In this week’s recap:

• AKP prepping for Nov. 2027 elections

• Yavaş in the spotlight, CHP shifts to fieldwork

• Horizon Europe debate further bruises Turkey-EU ties

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Göbeklitepe visitors are not impressed

Also from us this week:

• Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar on Turkey’s military and energy projects in Somalia

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped This Day In Turkey’s May edition for news tracking tools subscribers

Not a week goes by in Ankara without speculation over the next election date. It’s the local sport. It’s also a great conversation-starter when meeting strangers or when trying to revive a boring dinner date.

The heart beats faster for Turkish politics. Especially after Hürriyet reported Sunday the ruling AKP has already started preparing for elections in November 2027.

Turkey recap readers will know this was the most cited date for the next vote — slated for May 2028 at the latest — and the apparent confirmation by a leading pro-government newspaper serves to firm up the election date further.

Of course, other media outlets have made the case for election dates before and after Nov. 2027, including Turkey recap, so the following is a look at the current narratives and their merits.

What does the facts say: Turkey’s constitution allows two terms per president unless an early election is called or the constitution is changed.

For context, Pres. Erdoğan is currently serving his third term as president (elected in 2014, 2018 and 2023), but he is technically serving his second term under the executive presidential system that began in 2018, according to a Supreme Election Council decision.

Before that, he served as Prime Minister from 2003-2014, which also doesn’t count.

All that to say, Erdoğan is just facing his latest term limit dilemma, and it’s the AKP’s duty to fix it. But they don’t have the parliamentary votes to change the constitution again (at least for now), so calling an early election seems like the clearest path for a third Erdoğan term under the current legal system (subject to change).

What does the reporting say: Early elections can be held any time before May 2028. So, sources cited in the Hürriyet report said they want the next vote to coincide with the AKP’s 25^th anniversary in November 2027.

To read between the lines, this would be an emotional appeal to party supporters, who would need to take an extra psychological step to betray the AKP on such an occasion — regardless of the state of the economy. Think of it like a divorce on a wedding anniversary.

Yet, according to the BBC, an early election is not likely unless “absolutely necessary”, as might be the case if Erdoğan wants to secure the third term route. If so, the report states parliament could call for snap elections slightly before May 2028 to greenlight Erdoğan’s candidacy.

In a scenario where Turkey’s economy remains under pressure from the Iran war, other AKP sources told Türkiye Gazetesi that holding elections in the spring of 2028 would allow the party to “gain an extra 6-7 months” for economic mitigation policies.

Meanwhile, our team at Stüdyo recap reported, the AKP is publicly stating elections will be held in May 2028 as they prepare for elections in the second half of 2027. For their part, opposition sources told us they expect the AKP to introduce economic reforms, criminal justice reforms and other pre-election initiatives, though not until 2027.

Analysis: Seda Demiralp, a professor of political science and chair of international relations at Işık University in Istanbul, said the fact that both the incumbent bloc and the opposition are now openly entertaining early election scenarios makes the discussion more credible than before.

Given his mandate till May 2028, she said Erdoğan had little incentive to call for early elections, but the playing field is changing.

“Recent polling trends suggesting some recovery in support — possibly due to the rally around the flag effects of the Iran war — may be feeding a perception within the ruling camp that conditions are becoming more favorable,” Demiralp told Turkey recap.

She noted CHP chair Özgür Özel has also been calling for elections with greater frequency, adding pressure to the mix as the party’s presidential candidate and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu faces multiple trials.

“Early elections become more likely when both sides believe they have a viable path to victory,” Demiralp said. “We may be approaching such a moment.”

“That said,” she continued, “this window could be short-lived. If external factors — such as regional tensions involving Iran — subside and polling trends shift again, the current alignment of incentives could quickly dissolve.”

The Mansurian Candidate: Yavaş in the spotlight, CHP shifts to fieldwork

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47 years ago today: TRT’s first International Children’s Festival aired with great disco gyrations.

Happy National Sovereignty and Children’s Day from Ankara! (and Şanlıurfa!!)

In this week’s recap:

• Rutte visits Ankara, von der Leyen tests ties

• US envoy scorned for anti-democratic comments

• More CHP mayors removed from office

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Sheep joins wild goat herd, owner bids farewell

Also from us this week:

• Alan Makovsky gauges Ankara’s diplomacy pivot and US-Turkey ties on Recap radio

• Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu on ‘absolute nullity’ and possible developments for the CHP

EU leaders are supposed to praise Turkey publicly and exclude it privately. European Commission Pres. Ursula von der Leyen broke protocol and put the NATO chief in a rut during his visit to Ankara this week.

In a conversation with Germany’s Zeit newspaper published Sunday, Leyen said:

“We must succeed in completing the European continent so that it is not influenced by Russia, Turkey or China. We must think bigger and geostrategically.”

The unusual language for an official EU candidate country comes as European nations seek to deepen defense cooperation with Turkey to help deter Russian threats amid ambivalence from Washington on transatlantic security guarantees.

To call it awkward timing does not begin to describe the polarizing effects in Brussels, where the spotlight returned to the EU’s inconsistent messaging and lack of unity on Turkey as NATO Sec. Gen. Mark Rutte was in Ankara … to bolster the Western alliance with Turkey.

Reactions: Damage control duties first fell on Paula Pinho, von der Leyen’s chief spokesperson, who tried to clarify the remarks with variations of this quote:

The Turkey reference was a “recognition of its geopolitical clout, size and ambitions — not least in the Western Balkans — and not meant as a comparison with any other country,” Pinho told Bloomberg.

In response, AKP deputy chair and spox Ömer Çelik issued a long list of criticisms for EU leaders in this interview with Anadolu Agency Wednesday.

“Turkey’s Balkan vision is based on peace, opposed to the divisive policies we call Balkanization and is more based on values. For von der Leyen to include Turkey among the countries she positions as opposed to the EU is a truly grave mental and political contradiction,” Çelik said.

Von der Leyen’s comment also did not pair well with statements by Marta Kos, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, who Monday said: “We need Turkey in light of the changing geopolitical realities in Europe and the Middle East.”

Nacho Sánchez Amor, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey, was also critical. When asked if he thought the statements were intentional, he told Turkey recap:

“I don’t think von der Leyen purportedly wanted to depict Turkey as a threat on the same level as Russia and China, but if it is simply a misstep and not a mistake, it’s very enlightening about the attitude of von der Leyen — always dismissing and forgetting Turkey as a candidate country,” Amor said in a phone call Wednesday.

Rutte in Ankara: Local news channels covered the episode on a split screen as Rutte visited the Turkish capital this week in preparation for July’s NATO summit in Ankara — which got a new logo with the presidential palace on it, in what may be another unintended political message that offers deep insights on Turkey’s western partners.

While in town, Rutte met with Pres. Erdoğan, FM Hakan Fidan, Defense Min. Yaşar Güler and visited the facilities of Turkish defense giant Aselsan, where he praised the nation’s young engineers and ‘defense industry revolution’.

Analysis: Putting it all together, Turkey appears to be hedging on Europe by cooperating with Russia and China. Meanwhile, Europe is also hedging by both working with Turkey and taking precautions, said Dimitar Bechev, director of the Dahrendorf Programme at St. Antony’s College and author of the upcoming book The Scramble for Europe.

Bechev told Turkey recap that Ankara is pursuing “soft revisionism” with the end goal of having more power to modify the institutions and rules governing Europe. He noted this does not mean Ankara poses an existential threat to Europe.

“It [Turkey] seeks equal status and is against scrutiny into its domestic politics,” Bechev said, referring to the jailing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu and other political repression. “The EU’s response is to offer incentives for cooperation. Not fight back. Especially after Russia invaded Ukraine.”

He summed up the EU approach as an attempt to “Co-opt Erdoğan. Not contain him.”

Cooperation vs. candidacy: Asked to comment on what this all means for Turkey-EU defense cooperation, Nacho Sánchez Amor told Turkey recap:

A defense partnership “is convenient and could be important, but this idea that we need Turkey is exaggerated and it’s not depicting the real thing. Turkey has not been allowed to enter SAFE and nothing happened,” he said, referring to the EU defense program.

“Sometimes, we exaggerate … to compensate for the lack of commitment to the accession process,” Amor continued. “The more we underline the partnership … the less we underline the accession process and the status of Turkey as a candidate country.”

Show him the conquista-door: US envoy scorned for anti-democratic comments

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But why did he announce it with a picture from Greece? Email us wrong answers only.

In this week’s recap:

• Probes loom for CHP’s Ankara mayor

• Opposition playbook and election prospects

• Antalya to host security pact talks on Iran war

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• East Med broils over işkembe soup and halloumi

Also from us this week:

• László Szerencsés on the Hungary elections and takeaways for Turkey

• Ceren Bayar and Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu assess CHP’s by-election strategy on Stüdyo recap

There are many new readers here—Hoş geldin!—so here are four things you need to know about the judicial pressure on Turkey’s main opposition CHP:

1. After gains in the 2024 local elections, the CHP has faced sprawling corruption investigations for about 1.5 years.

2. Many elected CHP officials have been removed from office and/or jailed before standing trial.

3. Throughout, Erdoğan and the CHP have threatened to pull large turps out of bags (a Turkish vegetable idiom explained here).

4. The largest turp actually came out of Batman this week at just under 4 kilos.

Now that we’re all caught up, the next turp is taking shape with looming investigations into CHP Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş.

A popular figure with nationalist appeal, Yavaş is seen as a viable presidential contender after last year’s arrest of the CHP’s official candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu.

What happened: Interior Min. Mustafa Çiftçi authorized a second probe into Yavaş over the alleged misuse of Ankara Municipality vehicles for a 2023 election rally in Karabük. The Ankara mayor denied wrongdoing Tuesday, stating: “There is nothing to fear.”

“Granting permission for an investigation without concrete evidence is a violation of the law. This approach is nothing more than an attempt at intimidation and discrediting,” the Ankara municipality responded in a statement Tuesday.

CHP chair Özgür Özel added that Pres. Erdoğan has routinely made use of state vehicles and resources without similar inquiries.

For his part, Erdoğan criticized the CHP in a speech to AKP lawmakers Wednesday, saying:

“Turkey, which is experiencing a period of resurgence in global politics, is unfortunately experiencing a ‘period of decline’ in the municipalities run by the main opposition.”

Crackdown in context: The investigation into Turkey’s second-largest city comes amid a widening probe into its third largest, Izmir.

Former CHP Izmir mayor Tunç Soyer was re-arrested Wednesday after the party’s Ankara provincial chair Ümit Erkol was arrested after his detention last week. Both arrests are linked to bribery allegations involving IZBETON, a subsidiary of the Izmir municipality.

For the full picture, here’s a few more news items on the CHP this week:

• Bolu’s acting mayor was detained Friday and later arrested for an ongoing extortion investigation that jailed Bolu’s elected mayor in February.

• 31 people were detained Friday for a corruption probe into the CHP-led Yenişehir district municipality in Mersin.

• Bornova Mayor Ömer Eşki was released Friday though his municipality remains under investigation for alleged fraud.

• Former CHP chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was sentenced to nearly a year in prison for insulting the president. His lawyer vowed to appeal the verdict.

• And the European Court of Human Rights notified Turkey of a case brought by Ekrem Imamoğlu regarding his pre-trial detention and investigations.

Analysis: Commenting on the investigations into Yavaş and other CHP officials, Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute, said the key issue is “not so much their legal substance, but their political impact.”

“These cases function in two main ways. First, they damage the reputations of political figures, regardless of the eventual legal outcome,” Korkmaz told Turkey recap this morning.

“Second, even in the absence of a conviction, they can paralyze these actors—either by keeping them entangled in lengthy legal processes or, in some cases, through temporary detention. In this sense, the process itself becomes the punishment.”

She continued, stating the trajectory of the Yavaş investigation will be determined primarily through the government’s own “risk calculations.”

“More broadly, these judicial processes … constrain political actors by discouraging bold action, and they contribute to shaping public perception—reinforcing a narrative that no one within the CHP is ‘clean’,” Korkmaz added.

“In that sense, they operate as instruments of political control as much as legal proceedings.”

Process of alleviation: Opposition playbook and election prospects

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And more recently with the unfortunate 2007 film ‘300’, which had no links to the ‘War on Terror’, just like this newsletter has no links to the war on Iran.

Thank you to all our readers and contributors over the years. This is a shared milestone, reached through a shared dedication to balanced, trustworthy news—and puns.

In this week’s recap:

• 198 IS suspects detained over Israeli Consulate gunfight

• Ankara repositions itself amid regional turmoil

• CHP faces one court battle after another

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Police week brings flowers and fake fights

Also from us this week:

• Howard Eissenstat details the Turkey-Israel rivalry in a changing region on Recap radio

• Journalist Hilmi Hacaloğlu shares updates from the Istanbul Municipality trial on Stüdyo recap

Turkey’s recent experience with militant attacks is long, and another one got added to the list as regional turmoil appears to have played out in Istanbul once again this week.

Midday Tuesday, three armed militants in tactical gear attempted to attack a building housing the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul, resulting in a gun fight that left one attacker dead, the other two wounded and two police officers with minor injuries.

No motive has been publicized, and no Israeli staff were in the consulate, as they had been recalled in late 2023. Yet, initial reporting indicates the deceased attacker had Islamic State links.

Investigations ongoing: Turkish Justice Min. Akın Gürlek Wednesday announced a nationwide anti-IS operation, detaining 198 suspects in relation to the attack.

This comes as the two injured assailants remain in police custody, and new details emerge about the deceased attacker, who was identified as Yunus Emre Sarban.

Halk TV columnist Ismail Saymaz reported in detail about Sarban, who was charged with “IS membership” in 2019 on suspicion of preparing an attack, but was released after five months.

Sarban’s assets were later frozen in 2021 over links to IS financial networks and reactivated in August 2024 following his acquittal. The other two attackers were brothers and one had a criminal record for a drug offense, according to the interior minister.

Separately, Turkey’s personal care retail chain, Gratis, launched its own investigation and fired several employees for apparently ridiculing police responders during the attack and posting the video on social media. Eight Gratis staffers have been detained.

Responses: Like US envoy to Turkey Tom Barrack, Pres. Erdoğan quickly condemned the attack, adding: “We will not allow Turkey’s climate of security to be damaged by … provocations.”

Israel’s Foreign Ministry also condemned the event in a statement, while sharing appreciation for “Turkish security forces’ swift action in thwarting this attack.”

“The incident, coupled with Israel’s gratitude for the swift response of Turkish security forces, underscores a zero-tolerance policy regarding terrorist threats against Jewish or Israeli targets on Turkish soil,” Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told Turkey recap.

She added, “The incident also highlights that limited tactical cooperation between Israel and Turkey is still possible, and that ISIS remains a threat to Turkey.”

Advantage point: Ankara repositions itself amid regional turmoil

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No party like it’s 2002? You know those were different times.

In this week’s recap:

• CHP weighs options after detention wave

• Ankara works to mitigate Iran conflict

• MHP resignation spotlights power struggle

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Izmir serves olive oil on tap (bring your own bread)

Also from us this week:

• Sinan Ülgen outlined how Ankara views the Iran war on Recap radio

• Our April editions of This day in Turkey and the Events calendar are now available for News Tracking Tools subscribers

In theory, people vote for political representation. In practice, one in five votes has been misrepresented since the 2024 municipal elections in Turkey. Some stats:

• 30 elected mayors or co-mayors, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been removed from office since the March 31, 2024 vote.

• 13 state-appointed trustees currently run municipalities in Turkey.

• 55 municipalities are run by parties not elected by voters due to party transfers and other changes.

In sum, the will of nearly 9 million voters in Turkey “has been disregarded”, the municipal and local government workers’ union (TÜM-BEL SEN) stated in their detailed analysis of “anti-labor and anti-democracy interventions”.

The figures come two years after the main opposition CHP led the 2024 vote. The party now faces its latest wave of corruption investigations, and CHP chair Özgür Özel is threatening to trigger early elections to safeguard Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş.

What’s happening: Yavaş, a popular nationalist and potential CHP presidential candidate, is expected to face a new corruption investigation as soon as this week. That’s what MPs from all parties were discussing in parliament this week and their evidence may be rumors, but they see a clear trend emerging in recent headlines.

1. CHP Uşak Mayor Özkan Yalım was arrested and removed from office Tuesday on bribery charges. Leaked police footage showed the mayor was detained while in a hotel room with a young municipal employee—which led to his suspension from the CHP and drew an apology from party leadership.

2. CHP Bursa Mayor Mustafa Bozbey was detained with 55 associates Tuesday in a corruption investigation on Bozbey’s term as mayor of Nilüfer—which ended in 2019. Bursa is Turkey’s 4th-largest city with about 2.5 million residents, some of whom protested the operation Tuesday night.

3. Ankara is back in the spotlight after 4 Etimesgut municipal workers were detained Monday on charges of “embezzlement” in the CHP-led district of Ankara. This comes as reports point to new evidence Yavaş misused public funds for concerts, fueling concerns of a looming operation on the Ankara municipality.

For those keeping score, this all comes as Imamoğlu notched a new investigation and Ankara’s Keçiören district mayor, who was elected under the CHP, is expected to join the AKP.

CHP response: In a presser Tuesday, Özel acknowledged pressure was growing on the opposition party and that western governments “tolerate” the AKP’s strategy of “eliminating its rivals” to maintain stable relations with Ankara amid regional instability.

Statements and reporting since then indicate the CHP may attempt to trigger elections through a coordinated resignation of its own MPs.

In theory, Turkish parliament must call snap elections if 5 percent of seats are vacant (30 MPs). Though again, in practice, MP resignations must be approved by the parliament, where the ruling AKP-MHP block holds the majority vote.

Speaking Wednesday, Pres. Erdoğan characterized Özel’s statements as “reckless” and the party as morally bankrupt before linking it to the nation’s long history with coups.

“Coup plotting is the character, spirit and identity of the CHP. Supporting coups and coup plotters is the CHP’s national sport,” Erdoğan said.

Analysis: Asked why the CHP is facing a new onslaught of investigations, Edgar Şar, co-founder and co-director at the IstanPol Institute, offered two possibilities:

1. The CHP, with its regular rallies and political activities, presents an “effective” opposition challenge that threatens the AKP’s “grip on power,” he said.

2. The new Justice Min. Akın Gürlek has expanded his previous work as Chief Public Prosecutor of Istanbul—where he initiated proceedings against Imamoğlu—and Gürlek is now targeting opposition figures nationwide, he added.

Moving forward, Şar suggested the CHP would need to be “much more creative” because “any popular objection” to the status quo is getting criminalized by the state.

“Many people really feel like they have no exits. They think that they are left with nothing to effectively object to what’s going on,” Şar told Turkey recap.

Speaking on the prospects of a snap election, he said: “The earlier the elections, the better for [the CHP].”

Though Şar underlined public opinion is difficult to measure, adding he believed that high polarization has “frozen” voter shares along party lines. And that was before the high uncertainty brought by the war in Iran.

“The more polarized the political atmosphere becomes, the more tolerant AKP voters will become towards the economic hardship and everything that’s going on,” Şar said.

“So, when you also take the Iran war into consideration—where I think it’s fair to expect a certain amount of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect—I think we will not see a very big margin in favor of CHP anytime soon in the polls.”

Done four: Ankara works to mitigate Iran conflict

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In this week’s recap:

• Turkey-Israel rivalry heats up again

• Migration and mediation top Ankara’s war response

• New messaging on the PKK peace talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Fat cats find a home in Turkish parliament

Also from us this week:

• Diego Cupolo and Emily Rice Johnson answered reader mail on Recap radio

The good news is that regional warfare mostly excluded Turkey this week—apart from a drone strike on a Turkish tanker in the Black Sea this morning and a stray naval drone washing up in Ordu Saturday.

The bad news is that Turkey remains highly exposed to regional instability as a growing rhetorical spat with Israel deepens anxieties.

As recap readers know, Israel-Turkey relations relapsed after Oct. 7 and the war in Gaza. In more recent weeks, leaders in both countries have exchanged threats, giving rise to phrases like “Turkey is the next Iran,” which it’s not, as Bobby Ghosh and most other analysts argue.

Still, the words are real even if AI-generated videos aren’t helping the situation.

What happened: Speaking on the first day of Eid al-Fitr Friday, Pres. Erdoğan said: “[May God,] in the name of his glorious name ‘Al-Kahhar’ [The Subduer] utterly destroy Israel.”

He added, “This Zionist Israel, as is known, has massacred hundreds, thousands of people … I have no doubt that it will pay the price for this.”

It’s nothing new for long-time Turkey watchers. Last Eid, Erdoğan shared a similar message and, in April 2024, he called for the utter destruction of “these Zionists, starting with Netanyahu.”

This may help explain Israel PM Netanyahu’s recent remarks about creating a “hexagon of alliances” to counter the “emerging radical Sunni axis,” which is understood to include Turkey. But the story goes back further and could extend much longer into the future.

Analysis: The Israeli sense that Erdoğan is “implacably anti-Israel” goes back to 2009, the year of the “one-minute” spat at Davos, explained Howard Eissenstat, Laurentian associate professor at St. Lawrence University.

Eissenstat, who published a new analysis on the Turkey-Israel rivalry, told Turkey recap that messaging on both sides is mostly for “domestic consumption” but underlined “the stories we tell ourselves matter.”

“In this case, we run the risk that Israeli and Turkish officials are cementing the idea that they are natural rivals in a zero sum game for power in the region,” he said.

“I don’t envision Israel and Turkey intentionally entering armed conflict,” Eissenstat continued. “But in the long term, we have two powers that see themselves as defining the region that have manifestly demonstrated their willingness to project power beyond their borders.”

He added that if both nations continue to see each other as rivals rather than partners, “then that points to a direction of potential conflict. And it could be indirect, it could be direct. For example, we already see the potential for proxy conflict in places like Syria.”

Regional reper-concussions: Migration and mediation top Ankara war response

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Ask us anything about Turkey and Turkey recap with this form or simply reply to this email. We’ll respond next week.

In this week’s recap:

• Opposition leader targets justice minister

• Turkey joins call on Iran to halt attacks

• Conflict alters peace process, election calendar

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Race horse served as mane course

Also from us this week:

• Yaman Akdeniz details the proposed social media regulations

• Lahib Higel on how the Iran war is reshaping Turkey-Iraq ties

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson recaps Turkey-Iraq pipeline news

After more than a year of judicial investigations into the CHP, the party’s chair did his own investigation into the justice minister, who then responded with more investigations.

That’s the plot of our lives here in Turkey, broadcast daily on a screen near you under the tentative title: Turnip the heat.

For reference, Turp means turnip or radish in Turkish. And the vegetable is the root of many CHP messages this week, the context of which you can read here.

The assets: In a presser Tuesday, CHP chair Özgür Özel alleged the justice minister acquired and/or sold properties with a total value of 452 million liras or about $10 million—a sum difficult to earn through a civil servant salary, he argued.

“There is an inexplicable accumulation of wealth,” Özel said while reviewing 12 property deeds allegedly held by the minister (available here).

Justice Min. Akın Gürlek quickly denied the claims on X, stating he would file a lawsuit for moral damages. The next day, Gürlek pushed back further, saying he owned four properties, and that as the former chief public prosecutor of Istanbul, he was required to declare his assets regularly.

The same day, reporting by Halk TV Wednesday indicated the public officials who conducted search queries on Gürlek’s properties had been identified and that legal action might be taken against them.

Berk Esen, an associate professor of political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul, said Özel’s allegations were significant, if accurate, and would be used by the opposition party to discredit ongoing investigations into the party.

“This is a strategy on the part of Özel to really hit hard at the government, to show that he still has some fight in him,” Esen told Turkey recap. “What that leads to remains to be seen. I don’t think the government is going to retreat.”

“Such allegations are risky in the sense that they are going to further harden the government to come after the CHP,” he continued. “We’re looking at constant fights between the two sides with no sign of any kind of moderation [ahead].”

The pressure: The news comes as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu marks one year in jail today, on a wide variety of charges detailed by Stüdyo recap. Also the CHP’s presidential candidate, Imamoğlu stood trial in the second week of the Istanbul Municipality case.

Özel led a rally at the city’s main municipality building Wednesday night, though the milestone week for the CHP crackdown was punctuated by the arrest of Kuşadası Mayor Ömer Günel, who was suspended from office on corruption charges Tuesday.

There’s also ongoing investigations in Antalya’s Manavgat district, where 12 of 36 affiliates detained last week were arrested. Speaking of Antalya, it’s worth noting an informant apologized this week for issuing false statements against that municipality.

The takeaway: Esen told Turkey recap the arrest of Imamoğlu and the ongoing targeting of CHP figures represents the “biggest authoritarian escalation that we’ve had from a civilian government since the 1950s.”

Characterizing the jailing of Imamoğlu as an attempted death blow to the opposition’s electoral prospects, Berk noted public opinion polls show mixed views on Imamoğlu’s case.

“Public opinion has not been swayed by any of these developments,” Esen said, referring to new corruption allegations against CHP figures.

“That may not mean much at this point … but in the medium to long term, this is going to be a huge problem [for the government] … and I don’t see how it can change this one year into the case because public opinion usually hardens, and it’s difficult to persuade people who think this is a political trial.”

Don’t withstand so close to me: Turkey joins call on Iran to halt attacks

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In this week’s recap:

• Turkey’s airspace violated again, NATO boosts defenses

• Calculations on Kurdish ground forces

• Istanbul municipality corruption trial underway

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Anti-war Sánchez sparks Turkey-Spain meme flood

Also from us:

• Help us prepare our first Q&A podcast: Submit any question about Turkey or Turkey recap by replying to this email or through this form

• Ezgi Başaran discussed how the Iran war impacts the Turkey-PKK peace talks on Recap radio

“S-400” was trending on social media in Ankara this morning, meaning it’s high time for air defense systems — as South Korea found out this week.

And while it may never be the right time to test the Russian-made missiles that caused a rift between Turkey and its allies, the Iran war has confirmed the Daft Punk maxim: Turkey is NATO after all.

What happened: NATO defense systems were deployed and strengthened in Turkey this week as the Iran war continues and a second missile was intercepted in approach of Turkish airspace Monday.

Some debris landed in Gaziantep without injury or damage, according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry. Falling fragments were also reported in Diyarbakır, also without injury, though with less details.

Like the first incident on March 4, this week’s missile may have targeted assets used by NATO forces in Turkey, namely the Incirlik air base in Adana and the Kürecik radar station in Malatya.

In response, NATO deployed a Patriot missile interceptor system in Malatya, the Turkish Defense Ministry announced Tuesday, following a NATO spox Allison Hart statement on X reading: “NATO stands firm in its readiness to defend all Allies against any threat.”

Prior to Monday’s missile incident, the US State Department ordered non-emergency US government employees and their family members to leave the Adana Consulate “out of an abundance of caution.”

Reactions: Turkish FM Fidan, who has worked to deescalate the conflict through diplomatic contacts with Iran, said the airspace violation was “unacceptable” in a phone call with Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi Monday.

For his part, Araghchi denied the missiles directed at Turkey airspace originated from Iran and said he would investigate the issue, according to Anadolu Agency.

Speaking to AKP lawmakers Wednesday, Pres. Erdoğan said Ankara continued efforts to reach diplomatic solutions through contact with Iran, the US and regional nations.

“This war must be stopped before it escalates and completely engulfs the region in flames,” Erdoğan said. “If diplomacy is given a chance, it is quite possible to achieve this.”

Analysis: Gönül Tol, director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, outlined four major concerns for Ankara in her latest analysis of the Iran conflict. Speaking to Turkey recap Wednesday, she said Turkish officials expect the war to “drag on for months” despite US Pres. Trump’s statements suggesting the end is near.

Tol said her sources in Ankara believe the attacks may create a “more belligerent, more militaristic regime” in Iran and that neither the US nor Israel have “achieved their aims in the war.”

The outcome is a “belt of chaos stretching from Syria to Afghanistan,” the sources said, which Tol characterized as a “grave danger and threat if you’re sitting in Ankara.”

Asked how Turkey’s government might be calibrating to fast-paced developments in its neighborhood, Tol responded: “I think they are banking on the prospect that Trump’s and Netanyahu’s goals might diverge.”

She added the mid-term question remains whether Israel can sustain the war without the current level of US involvement, stating there is potential for a protracted, low-intensity conflict across the region.

“All it takes is for Iran or Iranian proxies to just launch a drone or missile to disrupt traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. So, even a low-intensity conflict is going to be problematic,” Told said.

The Kurdish quest qualm: Calculations on Kurdish ground forces

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Announcement: Emily and I are hosting a Q&A podcast to mark the first anniversary of Recap radio! Send us questions using this anonymous form and we’ll respond soon.

In times of crisis, UNK principles advise us to talk it out.

In this week’s recap:

• Iran war impacts and scenarios for Ankara

• Defense concerns in Turkey

• Kurdish incursion may upend PKK talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Trump’s self-proclaimed Turkish daughter makes news again

Also from us this week:

• Report: Daniel Thorpe on how Iranians in Turkey are experiencing recent events

• Podcast: Hürcan Aslı Aksoy on the war’s implications for the Turkey-Israel rivalry

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson on the Turkish market effects in Economy recap

It’s been a while since we had this kind of war. The fog is real and social media—like high beams—can make things worse. Here’s a useful AP guide of what happened in each impacted country.

The following is a breakdown of Turkey-related news, prospects and implications stemming from the Iran war:

Official statements: Turkish Pres. Erdoğan Monday condemned US-Israel strikes as a “clear violation of ​international law”. The same day AKP spox Ömer Çelik offered more comments, stating recent US-Iran negotiations had been “completely abandoned” for a “ pre-planned attack.”

On Sunday, Erdoğan extended his condolences to the people of Iran following the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in airstrikes.

Border security: The three Turkey-Iran border gates have seen light traffic since the conflict began Saturday, according to news reports.

Noting there was “no extraordinary situation”, Trade Min. Ömer Bolat announced Monday that “same-day passenger crossings at all three customs gates have been mutually suspended.”

Speaking Tuesday, FM Hakan Fidan said Iran was not allowing its own citizens to cross the border. Then Wednesday, Interior Min. Mustafa Çiftçi repeated that claim, adding Turkish nationals in Iran—an estimated 20,000—and third-country citizens were allowed to exit Iran.

Çiftçi added that 5,010 people entered Turkey ​from March 1-3, and that tent camps would be prepared near the border if traffic increases in the coming period.

Airspace security: Unlike neighboring states, Turkey has reported just one near-airspace violation since Saturday. Analysts link this to the NATO umbrella, and the escalation risk carried by any strike on Turkey. (covered in detail below)

That said, an Iranian missile approaching Turkish airspace through Syria and Iraq was shot down by a US navy ship Wednesday, causing debris to fall in Turkey’s Hatay province without reported injuries.

A Turkish official told AFP the missile was “aimed at a base in Greek Cyprus but veered off course”. While a US official told the Wall Street Journal the missile was targeting Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which hosts US forces and nuclear weapons.

Before publication today, Iran’s military denied firing a missile at Turkey.

Analysis: Güney Yıldız, a senior advisor on geopolitics and strategic insights at Anthesis Group, has been covering developments for Forbes Magazine. In written responses to Turkey recap, he laid out three scenarios for Iran and Ankara:

1. Consolidation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which Yıldız said is Turkey’s preferred outcome though its probability decreases daily. In this scenario, surviving IRGC members form a pragmatic government, Fidan maintains intelligence contacts, Turkey maintains energy contracts with Iran and Kurdish-populated border areas are managed bilaterally. The problem: “Every additional day of strikes thins the [IRGC] bench further,” he said.

2. Extended conflict and a degraded but surviving state. This is the most likely medium-term outcome, according to Yıldız. “In this scenario, Turkey faces a more expensive version of the status quo. The bilateral relationship becomes harder to manage, not because Iran is hostile to Turkey, but because there’s no single counterpart to manage it with … Ankara’s balancing act [with NATO] becomes harder to sustain but not impossible … [while] energy exposure is the most concrete problem.”

3. State fragmentation, the low probability-high consequence outcome. Yıldız wrote: “Iran’s governance fractures along provincial, ethnic and institutional lines. No single authority controls the border regions. Kurdish armed organizations, Azeri ethnic movements and IRGC remnants operate independently. The refugee scenario escalates to millions.”
   

   “This is the scenario Turkey’s playbook was never designed for,” he continued. “It would require a fundamental rewrite of Turkish foreign policy from managing a rival state to managing a failing one. The Syrian template partially applies … but Iran is not Syria.”

In sum: Yıldız wrote Ankara plans for Scenario 2 while hoping for Scenario 1 and contingency-planning for elements of Scenario 3. Across all three: “Turkey’s interest in a coherent Iranian state doesn’t change.”

The writhing on the wall: Defense concerns in Turkey

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The best part is the beekeeper’s stated goal aligns with ours: To bring “a sweet taste to politics.” We’re open to a merch partnership if anyone has this guy’s contact info.

In this week’s recap:

• PKK peace process shifts gears

• US Turkey and Syria envoy busy in Iraq

• Ankara treads carefully amid US-Iran talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Scientists develop tomatoes for moon farms

Also from us this week:

• Amy Austin Holmes outlines post-ceasefire dynamics in Syria on Recap radio

• DEM’s Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit discusses the peace process on our Turkish podcast

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped our “This day in Turkey: March” edition, now available for news tracking tools subscribers

With its report filed and The Smurfs set to broadcast in Kurdish, the parliamentary peace commission mandate has come to an end. Now the real work begins.

But the next steps in the Turkey-PKK peace process* remain unclear after various hints at possible openings and obstacles for the road ahead—as is characteristic of most statements by MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli, including the one he delivered Tuesday.

*Disclosure: This is your regular reminder that my wife is a DEM Party MP.

What happened: In his party’s parliamentary group meeting, Bahçeli simultaneously introduced three areas for progress and three areas for problems in advancing the peace process. Here’s a breakdown of what he said:

1. Legal regulations should be implemented “swiftly and transparently.” Though only after a “criteria” for monitoring the PKK disarmament is established, which may not be so swift.

2. The “two Ahmets” should be reinstated after a “re-evaluation” of the trustee system—in reference to Mardin Mayor Ahmet Türk and Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer, who were removed from office on investigations that have since concluded.

3. The “status” of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan should be “addressed”. He did not define what this means, but added the Kurdish rights movement’s umbrella organization, the KCK, must also dissolve as part of the peace process.

Pres. Erdoğan also weighed in during his AKP group speech Wednesday, stating the parliament would take a driving role “in the new phase” of the process and that no nation should “give us a lesson in minority rights”. See above: The Smurfs.

Response: Clarifying some of the above, veteran DEM politician Ahmet Türk told the BBC that Öcalan doesn’t expect to be released from Imralı, but improved prison conditions such as increased contact with “his organization” would “contribute to a permanent peace.”

“The important thing is for the government’s thoughts on the solution to the Kurdish issue to come to light. There is no need to twist or bend this matter,” Türk said.

“The government has a majority in parliament. If they wish, legal arrangements can be made, brought to the parliament’s agenda and the appropriate steps can be taken.”

A Milliyet report Wednesday potentially offered more clarifications, citing draft legislation that would first redefine “effective repentance” laws for PKK members involved in crimes and, second, issue a new regulation on prison sentences that would apply to PKK members.

Analysis: Speaking to Turkey recap this morning, Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute, said the public has high expectations for tangible steps in the process, according to survey data and her own recent fieldwork in Diyarbakır.

“The initial cautious optimism has gradually shifted into cautious pessimism,” Korkmaz said. “What could restore trust are visible and implementable measures.”

Potential steps include the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Constitutional Court rulings, as highlighted in last week’s recap. Ending the trustee practices and reinstating elected mayors could also serve as “concrete actions” to strengthen public confidence in the process, she said.

“While broader legislative reforms or return mechanisms may follow, rebuilding trust through these immediate steps is the primary requirement for sustaining societal backing,” Korkmaz said.

Regarding Bahçeli’s role in the process, she added he tends to introduce “politically sensitive ideas” to test public reactions and “expand the boundaries of debate,” but:

“His statements should be read less as isolated provocations and more as calibrated signals—potentially preparing the ground for subsequent steps,” Korkmaz told Turkey recap, stating the moves suggest a deliberate “role-sharing” within the ruling bloc.

“However, this does not resemble a pluralistic or broadly participatory peace architecture. Instead, it appears to be a tightly managed process conducted primarily among Erdoğan, Bahçeli and Öcalan, with political recalibration unfolding accordingly.”

Up next: DEM Party will mark the one-year anniversary of Öcalan’s Feb. 27 disarmament call by releasing a new statement from the PKK leader tomorrow.

This follows a meeting Tuesday between Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş and DEM Party leaders. Kurtulmuş has now met with all major parties to discuss the next steps. More details on those next week, inshallah.

Barrack around Iraq: US Turkey and Syria envoy busy in Iraq

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And in Fatih, rose water joined the preparations. Ramadan Mubarak to all who celebrate.

In this week’s recap:

• Vague report advances PKK peace process

• Öcalan calls for “Democratic Integration”

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Turkey trades horses for horsepower

Also from us this week:

• Ioannis Grigoriadis joined Recap radio to review Turkey-Greece relations

• Wouter Massink explains Turkey’s cost of living crisis with seven charts

• And those who want more can subscribe to our daily newsletter on Turkish politics

Like your average Netflix series, the Turkey-PKK peace process released another episode with just enough content to keep us watching, but without delivering a sense of fulfillment or satisfaction for just about anyone.

The parliamentary peace commission voted Wednesday to approve a report laying the theoretical groundwork for legal reforms. The move advances a process seeking to end Turkey’s longest-running conflict, but the text falls short of addressing the causes and practical remedies for the nation’s so-called “Kurdish issue”.*

And let’s not forget the irony of debating democratic reforms while the nation’s main opposition candidate is in jail for a dozen-or-so investigations.

*Disclosure: Before we start, let me repeat that my wife is a DEM Party MP.

The report text begins by notably reframing the peace process not as an initiative brought to parliament by MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli on Oct. 1, 2024 —the common media narrative—but as one introduced a few days earlier by Pres. Erdoğan at Malazgirt.

Transferring credit to the Turkish leader alone increases the likelihood of success for the process. The question of what exactly the process aims to achieve, though, remains undefined by the report, which might be normal considering the sensitivity of the issue. Here’s a review of the text:

• Included: Many references to preserving the security and integrity of the Republic. The most concrete sections (5,6 and 7) establish the need to disarm and reintegrate PKK militants while also introducing legal and democratic reforms.

• Excluded: References to a “Kurdish issue” and the “right to hope”—or early release from life sentences—as well as peace process norms like international mediators, a truth and reconciliation commission, an implementation commission, missing persons units and references to mother tongue education, which is the core of the “Kurdish issue”.

Throughout, mentions of the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds are present, likely to avoid appearances of favoring one group over the other.

The text is a balancing act, and close observers will have heard much of it before, but one more point worth noting (section 7.1) is the emphasis on strengthening mechanisms “to ensure full compliance” with European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings, which has implications for jailed Kurdish politicians and many others.

A day prior, in a complicated X post, MHP deputy chair Feti Yıldız referenced compliance with ECHR rulings as a possible bridge to “conditional release” (a term he prefers over the “right to hope”) for certain prisoners in relation to the peace process. But everything depends on how legal frameworks are crafted and applied.

Reactions: Today’s Stüdyo recap has a comprehensive breakdown of the responses to the report, which was approved on a 47-2 vote with one abstention.

CHP MP Türkan Elçi said she abstained because the report did not include provisions for investigating unsolved murders. Meanwhile, TIP MP Ahmet Şık voted “no”, stating:

“There is a Kurdish issue in Turkey. A political mindset that denies this reality is now presenting us with claims of a solution.”

For their part, DEM Party released a statement Wednesday arguing the Kurdish issue cannot be defined through “terrorism”. Put more simply, their argument is that a political problem (denial of Kurdish rights and language) created a terrorism problem, and not the other way around.

PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s reply is analyzed in detail below, but to wrap this section, Erdoğan pointed to the road ahead in a statement Wednesday:

“Now, discussions on the legal aspects of the process will begin in our parliament,” the Turkish leader said. Lawmakers told AFP deliberations would likely begin after Ramadan.

Analysis: Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, a senior fellow at Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), said the next steps may involve legal measures to regulate the return of disarmed PKK members to Turkey as well as the release of sick and elderly prisoners.

Elected officials may also be reinstated in some Kurdish-led municipalities currently managed by state-appointed trustees. Though she noted the full implementation of civil liberties will be difficult.

“For the compliance with ECHR rulings, the implementations were applied arbitrarily, so isolated positive steps are insufficient,” Aksoy told Turkey recap. “What is required is a change in practice.”

As things stand, PKK militants anticipate reciprocity for disarmament while opponents of their reintegration hold doubts towards pledges for peace and democratization. Aksoy underlined the tension between the expectations and limitations of the government in the coming period.

“A lack of communication can fuel nationalist backlash on one side and disillusionment on the other, increasing the risk of renewed escalation,” she said. “For permanent progress, institutionalization, transparency, inclusion of civil society and a shift from conflict management to political transformation are needed.”

Regarding DEM Party’s role, Aksoy said politicians must “clearly explain” their expectations for cultural rights and democratic participation.

“This means, [in addition to] presenting the demands of the Kurdish people, explaining those to the rest of the society and establishing monitoring mechanisms,” she continued. “But it’s a very challenging task in the shrinking political space under an authoritarian governance.”

Go deeper: Öcalan calls for “Democratic Integration”

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In this week’s recap:

• Regional security concerns revive EU-Turkey talks

• New ministers signal more crackdowns ahead

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Canned comms chief heading to Vatican?

Also from us this week:

• Reha Ruhavioğlu outlines how Syria affects the PKK peace talks (in Turkish)

• Nimet Kıraç on how slow job growth is stalling earthquake recovery in Hatay

• It’s prime time to follow Turkish politics and, yes, we have a daily newsletter for that

EU-Turkey ties were defined by problems until larger problems took precedence. Meaning, Turkey’s stalled accession bid is getting compartmentalized into more manageable frameworks based on defense and trade cooperation as European leaders prioritize regional security.

The shift came Friday, personified in a meeting between Turkish FM Hakan Fidan and EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, and verbalized in a joint statement reading:

“Both sides recognized that enhancing collaboration in areas of mutual interest, including security and connectivity, is of strategic importance in light of ongoing regional and global developments.”

Considerations driving the new approach include but are not limited to:

1. Washington’s reduced or, at least, ambivalent role in EU security

2. Dangerous wargame projections for a hypothetical Russian invasion in the Baltics

3. Turkey’s significant contributions to ongoing NATO military exercises in Europe

4. Ankara’s perennial reminders that it has options and remains BRICS-curious

Urgency has arrived after 12 years of war in Ukraine and 12 months of Trump 2.0. And like any last-minute dinner, a quick fix involves defrosting EU-Turkey relations, not with a microwave, but with promises of Customs Union modernization, more multiple-entry Schengen visas plus increased trade and connectivity.

“Preparing for peace and stability in Europe implies preparing a strong partnership with Türkiye,” Kos told Politico before the meeting last week.

The imagery is impressive, too. NATO is holding Steadfast Dart 2026 drills in Germany with about 10,000 service personnel from 11 nations, including Turkey, which dispatched 2,000 forces and the TCG Anadolu navy ship with the 66th Mechanized Infantry Brigade inside.

Analysis: Taken together, the above developments signal the EU’s growing willingness to engage with Ankara beyond the accession framework, said Riccardo Gasco, foreign policy program coordinator at the IstanPol Institute and co-author of a recent report on just that.

“I think [accession] is being left out of the conversation on purpose right now because everyone knows that it doesn’t bring you anywhere,” Gasco told Turkey recap. “So they started to talk about different things.”

Those include bilateral defense deals instead of EU-wide initiatives like the SAFE program, he said, listing recent agreements between Turkish firms and Italy, Spain, Portugal and Poland. Yet, a potential downside of such fragmentation is the lack of an institutional mechanism to track bilateral deals, Gasco noted.

What happens next depends on the details of the current EU-Turkey thaw. Following the bloc’s recent trade agreements with Mercosur and India, Gasco said EU officials were almost obligated to visit Turkey and extend an offer focused on mutual needs.

“What I see [coming] is some small advancements in some select areas, which will maybe build a base to then open a serious discussion on the Customs Union,” he continued.

“But right now, this is a movie we have already watched, in a way. Whenever the European Union feels unable to deal with pressing issues, it reaches out to partners, right? And one of those partners is definitely Turkey.”

Clockwork Arraign: New ministers signal more crackdowns ahead

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And this Justin Bieber hairline gag is brought to you by the strongest Ryanair social media crew.

In this week’s recap:

• Ankara pushes for US-Iran diplomacy

• Syria ceasefire deal followed by energy deal

• Turkey-PKK peace talks to move on

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• What the Epstein files say about Turkey

Also from us this week:

• EP rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor discussed EU-Turkey ties on our podcast

• Diego Cupolo on how AI slop will create new jobs for young journalists

As we face another war, US Pres. Donald Trump’s threats sound a lot like that Jace Everett song. Indeed, Trump wants to do “bad things” to Iran if a deal is not reached soon, and Turkey is uncomfortably close to the action.

US ships are amassing in the Middle East. Military strikes are in the cards if Tehran doesn’t accept US demands. Also, the US downed an Iranian drone Tuesday, meaning the US and Tehran are well down the path to escalation. And Ankara wants none of this because of the potential repercussions for the region.

The view from Ankara: Turkey offered to moderate negotiations, and Istanbul was expected to host US-Iran talks Friday until they were moved to Oman. Top Ankara officials have been pushing for de-escalation for weeks, most notably FM Hakan Fidan, who hosted his Iranian counterpart last Friday while calling for diplomacy.

For his part, Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi appeared on CNN TÜRK the same day, delivering a message for peace in his own way:

“When I say we are prepared for war, it should not be interpreted as meaning we want war. On the contrary, our aim is to prevent war,” Araghchi said.

Speaking Wednesday from Cairo, Pres. Erdoğan made his anti-war stance clear, as well:

“Foreign interventions in our neighbor, Iran, will pose significant risks to the entire region. Solving the problems with Iran through diplomacy, including the nuclear dossier, will be the most accurate method,” Erdoğan said in a joint presser with Pres. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

Analysis: Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, recently published a comprehensive look at Turkey’s calculations with Iran amid regional tensions, and what a weakened government in Tehran might mean for the Turkey-Israeli rivalry.

He argues the Turkey-Iran modus vivendi is fragile and Ankara’s capacity to “shape outcomes in its immediate neighborhood” is limited.

In light of those dynamics, Grinberg told Turkey recap Ankara had sought to gain leverage to shape fast-moving developments by offering to host US-Iran negotiations, but that didn’t work. One reason, he said, might have been security concerns with Turkey’s participation and MIT, its intelligence agency.

“Iranians, they fear Turks … and Oman is way more comfortable for the Iranians because it’s their own backyard,” Grinberg said. “I also suspect that the Iranians understand that MIT is a very serious organization. They would find it more difficult to keep all their secrets, and MIT would know [them if the meeting] was in Istanbul.”

What’s next: In the event of war, Grinberg framed concerns about mass migration to Turkey and the mobilization of Kurdish separatists in Iran as propaganda campaigns designed to draw support for Tehran’s leadership.

Yet, he also expects the US to carry out strikes. Grinberg said US forces are probably not getting moved for a “bluff or joke.”

“I’m sure that Trump, better than anyone else, understands very well what it means if you threaten and don’t really put it into practice,” he told Turkey recap.

“Second,” Grinberg continued. “There’s no way Iran agrees to American demands, because it’s simply … political suicide. Because it will be automatically interpreted by friends and foes as a surrender, so there’s no way.”

Lease and desist: Syria ceasefire deal followed by energy deal

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If you’re reading this and within commuting range, you are personally invited.

In this week’s recap:

• Humanitarian crisis mounts on Turkish border

• Ömer Özkizilcik on IS transfers, border security

• Implications for the PKK peace talks

• Ankara mulls ‘buffer zone’ for refugees in Iran

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Winter festivals for the rest of us

Also from us this week:

• Saadet Party’s Bülent Kaya told Ceren Bayar where the PKK peace talks stand now

• Bilge Yeşil outlines media strategy in the New Turkey on Recap radio

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped the February edition of This Day in Turkey for news tracking tool subscribers. Enjoy!

The ceasefire is holding, for now. On and off clashes rattled but have not shattered the temporary truce between Damascus and remnants of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after last week’s offensive.

Initiated on Jan. 20 and extended until Feb. 8, the ceasefire has seen violations from both sides, according to NGO reports, as negotiations keep everyone guessing what comes next.

In the meantime, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in SDF-held areas along the Turkey-Syria border, where a winter storm Monday exacerbated conditions.

On the ground: An estimated 173,000 people were displaced by recent conflicts in northern Syria, the International Organization for Migration reported Sunday. (scroll down for map)

Aid convoys have entered Hasakah from Iraqi Kurdistan (pictured above) though supply shipments have been more limited in the now isolated Kobani enclave, according to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an analyst and journalist who co-authored two books on Kurds in Syria.

“Despite the humanitarian corridor, not a lot of aid that has come and there’s thousands of people [in Kobani], so it’s difficult,” Wilgenburg told Turkey recap.

He was in northern Syria during the offensive and published his observations here. In his discussions with locals, Wilgenburg noted two points: Many feel betrayed by the US and many are considering their next move if the ceasefire collapses.

“Everybody’s really afraid and a lot of civilians want to flee,” he said. “They want to go to Iraqi Kurdistan, but the thing is there’s not really a road and also I don’t think that Iraqi Kurdistan wants the demography of the area to change.”

Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Tuesday said Turkish state agencies and humanitarian agencies were “reaching out to those in need in northern Syria and delivering aid.” In a joint statement the same day, CHP and DEM leaders called for Turkey-Syria border crossings to remain open for more aid deliveries.

On the politics: The situation remains fluid, though Ankara views a weakened SDF as a positive development for its regional security interests. The withdrawal of Russian forces from the northeast Syria base in Qamishli may also be viewed as positive for US regional interests.

Reporting by the Wall Street Journal suggests Syrian Pres. Ahmed al-Sharaa and his forces swept further into SDF areas than envisioned by negotiators, including US envoy Thomas Barrack, who originally sought SDF withdrawals west of the Euphrates as a “gesture of good faith”, according to WSJ’s Lara Seligman.

US officials are now debating measures to help protect Kurdish forces in Syria—who allied with Washington in anti-ISIS campaigns. Most notably, US Sen. Lindsey Graham Tuesday said he would propose a “Save the Kurds Act” that would “impose crippling sanctions on any government or group engaged in hostilities against the Kurds.”

Meanwhile, Washington’s stance remains ambiguous. In her analysis, Gönül Tol reported “Ankara coordinated with Barrack ahead of the offensive to ensure Israel would not intervene to protect the SDF,” according to a Turkish official.

What comes next in Syria, Tol wrote, leaves the SDF with several “grim choices”:

“If, after the two-week cease-fire deadline expires, it opts to resume fighting, Syrian forces are likely to overrun the remaining SDF-held territory, with Kurdish civilians caught in the crossfire and little prospect of meaningful international protection. If the SDF instead accepts Damascus’s terms, it will effectively be acquiescing to the end of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy in Syria.”

Interview: Ömer Özkizilcik on IS transfers, border security

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In this week’s recap:

• Syria clashes redraw map, threaten mass migration

• US regional policy centers on IS containment

• Greek marine park and Israeli ties test Ankara

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• ‘Marylin Monroe of Mardin’ arrested

Also from us this week:

• Henri Barkey joined our podcast to discuss events in Syria and the PKK talks

• Daniel Thorpe reports on the trust deficit behind the peace process in Turkey

• Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu interviewed IYI Party deputy chair Selcan Taşçı on Stüdyo recap

You know it’s bad when SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi gets called the Kurdish Kılıçdaroğlu.

The end of 2025 deadline for Damascus-SDF integration talks has passed. The Syrian Army and its proxies have taken control of 90 percent of land once held by the SDF, resulting in an estimated 1,000 deaths on both sides of the clashes.

And according to some analysts, the SDF has ceased to exist as affiliated Arab tribes have splintered off, leaving a core Kurdish fighting force to defend Kurdish-majority areas in Kobani, Hasakah and Qamishli—which constitute a “red line” Abdi has vowed to defend.

For context, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is/was a mixed force of mostly Kurds and Arabs led by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia with ideological ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), though most people in Ankara would just call all of the above ‘terrorists’.

For more than a decade, the SDF allied with the US to defeat and contain Islamic State militants, a relationship that has now “largely expired” and is covered in detail below.

Views from Turkey: With the prospects fading for an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria, aka the “Rojava project”, a four-day ceasefire (effective Jan. 20) is mostly holding as Damascus and the SDF return to the negotiation table.

Pres. Erdoğan and coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli met Wednesday, issuing no press statement, though they likely discussed developments in Syria. Earlier that day, Erdoğan reiterated support for a centralized state in Syria that would be free of terror.

“With the recent developments in Syria, the future will be brighter than snow for Turks, Turkmens, Kurds, Arabs and all our other friends,” Erdoğan said at the AKP parliamentary group meeting.

Speaking Tuesday, Bahçeli said last week’s presidential decree on Kurdish rights in Syria was “in line with our thoughts and suggestions.” He added the roots of SDF and YPG forces must be “eradicated” from areas east of the Euphrates river.

“The security of Damascus is the security of Ankara,” Bahçeli told MHP lawmakers Tuesday.

Meanwhile, DEM Party officials framed recent events as attempts to remove Kurdish nationals and cultures from ancestral homelands. DEM led several protests in southeast Turkey and near the Syrian border, where demonstrators clashed with riot police.

A delegation led by DEM Party co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları entered northeast Syria Wednesday for consultation meetings amid ongoing negotiations.

Analysis: Speaking to Turkey recap, Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), said a ceasefire collapse could trigger a humanitarian crisis and a mass migration out of remaining SDF pockets in Syria.

“A full-scale war would lead to tens of thousands of local Kurds being displaced, a lot of them probably moving toward Iraqi Kurdistan or some toward Turkey, if Turkey opens up the border crossings for them,” Salih said.

He underlined Kurdish civilians do not feel safe in jurisdictions held by government-aligned militias, some of which have been publishing graphic videos online of dead, decapitated, tortured or apparently kidnapped Kurdish fighters.

“People see this stuff and they have seen what has happened in Sweida and in the Alawite areas. So, they are very much justifiably and understandably fearful of what could unfold,” Salih told Turkey recap.

He added Kurdish nationals across the Middle East have mobilized to protest clashes in northeast Syria, adding there is potential for heavier fighting and casualties in the days ahead.

“There is a unanimous consensus among the Kurds in Rojava, across the region and in the diaspora, that this is an existential war … and that it is not going to stop there. It will most probably go to other places, like Iraqi Kurdistan,” Salih said.

This IS the end: US regional policy centers on IS containment

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1. Embrace the rage in Diyarbakır’s therapeutic new ‘House of Anger’

2. Elevate above it in ‘Opium Black Castle’ and let the fog do the rest

In this week’s recap:

• Turkey promotes stability, dialogue in Iran

• Aleppo clashes shake trust in peace talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Storm throws caution sign to the wind

Also from us this week:

• Gelecek MP Kani Torun on how the Aleppo clashes impact Turkey’s peace process

• Kaya Genç came on the podcast for a health check on journalism in Turkey

• Diego Cupolo on party transfers and the renewed push for constitutional amendments

Since demonstrations began on Dec. 28 in Iran, at least 2,000 protesters have died and at least 10,000 are in jail as ‘de facto’ curfews and internet blackouts continue.

Viewed from Ankara, where the priority is regional stability, several government officials have voiced opposition to foreign intervention in Iran while promoting deescalation through dialogue.

“We foresee that external interventions, especially initiatives arising from Israel’s provocation, will lead to greater crises and hardships,” AKP spox Ömer Çelik said Tuesday. “We emphasize the importance of stability in Iran to prevent the region from being dragged into further chaos.”

Turkish FM Hakan Fidan echoed the stance in a press conference today (Jan 15). This comes as US Pres. Trump threatens military action, and some US base personnel have been advised to leave Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, according to Reuters.

The concerns for Turkey are varied, ranging from potential Kurdish minority movements to Israeli maneuvers that would tip the regional balance and also mass migration, though recent developments have not triggered major movements along Turkey’s eastern border,

Gönül Tol, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, previously wrote Ankara favors stability in Iran because:

“Turkey is already grappling with the consequences of chaos in Syria and Iraq, which have brought waves of refugees, cross-border threats, and economic strain. A destabilized Iran would magnify these problems just as Erdoğan faces mounting domestic pressures ahead of the 2028 elections.”

Likewise, Henri Barkey, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote this week that Ankara seeks to avoid escalation, but asked:

“If Iran’s regime topples, would Turkey welcome its replacement by a new pro-Western government?”

Barkey then posed such a development could present Ankara with a “new rival”.

“Hence,” he continued. “Spokesperson Çelik’s remarks could be reflecting at least the Turkish government’s wish that Iranians do indeed resolve their problems themselves and perhaps change little.”

Another widely shared narrative is that a government collapse in Tehran would leave Turkey as Israel’s sole rival in the region, essentially requiring both nations to compete for military superiority.

“If Iran weakens and ceases to be a rival for Israel, Turkey will emerge as the only country in the region capable of balancing Israel,” Oytun Orhan, Levant studies coordinator at ORSAM, told DW.

Analysis: To get a better sense of what all this means for Ankara, I spoke to Borzou Daragahi, a long-time international correspondent and author of the Badlands newsletter, who is based in Istanbul and has reported extensively from Iran.

Daragahi dismissed Turkish nationalist rhetoric about potential uprisings among Azeri minority groups in Iran.

“They’re the overclass, why would they break away … with Baku … when they could have Iran?” he asked.

That said, Daragahi maintained the protests have paused for now, but “there will be another round, definitely,” all of which does not sit well with the Turkish government.

“Turkey very well understands … that regime change is a really ugly business [and] that it will take years for the regime to come down.”

He continued, saying an escalation could prompt near-civil war conditions in parts of Iran, including Kurdish population centers, which have been “restless and agitating for some kind of autonomy for decades.”

“The legitimate struggle of the Iranian people is being hijacked for a geopolitical agenda and Turkey sees that happening,” Daragahi said, referring to multiple outside actors, including Israel.

He concluded that a “modus vivendi” has been achieved between Tehran and Ankara, and “any change has traditionally been for the worse … It took a lot to achieve the [current] situation despite competing and conflicting interests.”

Conflicting priorities: Aleppo clashes shake trust in peace talks

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In this week’s recap:

• What Maduro’s capture means for Ankara

• Turkey ready to support Damascus amid Aleppo clashes

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Ankara woman claims to be Trump’s daughter

Also from us:

• If you somehow missed it: Our 2026 predictions issue is a banger

• Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı outlined Turkish foreign policy in 2026 and Daria Isachenko focused on Central Asia in our latest podcasts

• Wouter Massink reported on drought and water mismanagement in Anatolia

• This day in Turkey is back and better than ever thanks to in-house historian Emily Rice Johnson (available for news tracking tool subscribers)

Anti-imperialism is the common bond of Turkey-Venezuela ties—if you discount the Ottoman empire.

To specify, it’s the shared anti-US sentiments that aligned Ankara with Caracas after the 2016 coup attempt, when Erdoğan dug in with decisions we’re still debating today and when Maduro needed allies.

There’s also populism. From Palestine to Paris, Erdoğan has long framed himself as the voice of the “oppressed” with rhetoric not far from that of Aló Presidente, the hours-long, unscripted TV show hosted by former Venezuelan Pres. Hugo Chavez.

That’s why the Turkish opposition called out Erdoğan’s silence in the immediate aftermath of Maduro’s capture by the US this weekend. Following years of warm Turkey-Venezuela relations—and gold refining schemes—a noticeable omission from Erdoğan’s speech Saturday was highlighted by CHP chair Özgür Özel on X:

“Your friend Trump … took your brother Maduro,” Özel wrote in a post with the first image of Maduro in US custody. “How tragic it is that you remain silent in the face of this photograph.”

For his part, Erdoğan held a phone call with Trump Monday and conveyed concerns “that Venezuela should not be dragged into instability”, he said in a speech the same day.

So, what now? Reports suggest Maduro rejected an ultimatum for a “gilded exile in Turkey”, a claim reiterated by US Sen. Lindsey Graham, but denied by Erdoğan when asked about it Wednesday (see the last line).

Meanwhile, Venezuelan VP Delcy Rodríguez is serving as interim president in Caracas. She is a prominent member of the government, and the implications of recent events remain to be seen.

Analysis: To understand what this might mean for Ankara, I contacted Imdat Öner, a former diplomat at the Turkish embassy in Caracas and current senior fellow at the Jack D. Gordon Public Policy Institute of Florida International University.

Öner has written extensively on Turkey-Venezuela ties, which he frames as an “alliance of convenience” built on the personal chemistry between Erdoğan and Maduro.

“Maduro trusted Erdoğan partly because Erdoğan was openly confrontational with the West, particularly in the tense period after the failed 2016 coup,” Öner told Turkey recap.

With Maduro now in US custody, Öner does not expect a major shift in Ankara’s approach to Venezuela, which Turkey sees as the political “gateway to Latin America”, he said.

Conversely, “Turkey is still viewed as a reliable partner by Delcy Rodríguez, who visited Turkey several times during her tenure as vice president, and that goodwill hasn’t vanished,” Öner continued. “But the decisive factor will still be Trump. He is likely to set clear limits on how far Ankara can go.”

Yet, bilateral relations were showing signs of strain before US warships amassed in the Caribbean. Öner noted Erdoğan did not congratulate Maduro following his 2024 re-election in a widely disputed vote.

Going back further, Turkish business ventures in Venezuela had also become increasingly constrained by US sanctions imposed on the Maduro government since the mid-2010s.

“Despite the political rhetoric, Turkey didn’t significantly expand its economic footprint in Venezuela after US sanctions,” Öner said. “Some Turkish firms had already signed energy and petrochemical deals with Venezuelan state companies, and others were exploring tourism and commercial opportunities, but nothing on a major scale.”

“Now Trump is pushing the new Venezuelan leadership to cut ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba,” he added. “If Erdoğan plays his relationship with Trump well, Turkey could step into some of the space those countries may be forced to leave—opening the door to new investment opportunities.”

Turn of the Turkish century: Everything else that happened …

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That said, keep an eye out for some special, year-end newsletters from us. If you still need that daily hit of Turkish politics, Stüdyo recap will keep dishing out the news from Ankara. Happy holidays!

In this week’s recap:

• Erdoğan seeks S-400 refund

• Interview with an EU skeptic

• Arrest spotlights AKP ‘civil war’

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Tigris River foaming at the mouth

Also from us this week:

• Karolina Wanda Olszowska & Karol Wasilewski on Russian disinformation in Turkey

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson on minimum wage discourse in our Economy recap

Our holiday sale ends soon: Sign up and save 25 percent on annual subscriptions.

Like most of us this holiday season, Ankara will be exploring refund options … on Russian missile defense systems.

That’s right, Pres. Erdoğan wants to return the notorious S-400s in a move to boost US ties and get Turkey back on the list of countries that can buy F-35 fighter jets. The best part is he really does want a refund, according to Bloomberg, which broke the story last night.

It’s one way to end with a bang and the surprising headline ties together all the week’s news from the Black Sea. Let’s break down events in chronological order:

The timeline: Last Friday, Turkey’s defense ministry said there were “no new developments regarding the S-400” following previous statements by US Turkey envoy Thomas Barrack who said negotiations were underway with the eventual goal of removing CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.

Also last Friday, Erdoğan met with Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin at a summit in Turkmenistan (pictured above), where the pair discussed a Ukraine ceasefire, according to public statements.

At about the same time as the meeting, a Turkish car ferry anchored in Odesa was hit by airstrikes that Kyiv blamed on Moscow. Russia reportedly struck two Ukrainian ports that day, damaging three Turkish-owned vessels.

The twist, according to Bloomberg, is that Erdoğan reportedly raised the S-400s issue in his meeting with Putin Friday. If confirmed, this provides new context for the stray drone that was shot down while approaching Turkish airspace Monday.

The drone’s origin remains unconfirmed, though according to a Defense Ministry statement, it “had gone out of control” and it was targeted by a Turkish F-16. An investigation is ongoing.

Then, on Tuesday, Russia’s Defense Ministry announced it was conducting planned Tu-22M3 long-range bomber flights over international waters in the Black Sea with fighter jet escorts.

Whether routine or not, Erdoğan chimed in the same day to reiterate concerns about the Ukraine-Russia conflict spilling over into the Black Sea.

“Recent reciprocal attacks seriously threaten navigation safety in the region,” Erdoğan said. “Targeting commercial and civilian ships benefits no one. We have clearly conveyed our warnings to both sides on this matter.”

In the background, Barrack met with Turkish FM Hakan Fidan Tuesday. A US delegation followed up Wednesday, adding positive messaging on the S-400 issue from the former US National Security Adviser to the VP Philip Gordon.

Analysis: Just before we sent this newsletter, the Kremlin denied that S-400s were discussed in Friday’s meeting. Ankara has yet to confirm the Bloomberg report. Regardless, the S-400 purchase was always a gamble, and it remains to be seen if Erdoğan can cash out.

Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the move would be “really brave and brazen” for Erdoğan as it marks a significant pivot in his relationship with Putin.

“I think it just shows how important it is for Erdoğan to reset Turkey’s ties with the US and improve his ties with Trump,” Çağaptay told Turkey recap. “Once the S-400s are returned, even the staunchest opponents of Turkey will have a really hard time justifying why Turkey should not have access to the F-35s.”

When asked how Moscow might respond, he said Russia typically retaliates with “passive aggressive military moves” in or near Turkey’s maritime boundaries, as it did following Turkey’s 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 fighter jet on the Turkey-Syria border.

The Black Sea is “an international space, but it’s too close for Turkey’s taste,” Çağaptay said, adding Russia may apply other forms of pressure through informal trade sanctions on Turkey.

“[Moscow can] suddenly announce that Turkey’s tomatoes and other sought-after produce … doesn’t meet Russia’s health requirements,” he continued.

“Russia could go further with support for anti-HTS groups in Syria, including through former regime remnants and destabilize Syria … that would be one area where Turkey’s more exposed.”

Interview with an EU skeptic: Hasan Ünal

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That’s what he said, and if you need a break from politics right now, the backstory is jarring.

In this week’s recap:

• Amor keeps hope alive for Turkey’s EU bid

• US Envoy says S-400 solution in sight

• Syria marks one year since regime change

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Provocateur detained for anti-muslim statue

Also from us this week:

• Nimet Kıraç on why young Syrians in Adana hesitate to move back to Syria

• László Szerencsés details the ties that bind Orbán and Erdoğan on our podcast

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson covers the rate cut in our Economy recap

And remember to discount your blessings with our holiday sale. Buy now, save later.

Mark this moment: With two weeks left in 2025, Turkey had its first slow news week of the year.

And all it took was annual budget talks that keep politicians locked up in parliament for a 14-day marathon of full-body fiscal exertion and some heavy drinking, we’re told.

That means Turkey correspondents like me got to breathe, to notice the change of seasons and got to look deeper into current events—pretty much like Thoreau looks into a stream and notes the surface “slides away, but eternity remains” just below it.

Yes, that’s a reference to Turkey’s eternal EU accession bid: the grievance behind all EU-Turkey grievances and the base of many discussions in Ankara these days.

As the Russia-Ukraine war drones on and Washington reevaluates historic alliances, European security is in the spotlight and so are EU-Turkey defense ties.

This new urgency on European-Turkey cooperation has surfaced the limits imposed by Ankara’s stalled accession, as underlined in recent discourse on Turkey’s inclusion in the bloc’s SAFE program.

Likewise, as Turkish FM Fidan said in Germany last month, EU accession is based on a criteria of democratic and governing standards, which are not being met according to the latest statement from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.

Still, in the same speech, Fidan also maintained full membership in the bloc remains a “strategic goal” for Ankara—a phrase echoed by Pres. Erdoğan Monday.

So, to get a sense of where accession stands today, I spoke with Nacho Sánchez Amor, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey, who was recently in Ankara on a reporting visit.

Amor’s approach on Turkey has changed since the 2023 general elections, when he was pushing for a new “format” for EU-Turkey ties that would not be based on a “cynical” accession process, as he told Turkey recap at the time. Today, Amor has reverted to supporting for Turkey’s EU bid, stating:

“I received a lot of pressure from the civil society saying that if the European Union kills the accession process, it is never going to be resuscitated and that means killing the hope of many millions of Turkey’s citizens,” Amor said.

He added: “I was convinced that the accession process is, in a way, leverage and is an incentive for many people in the country to continue considering Europe as a goal.”

When asked about Turkey’s inclusion in EU defense programs, like SAFE, Amor said “it’s important to have Turkey” on board, but noted security cooperation would face barriers as long as Greece faces threats of war from Ankara, known as ‘casus belli’.

He also pointed to Turkey’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 missiles as another stumbling block for stronger EU-Turkey defense ties.

“I think Turkey has to go to Brussels regarding SAFE and offer some solution for the S-400,” Amor told Turkey recap. “Whatever the solution, a technical solution, storing it, reselling it … I think it’s good to get rid of this old, let’s say, irritant.”

The other irritant “is the lack of alignment in foreign policy,” he added, before moving to domestic politics and human rights infringements.

His main tagline for the government might have been that Turkey’s constitution is “not a menu” for authorities to pick and choose from when applying laws to different members of society.

Last week, Amor met with politicians and political prisoners, including Selahattin Demirtaş in Edirne prison as well as Ekrem Imamoğlu, Osman Kavala, and Can Atalay in Silivri prison.

He cited a long list of shortcomings with judicial independence, emphasizing Turkey is a founding and “respected member” of the Council of Europe while also noting “nobody obliged Turkey to be a member”, which requires compliance with institutional decisions, he said.

Despite his many frustrations since assuming his post in 2019—we did not get “one single piece of good news coming from human rights, rule of law and the judiciary,” he said—Amor retains hope for Turkey’s future accession prospects.

“It’s going to take a lot of time,” he said, but “there were periods in the country’s history [when people were] really committed to the idea of becoming a democracy.”

Amor added the current “environment is not very appealing. Every corner of the world is subject to this authoritarian trend. But there are some bright spots, and I would like to see Turkey as one of those cases.”

Eye on the fighter: US Envoy says S-400 solution in sight

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In this week’s recap:

• Russian shadow fleet hit in Black Sea

• CHP holds 4th congress in 2 years

• Peace commission to get Öcalan debrief

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Barzani lights diplomatic crisis at poetry event

Also from us this week:

• Wouter Massink and Daniel Thorpe on the high rate of workplace deaths in Turkey

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson covers the latest inflation figures in Economy recap

Like what you see? Get more for less with our holiday sale on paid subscriptions.

With the prospect for Ukraine peace talks unclear, four Russia-connected tankers have come under attack in the last week.

Ukraine claimed two naval drone attacks on tankers near Turkey’s Black Sea coast Friday. Though another attack in the Black Sea Tuesday and one near Senegal Thursday remain unclaimed.

Taken together, it appears failures to reach a ceasefire in Ukraine have placed a growing target on Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” — the term used for the hundreds of shipping vessels that have helped Moscow evade oil price caps and sanctions throughout its invasion of Ukraine.

What happened: Within one hour on Friday afternoon, Ukrainian naval drones hit two sanctioned oil tankers, named Kairos and Virat, en route to a major Russian oil terminal, a Ukrainian official told Reuters.

Both tankers were empty, had sailed under various flags and their crew members escaped alive. The US, EU, UK, Canada and Switzerland sanctioned Virat, while the EU, UK and Switzerland sanctioned Kairos.

In response, Kremlin spox Dmitry Peskov said the attacks “in Turkish territorial waters targeting commercial ships” represent “an attack on the sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey.”

Speaking Monday, Pres. Erdoğan said Ankara “absolutely cannot excuse” attacks that threaten navigation, life and the environment in its maritime boundaries.

“The war between Russia and Ukraine is reaching a point where it openly threatens the safety of navigation in the Black Sea,” he said. “The targeting of commercial vessels in our exclusive economic zone on Friday signals an alarming escalation.”

A third Black Sea attack hit the Russian-flagged tanker MIDVOLGA-2 north of Sinop Tuesday, according to Turkey’s General Directorate of Maritime Affairs.

The vessel was delivering sunflower seed oil from Russia to Georgia and its crew was unharmed, though Ukraine’s FM spox Heorhii Tykhyi said Ukraine was not involved, stating “Russia may have staged the whole thing”.

After the attack, Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin threatened to cut Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea, adding Moscow would intensify strikes on Ukrainian facilities and vessels.

And the heat goes on, as the Romanian Defense Ministry said it destroyed a maritime drone in the Black Sea Wednesday.

Separately, in an apparent attempt to avoid further incidents, the Beşiktaş shipping group—which owned the tanker hit near Senegal—said it would halt all Russia-related shipping activities.

Analysis: Yörük Işık, a geopolitical analyst based in Istanbul, where he runs the Bosphorus Observer, said the two tankers hit Friday were among the “darkest of the dark fleet vessels” and “well-chosen”.

“These two vessels exclusively work on the Russian market, on Russian routes and also they’re flagless,” Işık told Turkey recap. “The flag that they’re hosting is totally fake … The entire registration is fake.”

He continued, stating the Russian government has long used such vessels to earn foreign currency to help finance its war in Ukraine. He said Kyiv likely chose to retaliate to change the “narrative” about Kyiv’s capacity amid stalled Washington-led peace negotiations.

“Ukraine needed to show that it has many means under its control and [that] it can prosecute this war … it can seriously disrupt and even maybe stop the seaborne crude traffic coming from Russian ports,” Işık said.

Reflecting on the systemic implications of Russia’s shadow fleet, Işık said illicit maritime trade needs to come under greater scrutiny due to the security threats posed by “a secondary layer of traffic” on international shipping routes.

“These vessels pose great environmental risks and other technical issues,” he added, highlighting shipping choke points like the Turkish straits as well as the English Channel and Danish straits.

“When something happens to these vessels, who pays? How are these issues covered? These vessels are working outside the internationally accepted business practices.”

​​Party congress all the time: CHP holds 4th congress in 2 years

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