium, a mildly radioactive metal that’s also at the Beylikova site.

Due to the presence of thorium, Turkey’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority will oversee the establishment of “a long-term storage facility” for radioactive waste created in the refinement of REEs.

Radioactive risks

Environmental groups fear such a storage facility would involve a toxic tailings pond—an open pit designed to hold mining waste—that could potentially leak and contaminate local water sources.

Such risks can be heightened in REE production because despite their name, rare earths are rather common, but they exist in low concentrations. This requires mining operations to process vast amounts of soil to extract the valuable compounds, creating hazardous amounts of mining refuse in the immediate vicinity.

“[REEs] must be subjected to an extensive and arduous purification process,” Levent Büyükbozkırlı, a member of the Polen Ekoloji Kolektif, told Turkey recap. “This confronts us with the reality of massive toxic chemical usage, excessive water consumption and the contamination of that water with heavy metals and acids during the purification stage.”

Recent studies estimate that isolating one ton of rare earths produces 2,000 tons of toxic waste. Given Turkey’s ongoing deregulation drive to fast-track mining projects, critics argue the state is not taking the measures needed to safely dispose of large quantities of mining refuse.

To make their case, local mining opponents often juxtapose the 2024 collapse of the Iliç gold mine—which killed nine workers and released cyanide-laden waste into nearby rivers—against the fact 84 percent of mining project applications that year were exempted from comprehensive environmental impact assessments.

Unverified reserves

For Beylikova, the toxic waste risk depends on the concentration of REEs in soil, which has yet to be verified. Eti Maden has reportedly applied for international certification, but the process has yet to be finalized, which is why Turkey is not listed as a REE source in official catalogs like the US Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodity Summaries.

Without certification, it is difficult to forecast the opportunities and risks posed by REE development in Turkey, said Kathryn Goodenough, principal geologist at the British Geological Survey.

She visited the site prior to the pilot program and estimates 0.2 to 2 percent of the deposit is likely to be rare earth oxides, meaning roughly 1.4 to 14 million tons of the estimated 694-million-ton reserves might hold REEs. Though significantly less than state projections, the total would still place Turkey in the top 10 nations with proven REE reserves.

Regarding the site’s radioactive waste risk, Goodenough said it depends on how the minerals are processed.

“As I understand it, the main ore mineral at Kızılcaören is bastnaesite which is a rare earth- and fluorine-bearing carbonate mineral,” she told Turkey recap. “If the focus is on processing bastnaesite, then the tailings may be relatively low in radioactivity.”

Goodenough underlined that many steps remain for Beylikova to become a fully operational REE mine—a process that can take about a decade. And while official certification would help draw international investments, Goodenough said Turkey could also opt to develop the deposits with domestic funding.

Domestic benefits

Advocates for safeguarding Turkey’s strategic reserves have argued the nation’s domestic wind turbine and electric vehicle sectors provide a sufficient industrial demand base for Beylikova’s REEs and reduce the need for international investors.

The core issue is that Turkey lacks the technological capacity to process REEs, said Beylikova Mayor Karabacak, adding that negotiations with American and Chinese partners are ongoing.

Yet Karabacak, a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), stressed that maintaining sovereignty over mineral rights and keeping the economic benefits local took precedence over exporting raw materials for little gain.

“We want a factory to be established here, a job system to be provided here,” Karabacak told Turkey recap. “We want a solution to unemployment here.”

Mock samples of 12 rare earth minerals sit on the mayor’s desk. They are inside glass tubes arranged on a wooden, Eti Maden-branded display case. Eyeing the mineral name labels, the mayor acknowledged not only the risks mining poses to local water sources and the agriculture sector, but also the value locally refined REEs would bring the region.

“We are not against mining,” Karabacak said. “We want the [minerals] to be extracted in a healthy way without harming the environment and to be processed in our country, in our district, to contribute to the nation’s economy.”

Global demands

Meanwhile in Washington, Trump followed up on his recent supply chain directive with a second executive order in late July to further safeguard critical minerals for the US.

Environmentalists have expressed concerns that rising REE demand will inevitably increase their market value, rendering even low-yield mining projects economically viable in the near future—and opening more sites in Turkey and beyond to potential contamination.

Yet without international certification, Beylikova’s future remains hard to predict, said Imdat Öner, a former Turkish diplomat and current senior fellow at the Jack D. Gordon Public Policy Institute of Florida International University, who recently co-authored a comprehensive assessment of Turkey’s REEs prospects.

“Turkey is highly interested in making deals with the US on rare earth elements, but it would depend on Turkey meeting strict US supply‑chain transparency and security requirements,” Öner told Turkey recap.

He added, “Turkey’s strong position in boron and certain critical minerals could make it a useful partner, especially as the US seeks alternatives to China. Still, any potential agreement or deal would likely be limited, technical and compliance‑heavy.”

Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources did not respond to multiple requests for comment for this article. Likewise, Eti Maden representatives did not reply to questions about the certification process of the Beylikova deposit.

Back in Kızılcaören, Ruşen finished washing his car and smirked at the thought that Trump might be interested in the minerals beneath his feet.

“Sure, Trump wants whatever he can get,” Ruşen said. “Chinese visitors used to pass by here, too … I haven’t seen them in a while, though.”

Asked if locals might benefit from state efforts to develop the REE mines, Ruşen raised his eyebrows and waved off the premise of the question.

“They say it will bring jobs, but we know it won’t. Maybe one or two, but the rest will go to yabancılar,” he said, using the Turkish word for both foreigners and strangers from out of town.

Correction: The initial version of this article spelled the villager’s name ‘Ruşan’. This has been updated to the more common spelling ‘Ruşen’.

Ask us anything

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Get in touch at info@turkeyrecap.com.

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Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Hilmi Hacaloğlu, Political correspondent

Gözde Ocak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

This article is part of a series of reports focusing on Turkey’s climate governance produced with support from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Office, and in no way reflects the views of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

• Aug 2

  • The DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan on Imralı Island

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Welcome back! Diego here once more with the lira-cal scripture before Emily’s resurrection.

In this week’s edition:

1. Turkey-Iraq pipeline talks ongoing, oil flowing

2. How the new US tariffs impact Turkey

3. International cash flow monitor

4. This week’s stat round-up

Brent and goods system: Turkey-Iraq pipeline talks ongoing, oil flowing

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We just learned watermelons can be peeled by hand, and it’s made us question everything about our daily rind. Here’s the master’s process.

In this week’s recap:

• New Party takes helm of opposition bloc

• CHP ranks depleted, still getting detained

• Peace process law imminent (again)

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• It’s 2026. Do you know where your uncles are?

Also from us this week:

• In-house historian Emily Rice Johnson dropped This Day in Turkey’s August edition for News Tracking Tools subscribers only

By now, recap readers know ousted CHP Chair Özgür Özel launched a new party Friday. Its name is ‘Yeni Parti,’ meaning ‘New Party’. And the internet is still talking about how the ‘N’ in Yeni looks like the ‘N’ in ‘Netflix’.

Responding to this critical matter, Özel said that’s not the party logo, just the name, and a logo competition would be held “if necessary.”

Those who cannot Netflix and chill can look at the first Yeni Party office in Hatay, which does not use the scarlet letter—and which a Yeni Party staffer told us was meant to resemble folds in the Turkish flag. Okay, on with the reel news …

What to know: The breakaway party represents an objectively bold move by former CHP lawmakers seeking to reclaim the nation’s main opposition mantle after a court ruling reinstalled unpopular ex-CHP Chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in May.

The move is bold because Yeni Party will face obstacles in terms of basic funding and snap election eligibility along with the ever-present threat of legal actions against government opponents.

“It’s an exciting and stressful time,” a Yeni Party staff member told Turkey recap. “The media is spreading rumors that Yeni Party is structurally weaker and more likely to get targeted with corruption probes than CHP. We’re not sure what will come next.”

In the first statement on Yeni Party from a government insider, Chief Presidential Advisor Mehmet Uçum called the splinter party “insignificant,” adding the party ranks are corrupt and that the CHP had been purified by their exit.

To date, 91 CHP MPs have transferred to Yeni Party as hundreds of provincial and municipal officials are currently in the process of changing their party memberships (covered in more detail below).

Despite the swelling ranks and the MHP’s appeal, Yeni Party cannot receive treasury funding before the next elections under current laws. So, Özel launched a fundraising campaign Wednesday, appealing to supporters for help in filling the immediate financing gap (on the heels of a major fundraising scandal in Turkey).

In the meantime, procedural and administrative prep work churns behind closed doors, as with Yeni Party’s first group meeting Tuesday, which was for party officials only and involved bureaucratic measures, a Yeni Party source told Turkey recap.

New party, new hue? The party program is online and repeats the phrase “We will change this oppressive system” a total of 15 times. Much of the program will sound familiar to CHP followers, though with a few tweaks. Here are some core initiatives:

• A return to the parliamentary system

• Implementing Constitutional Court and ECHR rulings

• Re-adopting the Istanbul Convention on violence against women

• Mother tongue and equal citizenship as basic rights

• Accelerating the EU accession process

What’s different is Yeni Party seems to be positioning itself as more “pro-Western” and more progressive than the CHP, said Çağdaş Üngör, a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Marmara University in Istanbul.

In a new commentary, Üngör argued the party program “shows an attempt” to merge foundational Kemalist principles with post-Kemalist ideals on pluralism and minority rights.

“They will have to appeal to more people than the regular CHP base,” Üngör told Turkey recap, adding this was “mathematically” necessary for electoral success.

“All these Kemalist principles, they cannot let that go because that’s been the backbone of opposition right now for so many years,” she continued. “But keeping them should not be a barrier for [Yeni Party] to reach other people, as well. So, there is a delicate balance there.”

A Yeni Party staff member expressed similar sentiments in an interview with Turkey recap, stating the party has a new image that may appeal to voters who are “allergic” to CHP’s legacy.

The staffer also expressed grief for having to leave the CHP, but said even voters who supported Kılıçdaroğlu in the past, could not support his reinstallation by a politicized judiciary—resulting in a mass exodus of both members and voters to Yeni Party.

The takeaway: Apart from the immediate obstacles regarding party funding, eligibility and prosecutions, the main question going forward is whether Yeni Party can draw support beyond the traditional CHP voter base before the next elections.

“If it goes smoothly, I think there’s a good chance that they can appeal to undecided voters in Turkey, especially the younger generation,” Üngör said.

“What they promise is basically more freedom,” she added. “You don’t even have to go for a very sophisticated agenda. Many people, especially the younger people, are [feeling] very much restricted.”

Kemal night long: CHP ranks depleted, still getting detained

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1 August

1840

• The first issue of Ceride-i Havadis (Journal of News) was published. The first semi-official newspaper published in Ottoman Turkish was founded by William Churchill — an Englishman who had moved to Istanbul and worked as a translator at the American Consulate.

1953

• Yeşilköy Airport — later known …

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Welcome back! Diego here, holding down the fort while Emily forages in the wild.

In this week’s edition:

1. Central Bank holds rates, warns of inflation risks

2. Why the Haluk Levent investigation matters

3. Polymarket, Kalshi sites banned in anti-gambling sweep

4. International cash flow monitor

5. This week’s stat round-up

Fortune favors the hold: Central Bank holds rates, warns of inflation risks

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Shout out to the Montreux Convention, which marked its 90th anniversary this week. Balancing military powers with a strait face since 1936.

In this week’s recap:

• Ousted opposition leader to form new party

• CHP probes weigh on transfer decisions

• Key peace process law now imminent

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Governor dismissed on cycling short notice

Also from us this week:

• Wouter Massink on how Russia’s shadow fleet is getting scrapped in Turkey

On Tuesday, Özgür Özel delivered the speech many have been expecting since his ouster from the CHP exactly two months earlier.

In an emotional appeal that drew both tears and roaring applause from attendees, Özel said he’d resign from Turkey’s main opposition party and establish a new party to challenge Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next election cycle.

“We will never accept being a controlled opposition. This is not a separation, this is not giving up,” Özel said in his final CHP parliamentary group speech. “We are not taking off our shirts in politics. We are all together putting on a fiery shirt in politics for the future of this country.”

At the time of writing: Özel held a closed meeting Thursday morning with CHP members that may resign en masse and transfer to his new party—which has yet to be named. Here’s what we know from initial reports:

• Roughly 95 of CHP’s 135 MPs may join the new party, though the timing remains uncertain (read below)

• The party name and logo are finalized. Formal application is expected next week

• The party establishment date is expected in “August or September”

• A rent agreement was made for a party HQ to be opened in October

• A ‘back-up’ party is ready in case all the above fails

Noteworthy: MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli chimed in today to say the new party should have access to treasury funds like all parties over the parliamentary threshold.

Reminder: This is all taking place after Turkey’s top court of appeals announced Friday that it would review the CHP congress case after the summer judicial break, which ends Aug. 31.

A delayed review of the appeal was a red line for Özel and his supporters, who seek to clinch electoral eligibility for the new party in case snap elections are announced this year.

New party considerations: Nearly all polls suggest the new party will surpass the Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu-led CHP in voter support, while some surveys place Özel’s party in close competition with the AKP.

A turbulent period lies ahead for Turkey’s opposition as various CHP officials have begun announcing whether they will stay with Kılıçdaroğlu or join Özel this week. Some CHP members are also remaining “independent” or resigning without choosing sides yet.

When it comes to CHP voters, a reported 220,000 have already renounced party membership. Among them is the “entire family” of Dr. Arife Köse, a political scientist at the University of East Anglia.

Asked if the new party might help restore the “competitive” part of Turkey’s “competitive authoritarianism,” Köse told Turkey recap:

“The regime may well try new steps against the new party to keep it from contesting the next elections. I don’t think the government will strip the immunities of the MPs and of Özel himself if they transfer to the new party—that will risk derailing the ongoing process with the Kurds, too.”

Analysis: A key concern remains the potential division of opposition votes between the CHP and the new party, diminishing both parties’ prospects for electoral success. Köse estimates the CHP will likely retain between 3 to 5 percent of the voters.

Still, she emphasized a rapid party establishment process is now necessary not just for electoral eligibility, but also to keep Özel supporters energized.

“What really matters now is whether Özgür Özel can turn his popularity into support for the new party itself,” Köse told Turkey recap.

“If he manages to mobilize people and build what he calls a ‘party of Turkey’—one where social democrats remain the backbone, but it reaches out to much wider sections of society—he can minimize that risk. Whether he wins over other opposition parties and their voters comes down to those same two factors.”

Crackdown chronicles: CHP probes weigh on transfer decisions

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ALIAĞA—Hidden at the edge of the Aliağa peninsula, an industrial town on Turkey’s western Aegean shore, lies the world’s third-largest ship-breaking hub.

Every day, across just over a kilometer of coastline, about 1,500 workers use cranes, blowtorches and their hands to strip down massive hulls into manageable pieces for nearby steel mills and processing facilities.

Long a graveyard for both old ships and the men who dismantle them, Aliağa’s scrapyards have more recently become a final stop for Russia’s notorious shadow fleet.

This armada of worn-out tankers operates outside the international maritime system, allowing Moscow to export oil and evade Western sanctions imposed after its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Yet, as more shadow fleet vessels age out of service, a growing number are being sent to Turkish shores, where their unregulated status presents both legal and environmental challenges.

The Eagle S

At least two sanctioned tankers, the Eagle S and the Hitit, were rammed onto Aliağa’s shores for demolition in recent months. Both have been sanctioned by the EU, Britain, Switzerland and Canada for their role in transporting nearly 3.5 million barrels of Russian black market oil since 2024.

The 229-meter-long Eagle S has also been linked to sabotage and espionage activities. In December 2024, the ship dragged its anchor across the Gulf of Finland, severing multiple Finnish and Estonian submarine cables.

This prompted a nighttime helicopter raid by Finnish special forces, who reportedly found surveillance equipment with Russian and Turkish keyboards onboard. Charges against the crew were eventually dropped as the incident occurred outside Finland’s jurisdiction.

A spokesperson for the Finnish authority that detained and inspected the ship told Turkey recap that there was no indication the vessel was destined for scrap at the time of its release last year.

Yet, social media footage showed the Eagle S arriving in Aliağa in November 2025 after disabling its tracking device off the Egyptian coast, according to Kpler data Turkey recap obtained from the Kyiv School of Economics’ (KSE) Sanctions Hub of Excellence.

Today, the Eagle S lies side by side with various Russia-linked hulls in Aliağa. This includes the Turkish-flagged Hitit, a relatively well-kept tanker that lost its commercial value once sanctions were imposed on it in 2025.

Also present are the Vilamoura, a tanker tied to Russian oil shipments that was damaged by a suspected Ukrainian attack off the Libyan coast in 2025; the Abinsk, a bulk carrier operated by a company implicated in carrying grain from occupied Ukraine to Israel; and the Yamal Irbis, a cargo ship managed by a Norway-linked firm connected to US-blacklisted Russian energy companies.

Shell companies

Nicola Mulinaris, policy adviser at the NGO Shipbreaking Platform, said shadow fleet vessels are typically poorly maintained and riddled with unknown hazards such as oil residues and contaminated storage spaces.

“Scrapping dark or gray fleet vessels is more dangerous because these ships often come with compounded risks,” Mulinaris told Turkey recap.

Shadow fleet ships tend to be registered to shell companies to obscure ownership, making it difficult to determine who is responsible for cleaning and preparing them for recycling, as well as who profits from the sale of the sanctioned asset.

The registered shipowners of both the Eagle S and the Abinsk share the same address at the Meydan Hotel in Dubai, alongside approximately 60 shell companies known to facilitate shadow fleet shipments.

This includes firms tied to Aleksejs Halavins, a sanctioned Latvian figure central to the Russian oil trade. Halavins also managed a firm sharing a Cyprus address with suspected shell companies of the TMS Group, which formerly operated the damaged Vilamoura ship.

“The use of the Meydan Hotel in Dubai is common because it is a free zone where all of these single-ship companies can register,” Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward, told Turkey recap.

“The way that these purchases and scrapping are put together—it’s all done so people like you and me can’t find out who’s behind it,” she added.

Scrapping in the dark

Many shadow fleet vessels lack a valid flag or class status, which are needed to validate crucial documentation for safe dismantling procedures.

This includes the Inventory of Hazardous Materials (IHM), which details the exact locations of all toxic substances on board. Without it, ship-breaking yards cannot map out a sound recycling strategy.

Sanctions on the ships could also make them radioactive for the legitimate entities involved in their scrapping, explained John Alonso, who leads the technical cooperation on ship recycling at the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

“They will have no insurance, no IHM, and no auditors will dare to go there because, of course, they may be impacted if they receive any money,” Alonso told Turkey recap.

Alonso appeared surprised to hear Turkish yards had accepted sanctioned ships.

“I assume that whoever bought that ship and then recycled that ship is protected because if you are highly [flagged for violations] at some stage, all bank accounts of that company will be frozen. They will be absolutely unable to operate even with national banks,” Alonso said.

Turkey’s ship-dismantling yards are known to have strong ties to the government. The son of former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım allegedly owns one of the facilities.

“Whenever we raise a problem regarding ship-breaking, they immediately say, ‘No, there is no such thing,’” Ibrahim Doğangül, an Aliağa municipal council member with the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), told Turkey recap.

Doğangül noted Aliağa Mayor Serkan Acar, of the government-allied Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has been in office for 12 years and maintains close but transactional relationships with the yard owners.

Some vessels currently in Aliağa also appear to have spoofed their locations or switched off their transponders before arrival—a known evasion tactic used by the shadow fleet. This makes it difficult to verify whether the ship is actually at the dismantling yard or still operating at sea.

Data from the KSE showed the Vilamoura recently resurfacing near South Korea under a different flag and supposedly carrying out ship-to-ship transfers.

International norms

Scrapping vessels without valid documents is also likely to breach the IMO’s Hong Kong Convention (HKC), the first international ship recycling treaty enacted last year and integrated into Turkish law last month. However, if a scrapyard violates HKC regulations, the IMO itself cannot revoke its yard’s license, Alonso explained.

“We are [the] UN, we don’t have a police ourselves,” Alonso said. “It is the responsibility of the government to enforce the national legislation.”

The Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change did not reply to requests for comment in time for this report.

In April 2026, the EU introduced a scrapping clause in its 20th sanction package adopted to encourage the responsible disposal of sanctioned Russian tankers. This exemption allows companies to legally deal with EU-sanctioned shadow fleet vessels, provided they are sent directly to approved yards.

An EU spokesperson did not respond to Turkey recap’s question on whether this clause applied to the Hitit and Eagle S, though the vessels arrived in Aliağa’s Izmir Mavi Denizcilik facility before the clauses were introduced.

Although the steel these ships hold is worth millions of dollars, experts at KSE’s Sanctions Hub of Excellence told Turkey recap that they doubted the Aliağa yards would face secondary sanctions, as only the United States occasionally enforces such measures.

“I don’t know whether there is any logical reason to apply any sanctions for something that will be dismantled, especially for a vessel that is in a very poor condition,” Yuliia Pavytska, head of KSE’s Sanctions Hub, told Turkey recap.

The US Treasury did not reply to Turkey recap’s request for comment.

Ticking time bombs

Whatever the legal hurdles, the lifespan of Russia’s aging shadow fleet vessels is limited. Pushed far beyond their operational boundaries, the vast majority of these tankers are increasingly unfit to sail. This comes on top of a surge in interceptions by Western nations and attacks by Ukrainian drones.

“The [shadow] fleet is in a much worse condition than standard vessels,” Istanbul-based ship-spotter Hayri Yay told Turkey recap, adding the ships often harbor numerous defects, including cracked hulls.

“These vessels only make [economic] sense because they allow oil to be transported very cheaply,” he continued.

The deteriorating condition of these ships represents a ticking time bomb for the areas in which they operate. In December 2024, two ancient Russian oil tankers split apart and ran aground in the Black Sea during a storm, spilling thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil.

In April, the sanctioned 26-year-old tanker Sofia allegedly leaked more than 300 tons of petroleum into the Black Sea for reasons that remain unclear.

“A lot of them, like the Eagle S, are no more than floating rust buckets,” Bockmann said. “The fact that they’re being scrapped and removed from the seas and they no longer pose an environmental and safety risk—that is actually a good thing for international shipping.”

Like Bockmann, many experts and industry stakeholders believe that scrapyards are the only viable option for the safe removal of Russia’s aging shadow fleet vessels. Yet, ship-breaking presents hazards of its own, ranking among the world’s dirtiest and most dangerous occupations.

In Turkey’s Aliağa yards, four workers have been crushed or have fallen to their deaths in recent months. Most vessels are riddled with toxic substances, including asbestos, PCBs, and heavy metals. This has made the region a hotspot for pollution and left a trail of retired ship-breakers suffering from incurable lung diseases.

“I regretted working there. Our end is bound to be bad,” said an Aliağa worker in his mid-40s expected to succumb to fatal lung cancer soon. “I’m not a smoker or a drinker—like many others at the yards. It is obvious where my disease came from.”

“You are face-to-face with death every second,” another worker in his 40s told Turkey recap. “But you’re desperate, obliged. If I quit, I’ll find no other job.”

The looming “tsunami of ships”

Against such environmental threats and human costs, Yay estimates Russia will discard its 300 to 600 shadow fleet tankers as soon as the war ends and sanctions subside. To date, India has been the largest recipient of sanctioned shadow fleet vessels that have been decommissioned.

Turkey is the only other country known to have received such ships for dismantling, according to data from the NGO Shipbreaking Platform and OpenSanctions, which shows two US-sanctioned vessels linked to the transport of stolen Ukrainian grain and Russian oil were scrapped in Aliağa in 2024 and 2025.

The same data indicates that the number of decommissioned sanctioned vessels has grown since 2025, increasing to at least a dozen in the first three months of 2026 alone.

The ship-breaking industry’s turn to sanctioned ships comes amid a historic downturn in supply, forcing numerous yards worldwide to close. The shadow fleet’s hunger for outdated vessels, together with high freight rates and shipyard shortages, has kept an unprecedented backlog of aging ships afloat.

Typically, ships end their service after 20 to 30 years, when structural fatigue sets in and the likelihood of accidents rises sharply. Oil tankers depreciate faster. The average age of the global fleet is currently 23 years old—the oldest it has been in decades. Nearly half of all tankers at sea are over 15 years old, and the shadow fleet typically is even older.

At the time of the Eagle S’s arrival in late 2025, multiple sources in Aliağa told Turkey recap that ship-breaking activity had severely plunged. But many expect the tide to turn soon, potentially overflowing the sector with pent-up demand.

“There’s a tsunami of ships for recycling coming up, and there’s by no means sufficient capacity around the world,” warned Alonso, adding that the IMO increasingly sees obsolete vessels deliberately being abandoned by shipowners.

He fears the complications attached to shadow fleet vessels will make them even more susceptible to the same fate.

Turkey recap reached out to several ship-breaking yards as well as the Ship Recycling Association of Turkey (GEMISANDER), but did not receive a response.

Daniel Thorpe, Sofia Cherici and Ali Dinç contributed to this report.

This article was updated to include relevant details about the EU’s 20th sanction package on Russia.

Ask us anything

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Get in touch at info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to produce balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

✅ Typos verify our humanity. All Turkey recap news output is created and fact-checked by people. Find our AI policy in our Code of Ethics.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Hilmi Hacaloğlu, Political correspondent

Gözde Ocak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

This article was produced within the framework of MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a Journalism Partnership funded by the Creative Europe programme that supports independent media specialising in international reporting.

This investigation was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe.

Fortunately, the Trade Ministry is investigating extreme price hikes, like a döner kebab in Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar that was reportedly going for 3,000 TL (64 USD). Protect ya net worth!

In this week’s edition:

1. Turkey’s pipeline disputes from Cyprus to Iraq

2. Karahan, Şimşek set the stage for rate decision

3. Canada-Turkey free trade talks loading

4. International cash flow monitor

5. This week’s stat round-up

Outer Borus: Turkey’s pipeline disputes from Cyprus to Iraq

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A decade after the July 15 coup attempt, a clear account of the New Turkey’s defining event has yet to surface. There is no question, however, that more than 250 people died that night and countless individuals remain in jail on scant evidence of their involvement.

In this week’s recap:

• US, Turkey explore F-35/S-400 solutions

• New CHP purges, ‘New Party’ in the works

• CHP Çankaya mayor arrested, removed from office

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Turkey denies visa to Omar Souleyman without ‘Warning, Warning’

Also from us this week:

• Soli Özel joins Recap radio to discuss the S-400 sale prospects and NATO summit

Today’s title is not a reference to the Amb. Tom Barrack’s X post (and its replies), but to the Trump administration’s gesture of good faith to the Erdoğan government in seeking to resolve the long-running F-35 issue.

In his visit to Ankara last week, Trump said he would “lift sanctions” on Turkey so the country could purchase F-35 fighter jets. But as recap readers know, this requires Turkey to get rid of its Russian-made S-400 missiles, as established in the 2020 and 2021 US National Defense Authorization Acts.

What’s new? Following the NATO summit, both US and Turkish officials have expressed the will to address the F-35/S-400 dilemma while also signaling potential pathways to a solution—including export options and technical workarounds.

One pathway is selling the S-400 to a third country, the announcement of which government-adjacent columnist Abdulkadir Selvi expected Friday.

Nothing happened, but Selvi repeated the claim Monday, praising a “new era in Turkish-American relations,” spearheaded by FM Hakan Fidan, intel chief Ibrahim Kalın and US envoy to Turkey Tom Barrack. (See above: Not that jet stir.)

Another pathway involves reading the fine print on the US CAATSA sanctions, which target Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB)—the government agency responsible for military procurements—and not Turkey’s armed forces. In short, the US can still sell weapons to the Turkish armed forces, as was the plan with the F-16 purchase that fell out of the news cycle.

What’s the problem? The US cannot transfer F-35 jets to Turkey as long as Turkey has S-400 missiles. That’s the fine print in the defense authorization bills that blocked the aircraft and imposed the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.

“There was a mention of the CAATSA provision in the 2020 NDAA that barred Turkey from the F-35, but that’s not the reason Turkey was barred. The reason … was because of its purchase and ‘possession’ of the S-400,” Aaron Stein, president of the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), told Turkey recap.

“So, even if sanctions are lifted or paused or whatever, that still doesn’t resolve the F-35 issue,” he added.

What about a waiver? In a recent commentary on this topic, Stein suggested a third pathway could see Turkey benefit from a sanctions exemption applied to India and Vietnam. Turkey did not originally qualify, he wrote, “because it was ramping up its relationship with Russia, rather than toning it down.”

Some analysts now argue Erdoğan taking is distance from Moscow, and this may work to Ankara’s favor in some US bilateral issues, but addressing the S-400s remains the starting point to the lengthy process of F-35 acquisitions for Ankara, Stein said.

“What has changed is that Trump took what was in the shadows and made it very, very overt,” he told Turkey recap. “While the ball has long been in Turkey’s court, there’s no denying that anymore. If they are willing to get rid of the S-400, they have a pathway to purchase the F-35 and have sanctions removed.”

What officials say: On live TV Friday, Fidan said the issue would “reach a conclusion soon.” He underlined that the Turkish government’s expectations were “actually being expressed by Mr. Trump.”

“From the very beginning, we did not want sanctions between allies in any way,” Fidan said, adding: “Elected political leadership—namely the congress, or in our case the parliament—should not play an obstructive role between allies in this regard.”

Speaking to CNN Sunday, US Amb. to NATO Matthew Whitaker said Trump would make sure “the right deal is cut” with Turkey on the F-35 without undermining US national security interests.

“What my tours through Turkey have shown is that they are a very capable ally,” Whitaker said, adding: “I think we should lean into that relationship with Turkey.”

Yet, Russia and its export controls on Turkey’s S-400 remain a decisive factor. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said it was an “extremely sensitive issue” and that contacts were ongoing between Ankara and Moscow.

Speaking on the possibility of a Russian green light for Turkey’s S-400 sale, Stein said:

“Why would they? This is a gift to keep two NATO allies apart and to keep the F-35 out of another country.”

The packing order: New CHP purges, ‘New Party’ in the works

Read more

The move could pave the way for the US congress to lift sanctions on Turkey and eventually facilitate the nation’s return to the F-35 fighter jet program, from which it was removed due to its 2019 acquisition of the S-400s.

Political scientist Soli Özel joined Recap radio to outline the significance of a potential S-400 sale, what that means for Turkey’s F-35 prospects and how this could impact the regional power balance with Greece and Israel.

Also discussed are the main takeaways from this week’s NATO summit, what the Turkish government sought to achieve by hosting the event and how all this serves Turkey’s long-standing drive for “strategic autonomy.”

Note: This podcast was recorded at 10:30 am Turkey time on Friday, July 10.

Referenced in this talk:

S400’ler üçüncü ülkeye gidiyor, satış bugün netleşecek (Hürriyet)

Netanyahu warns US could ‘destroy’ Mideast power balance as Trump floats F-35 jet sale to Turkey (France24)

The Ankara Corral (Turkey recap)

Quest for Autonomy: History, Geopolitics and Ideology in Turkish Foreign Policy (Institut Montaigne)

Other ways to watch & listen:

Our webcasts are also available on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts and other podcast players.

Ask us anything

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Get in touch at info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to produce balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

✅ Typos verify our humanity. All Turkey recap news output is created and fact-checked by people. Find our AI policy in our Code of Ethics.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Hilmi Hacaloğlu, Political correspondent

Gözde Ocak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

Only to hike water prices days later. Depozito giveth, zam taketh away. Net savings? Zero. Investigation ongoing.

In this week’s edition:

• International cash flow monitor: NATO edition

• Turkey applies to join SEPA

• Inflation stats and bank announcements

• This week’s stat round-up

💸 FDI & International cash flow monitor: NATO edition 🪖

Read more

In this week’s recap:

• Uncertainty lingers for US-Turkey jet deals

• Turkish defense industry courts global partners

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Everything else that trended during the summit

When he arrived at Tuesday’s Defense Industry Forum, a jet-lagged US Sen. Lindsey Graham ducked behind a staircase, took his shoes off and put his feet up on a chair, baring his dark blue socks to the Ankara NATO summit around him.

Reading this as an invitation, I asked if he expected any breakthroughs on a US jet deal with Turkey following news of possible engine sales and US Pres. Donald Trump’s tease about making Turkey “very happy.” Graham said not yet.

“We’ll have to see what Trump can do and how Congress reacts,” Graham told Turkey recap.

An apparently more caffeinated and more vertical version of the senator later told local media he was “open” to delivering F-35s to Turkey, a message echoed by other visiting US Congress members who expressed optimism with the usual, long-standing conditionalities on Turkey’s S-400 missiles and CAATSA sanctions.

Key discussions: A much-promised path for Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet program remains clouded by uncertainties following a much-hyped Trump visit to this week’s Ankara NATO summit. While international focus was on the revived Iran conflict, alliance cohesion and increased defense spending, Turkey watchers awaited news on jet deals that have yet to materialize.

“I haven’t totally made up my mind,” Trump said in a press conference Wednesday, a day after saying, “We’re going to be taking the sanctions off [Turkey],” while sitting with Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who gave a thumbs up.

Following Trump’s inconclusive speech, Erdoğan was asked to provide further details on the F-35 talks in a press conference last night. He dodged the question, stating, “Watch this space” or “Stay tuned” before adding Trump would follow through on his “promise” while answering a separate question.

Notably, Erdoğan said he’s still looking to secure US jet engines for the F-35’s domestic competitor, the KAAN warplane—which needs to be finalized now that Ankara’s Air Force Memorial Forest has been replanted in the shape of the national jet.

Separate from all of the above, there are ongoing talks concerning the ​export of the SAMP-T air defense systems to Turkey, according to French Pres. Emmanuel ‌Macron.

Key takeaways: Apart from the tarmac exhibition of Trump and Erdoğan’s personal ties, the Turkish takeaways from the summit included the exhibition of Ankara as a power center and Turkey’s participation in many of the announced NATO defense projects.

“Turkey, as a NATO country, is taking part in most of the announced projects, underlining its role as a top contributor to the alliance’s goal of expanding defense capacity,” a Turkish foreign ministry official told Turkey recap. “We are happy with the general outcome of the summit so far.”

The Ankara Summit Declaration text can also be interpreted as a boost for the inclusion of Turkey into more programs as leaders agreed to work on eliminating “defense trade barriers among allies.” Caveat: NATO Sec. Gen. Mark Rutte repeatedly insisted F-35s are a “bilateral issue.”

My takeaway: While the NATO family photos will transmit what happened in Ankara to the world, the police officers on nearly every Çankaya street corner and the endless billboards advertising music concerts and F1 racing transmitted another message to visitors:

The Turkish state is a capable partner and normal things happen here, too—just like in your country—despite the headlines about arrested opposition leaders, journalists and suspected dissidents. The billboards covered more than the cityscape.

Interview with Haluk Görgün: Turkish defense industry courts global partners

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In this week’s edition:

• Pensioners await July increase

• Minimum wage, unemployment and confidence indexes

• International cash flow monitor

• This week’s stat round-up

Ease the pension: Retirees await July increase

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In 1983, a Rolling Stone review of our NATO anthem said “the emotions are so raw that the song nearly goes out of control.”

Same goes for next week’s summit. Sing it! NATO se, NATO sa, NATO Aspava.

In this week’s recap:

• The pre-summit view from Ankara

• Turkey eyes EU ties, US jet deal

• CHP purges deepen, splinter party chance grows

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• AKP doctor orders surprise home visits

Also from us this week:

• Podcast: Dimitar Bechev on Turkey’s role in NATO and European security

Ankara’s finally getting the attention it deserves. Next week’s NATO summit will not only spotlight the Turkish capital’s role in regional defense but also its newfound beauty amid last-minute preparations that have fueled some excellent jokes.

In the run-up events, the host city’s goals are two-fold: Promote alliance cohesion and prevent protests like those seen during the 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul.

Street-level preparations: Protests have already begun in various forms throughout Turkey, where 26 to 61 percent of citizens support NATO depending on the survey. That said, mounted police officers are on patrol and 56,000 security personnel will be on duty in Ankara.

Strict security measures have banned gatherings, events and protests, with 103 people and civil society leaders arrested last week on anti-terror charges following dawn raids. Many local news organizations have also been denied press credentials to cover the summit.

In lighter top-down measures, airport taxi drivers have a new dress code and will distribute Turkish delights to visitors—fueling stereotypes for at least another decade or two. Plus, we finally got an official map of which roads will be closed for convoys.

In recent tours of the city, Turkey recap observed work crews painting new murals (often rushed floral patterns) and erecting billboard fences along convoy routes—apparently designed to block city scenes deemed undesirable.

While some billboards feature pro-NATO messages (pictured above), others promote Turkish defense products and cultural events, with Tayfun missile and Hürjet ads running alongside Gorillaz and DJ Tiësto concert promotions—not to be confused with Teknofest.

Palace-level expectations: Amplifying long-held policy objectives, the Turkish government has consistently sought to present the nation as a central NATO ally while showcasing its growing weapons manufacturing base to allied countries seeking to boost defense spending.

Speaking Monday, Pres. Erdoğan said the alliance is at a “historic turning point,” and that Turkey is among the nations that “best grasps the spirit of the new era.”

“Threats such as war, crisis, terrorism and irregular migration, particularly along the eastern and southeastern borders of our alliance, necessitate a reshaping of our understanding of security,” he said.

Erdoğan’s governing coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli echoed similar language Tuesday, stating Turkey “will play a leading role in reshaping the alliance’s future.”

Analysis: While much of the international summit coverage will likely anchor on US Pres. Donald Trump and his actions, the Turkish government will seek out an increasingly central role in European defense discussions to prepare for a more Euro-centric “NATO 3.0,” as recently described by US Defense Sec. Pete Hegseth.

“Looking ahead, there are different models on how the European security architecture could evolve. The most likely model is a stronger European pillar within NATO,” said Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, the US German Marshall Fund’s managing director of south and wider Europe as well as regional director for Turkey.

“If that happens, Turkey would like to be part of that pillar, not outside of it,” Ünlühisarcıklı told Turkey recap.

Kallas when you’re ready: Turkey eyes EU ties, US jet deal

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• Jul 1

  • Erdoğan hosts a Catholic Bishops of Turkey delegation in Istanbul

  • Erdoğan hosts Kyrgyz FM Jeenbek Kulubayev in Istanbul

  • Fidan co-chairs the Seventh Meeting of the Turkey-Kyrgyzstan Joint Strategic Planning Group with Kyrgyz FM Jeenbek Kulubayev in Ankara

  • The CHP Congress trial resumes in Ankara

Read more

1 July

1926

• The Turkish Cabotage Law (Law No. 815) came into effect. By reserving all domestic maritime transport, port services and aquatic resource exploitation exclusively for Turkish-flagged vessels and Turkish citizens, it decisively abolished the Ottoman-era capitulations that had long c…

Read more

To dig into the contradictions and opportunities of deeper Turkey-EU defense cooperation, Turkey recap editor Diego Cupolo spoke to Dimitar Bechev, director of the Dahrendorf Programme at St. Antony’s College’s European Studies Centre and author of the upcoming book, The Scramble for Europe, and a Substack by the same name.

This podcast covers how Turkey’s growing weapons manufacturing base and geographic leverage on the Black Sea naval balance has boosted Ankara’s role in regional security while improving Turkey-EU relations following years of tensions and democratic backsliding that continues today.

Referenced in this talk:

Scramble for Europe: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenging Regional Order (Oxford University Press)

Türkiye: Crackdown Ahead of NATO Summit (Human Rights Watch)

NATO’s Turkey Paradox (Modern War Institute)

Turkey does its own thing (International Crisis Group)

The Black Sea Has Become the Fulcrum of Europe’s Security (Carnegie)

Other ways to watch & listen:

Our webcasts are also available on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts and other podcast players.

Ask us anything

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Get in touch at info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to produce balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

✅ Typos verify our humanity. All Turkey recap news output is created and fact-checked by people. Find our AI policy in our Code of Ethics.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Hilmi Hacaloğlu, Political correspondent

Gözde Ocak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager