In this week’s recap:

• CHP locked in its own power struggle

• Congress to constitution: The math behind the strategies

• Peace process updates

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Ankara to stop everything for NATO summit

Also from us this week:

• Anna Montraveta Riu and Laia Palau Biel on land expropriations in the quake zone

• Yıldız Tar joins Recap radio to outline pending LGBT legislation in Turkey

• Diego Cupolo introduces Turkey recap’s manifesto and code of ethics

In the CHP leadership struggle, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu took the social media accounts and Özgür Özel retained the parliamentary podium—for now.

There are many moving parts (detailed below), but the key trends are:

1. A court ruling sparked a leadership crisis in the main opposition party

2. Erdoğan has since referred to this crisis as an “internal” party dispute

3. Ongoing disputes between CHP factions are confirming Erdoğan’s words

… and there are few other options for ex-CHP chair Özel as he works to retake the party leadership before the current CHP chair, Kılıçdaroğlu, expels Özel supporters from the party in a looming “anti-corruption” campaign.

What happened: Two hours before Kılıçdaroğlu held today’s CHP party council meeting, 28 council members resigned in an attempt to force an extraordinary congress. (We’re still waiting to see what happens next.)

A day prior, the Kılıçdaroğlu-led CHP Central Executive Committee requested the permanent expulsion of nine MPs who support Özel. While announcing the decision, the Kılıçdaroğlu camp spox said the nine MPs had been “removed from all their current positions within the party.”

The blow-by-blow came after clashes nearly broke out between opposing CHP camps outside parliament Tuesday morning. Amid uncertainty over who would speak in the parliamentary group meeting, Özel and Kılıçdaroğlu supporters faced off until CHP Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş called for calm on X.

Yavaş reportedly threatened to leave politics if the CHP descended into a street melee. His efforts deescalated tensions and both CHP leaders delivered speeches Tuesday—Özel in parliament and Kılıçdaroğlu in the party headquarters.

What voters think: In a recent MetroPOLL survey, the majority of respondents from all political parties—except the MHP—said they did not approve of Kılıçdaroğlu’s installment by court ruling. A new KONDA survey found comparable sentiments.

Throughout, suspicions of CHP-AKP coordination keep swirling after a journalist Wednesday asked Erdoğan if he had met with Kılıçdaroğlu but did not get a reply.

The inquiry came after political observers noticed that Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan used similar language in their speeches this week. For example, by:

1. Likening CHP corruption to a nightclub operation.

2. Claiming Turkey’s influence should expand to former Ottoman territories.

What’s next: Everything depends on the timing of the next CHP congress, which allows CHP members to vote on their leadership. Yet, as with the lawmakers, the party’s lawyers are also divided into opposing camps.

Some legal advisors argue an extraordinary congress is needed before July 26 to safeguard CHP’s eligibility in the next elections, while others say the appeals process must conclude on the CHP congress case before a new congress can be held.

In both scenarios, experts argue a party congress is the only “legitimate” conclusion for the CHP crisis. Meanwhile, party members interviewed by Turkey recap this week stressed the timing of the congress will be the key determinant for who leads the CHP next.

“What we’re seeing is a game of chicken,” said a CHP staffer speaking on condition of anonymity. “There are many gray areas in the rules on party congresses, so both sides are trying to dominate the discourse about what comes next.”

“Whoever blinks first, loses,” the source added, stating the Özel camp is working to trigger a congress while pro-Özel members are still in the party. Given enough time, Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to clear out all CHP structures with new appointees.

“We will practice clean politics. We will dismiss all those who are corrupt,” Kılıçdaroğlu said at the CHP headquarters Tuesday as the crowd chanted “expel”.

“We will work together with dedication, we will not work for personal gain,” he added.

Congress to constitution: The math behind the strategies

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In this week’s recap:

• Opposition camps regroup, Kılıçdaroğlu digs in

• Where key players stand on the CHP takeover

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• NATO’s future depends on Trump’s mood in Ankara

Also from us this week:

• Noah Bonsey joined Recap radio to discuss Syria and SDF integration

• Wouter Massink and Daniel Thorpe on Turkey’s fast-tracked mining boom

• Diego Cupolo and Emily Rice Johnson respond to reader mail

• Did we mention we’re throwing a party in Ankara and you’re invited?

Okay, this is not your ordinary news cycle, and this is not your ordinary recap.

Since we last reported on street clashes following CHP head Özgür Özel’s ouster, Turkey’s main opposition party has essentially fractured into two camps and everyone’s trying to guess what comes next — including who will post next on the CHP’s official X account, which is dormant.

It’s a real mess, so in true Marie Kondo fashion, we’re going to compartmentalize the main developments and reactions, though we can’t guarantee they’ll “spark joy”:

Camp K: Re-instated CHP chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu took the stage at the party’s Ankara headquarters Saturday with anti-corruption slogans focused on “cleansing” the party of “bribery” and other immoral actions.

The narrative closely echoed MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli’s media comments three days earlier, and reinforced analyses that Kılıçdaroğlu’s return is part of an elite pact to eliminate effective opposition in Turkey, as Sinem Adar argued here.

Yesterday, Kılıçdaroğlu’s spokesperson said the official CHP chair would speak at the party’s next parliamentary group meeting, on Jun. 9, and convene a party council on Jun. 11, though both are subject to change, according to our CHP sources and Stüdyo recap reporting.

This comes as Kılıçdaroğlu continues to purge party staffers while unveiling a new 19-member central executive committee for the party.

Camp Ö: Former CHP head Özgür Özel led rallies in Izmir, Manisa and Ankara before speaking at this week’s CHP parliamentary group meeting.

Following a streak of street-level mobilization, Özel’s address Tuesday was oddly ordinary and uneventful — as in he brought picket signs to condemn PlayStation prices — before a packed and lively audience.

Since his removal, Özel has been campaigning for an immediate party congress to re-elect the CHP leadership. The prospects for a speedy convention remain unclear, though Özel’s spokesperson has argued the CHP may lose eligibility to participate in snap elections if a congress is not held this July.

On Wednesday, Özel had collected more than 850 signatures from the party’s 1,130 delegates to hold an extraordinary congress. Kılıçdaroğlu has said a congress would be held after the court of appeals issues a final ruling on the CHP case. Stay tuned for more reporting on this.

New party prospects: When asked if he would launch his own political party if he fails to retake the CHP leadership, Özel has repeatedly stated he prefers not to split the party, but it remains a possibility in a “worst-case scenario.”

An April survey by MetroPoll found 66 percent of CHP supporters would vote for Özel’s new party, while about 22 percent would stick with Kılıçdaroğlu. Across all parties, support for an Özel-led party was nearly 35 percent.

Speaking to Turkey recap this morning, Seda Demiralp, a professor of political science and chair of international relations at Işık University in Istanbul, said Özel’s camp will likely try all institutional and procedural avenues to win back the CHP leadership.

If Özel’s efforts fail, a new party should be expected by the end of 2026, Demiralp said.

“Özel’s popularity among CHP voters is very high,” she told Turkey recap. “Our recent research shows that about 70 percent of CHP voters state that they would vote for Özel’s new party if he founded one. Among these voters, the level of anger towards Kılıçdaroğlu matches the anger towards Erdoğan.”

She added that Özel may also be appealing to a “significant portion” of undecided/swing voters, adding this segment tends to be less concerned about CHP dynamics, and more frustrated about “the politicization of the courts, democratic backsliding and the economic costs of the whole process.”

Vapid response: Where key players stand on the CHP takeover

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Don’t worry. We’ll miss you, too, and have some newsletters in the pipeline for the coming weeks, including a special Q&A podcast.

So, Ask Us Anything now using this anonymous form or simply hit the ‘reply’ button on this email. We read all our messages and invite questions on all things Turkey and Turkey recap. Cheers!

In this week’s recap:

• Breaking: Court rules to dissolve CHP leadership

• Turkey-Germany strategic dialogue revived

• Peace process gets quasi-modal

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Ankara scouts jogging route for Macron

Also from us this week:

• Jalel Harchaoui joins our podcast to outline Turkey’s changing Libya policy

• RSVP here for the first Turkey recap get-together in Ankara. +40 people already signed up. Come out and say hi.

As this newsletter was sent out, an Ankara Court of Appeals ruled to provisionally suspend the leadership of CHP chair Özgür Özel and the party administration. Former CHP chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu will take over the party leadership.

Kılıçdaroğlu led the CHP from 2010 to 2023, and just yesterday, he reclaimed the news cycle with a video statement, in which he said the CHP cannot be a “sanctuary” for corruption, and that the party knows how to cleanse itself “when necessary”.

This comes as the CHP faces the concurrent pressures of non-stop municipal corruption investigations and the lawsuit against the party’s leadership structure stemming from alleged irregularities during the CHP’s 2023 internal elections — otherwise known as the congress trial.

What it means: A “mutlak butlan” or “absolute nullity” ruling essentially voids the current CHP leadership and its actions following the 2023 party congress.

Kılıçdaroğlu had not denied claims he would retake the party chairmanship through a court ruling, though many CHP members and voters previously told Turkey recap they would interpret such a comeback as the equivalent of a “kayyum” or a state-appointed trustee to lead the CHP.

In the broader context, this long-standing issue is resurfacing amid more fervent snap election speculations than usual in Ankara (covered in the last recap).

Early election link? A CHP leadership crisis could trigger an early vote, though some AKP members have reportedly voiced opposition to the heavy-handed crackdown on the CHP, while some pro-gov media figures stated an “absolute nullity” ruling could come this week, which it did.

Earlier this month, former AKP deputy Şamil Tayyar said a court decision had been reached but not publicized. Though last week on X, he said he did not expect early elections due to the decision.

“There is a lot of movement in Ankara,” he wrote, adding that “politics from July onward seem poised to enter a new track.”

Video reactions: Looping back to Kılıçdaroğlu, his statement Wednesday was not well received on social media, where many openly blamed him for Erdoğan’s 2023 election victory. Within the CHP, initial responses were more respectful towards the ex-chair while denying claims of wrongdoing by the party.

CHP parliamentary advisors told Turkey recap the party would continue to address internal party disagreements privately to preserve its public image.

That said, many party members are convinced the AKP’s aim is to maintain the semblance of political opposition in Turkey while preventing any true challenges to power, as seen with the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu.

Or as Özel wrote in The Economist Tuesday: The AKP’s “goal is not to eliminate the opposition but to tame it: allowing it to contest elections, and even govern big cities, while forcing it to operate within narrowing constraints.”

Analysis: Speaking to Turkey recap today, Berk Esen, associate professor of political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul, said Kılıçdaroğlu sought to prepare the stage for his political return with his video statement Wednesday.

Esen continued, stating Kılıçdaroğlu would initially face backlash from CHP core voters but it’d be short-lived since he’d shape the party to accommodate his leadership ahead of the next party congress, which is not planned for another year or so.

“During this time, he can purge party officials at the local level, try to generate support, not so much among the base, but among the party cadres who would now see him as the leader and — in order to rise through the party ranks — they would pay homage to him,” Esen told Turkey recap.

“I really think that he wants leadership for himself. He’s out for vengeance,” Esen concluded. “He didn’t really accept losing the party leadership in the November 2023 congress. And he probably accuses those who defected from his side to join Özgür Özel of being traitors.”

Dost Kapital: Turkey-Germany strategic dialogue revived after 12-year pause

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In this week’s recap:

• Belgian delegation spotlights Turkey-EU defense talks

• Election rumors, CHP mayors join AKP

• PKK talks inch forward, Öcalan awaits visitors

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Sacrificial animals make a run for it

Also from us this week:

• Nareg Seferian lays out the regional implications for the Jun. 7 Armenian elections

• Please take a moment to complete our reader survey. Help us, help you.

• Also, Turkey recap is hosting a party in Ankara, and you’re invited!

This week brought incremental developments in Turkish domestic politics, and potentially explosive election rumors that we cannot confirm (details below), so today’s top section focuses on the more concrete and fast-developing discussions regarding Turkey’s role in NATO.

It’s the back burner topic behind all foreign policy debates in Ankara, and it’s moving to center stage as the city prepares to host the alliance summit in July. High-level visits from Belgium this week — led by Queen Mathilde (pictured above) — also spotlighted Turkey’s potential defense partnerships with EU states.

What’s happening: As Washington looks to put more European defense responsibilities on European nations, officials in Ankara are working to underline messages of cohesion and solidarity within NATO while presenting Turkey’s defense industry as a critical manufacturing base to fill defense gaps in European security.

The argument has been made before, but it’s getting louder as the NATO summit approaches, providing Turkey the platform and opportunity to showcase its alliance contributions and defense sector — as it did in the recent SAHA International Expo and will continue to do for local audiences with a new TRT program on Turkey’s military capabilities.

Belçikanka: A snapshot of the current zeitgeist came with a five-day Belgian delegation visit, including more than 400 business leaders, that peaked with a Turkey-Belgium Industry Day event Wednesday.

The trends in Turkey-EU defense were made clear throughout the visit as Baykar chair Selçuk Bayraktar told Queen Mathilde that drones are among the most powerful deterrents, stating “If you produce enough of them, no one can attack you.”

In his meeting with the Queen Monday, Pres. Erdoğan emphasized the need for progress on Turkey’s EU membership, customs union modernization and he also underlined that “Turkey’s participation in the EU’s defense initiatives is in the mutual interest of all sides.”

For Belgium’s part, FM Maxime Prevot said Turkey is “guardian of the southeast flank of the European continent.” Though in an Anadolu Agency interview, Belgian Defense Min. Theo Francken went further by stating Belgium …

1. Supports customs union modernization

2. Backs Ankara’s immediate inclusion in the SAFE loan program

3. Is working on major drone-related projects worth more than $1 billion

AFP reported Turkey and Belgium signed nine defense agreements this week though details remain sparse.

“There are a lot of opportunities also for Turkish companies,” Francken told AA. “You are way ahead, so we have to catch up and we can learn a lot from you.”

Headwinds: As Turkey’s defense industry continues to secure bilateral deals with individual EU nations, bloc-wide defense integration with Turkey is complicated by distrust and varying degrees of perceived threats stemming from Ankara’s foreign policy objectives (mainly from Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and France).

Most concretely, such disagreements have led to Turkey’s exclusion from the initial set of SAFE loans. Supporters of Turkey’s omission often argue the program’s core aim is to encourage weapons manufacturing within the EU, as opposed to the continued outsourcing of key components.

Meanwhile, proponents of Turkey’s integration argue Europe currently lacks production capacity that Turkish defense manufacturers can help fill — at least in the short-term. Or as the music group War put it in 1975: “Why can’t we be friends?”.

Still, amid the debates on Turkey’s exclusion from SAFE, the nation’s role in NATO is deepening following two announcements this spring on the establishment of a Maritime Component Command in Istanbul and Multinational Corps Headquarters in southern Turkey.

When asked to comment on the contrasting trend lines in Ankara’s regional defense role, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official said growing instability is creating new openings for Turkey-EU defense integration, but the initiative to advance cooperation comes mostly from Ankara.

“The [NATO] centers are nothing new, they have been planned for years,” the official told Turkey recap. “The issue is that we are pitching many ideas to our European partners, and we’re not receiving similar offers for cooperation from our allies. There is little reciprocity.”

“We are very often initiating the conversations on deepening solidarity and find the outreach to be one-sided, which is problematic for bolstering regional defense in these times.”

Snapchat: Election rumors, CHP mayors join AKP

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That means we’ll soon start publishing Turkey-focused climate change coverage here and, in Turkish, on studyorecap.com, where we’ll also launch a Turkish-language podcast series hosted by Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu on all things COP31.

Subscribe to Stüdyo recap if you haven’t already. Otherwise, stay tuned! We’ve been planting many seeds that will sprout soon — all made possible by your support. A big thank you to our readers!

In this week’s recap:

• Bahçeli wants a status update for Öcalan

• CHP plays offense, congress case looms

• Ankara-Yerevan advance normalization efforts

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Turkish language watchdog eyes diacritic mârks

Also from us this week:

• Suzy Hansen joins Recap radio to talk about how Turkey changed under Erdoğan

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson covers the latest inflation bump in Economy recap

Disclosure: This week’s main news centers on the peace process, so let me again disclose that my wife is an MP with DEM Party.

After months of abstract concepts and debates, the PKK peace process took on a more solid form this week with the release of a 15-volume book series on Kurdish literature and history by the Ministry of Culture and Mardin Artuklu University.

This flew under the radar and is not the much-awaited legal reforms, but it represents a meaningful recognition of Kurdish culture in Anatolia — the denial of which is at the core of the 40-year conflict the PKK and the Turkish state are currently trying to end.

Yet, how both sides are approaching a resolution remains highly abstract, mainly through the renaming of groups and individuals this week in keeping with the leftist tradition of changing words while leaving power structures intact. Though some real changes are coming maybe …

What happened: Following reports the peace talks had stalled, Pres. Erdoğan’s coalition partner and MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli called on the state Tuesday to grant the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan a more official status as a chief negotiator in the process (which he is).

This mirrors one of the requests shared by the PKK leadership the same day, when they announced the group would rebrand itself as an “Apoist Movement”, stemming from the “Apo” nickname for Öcalan.

In their statement, the militants said they had begun to disarm, completed withdrawal from border areas and released prisoners associated with Turkish intelligence as requested by state officials.

But they complained that Ankara has taken “no practical steps” to implement the proposals in the parliamentary peace process report finalized this February.

To facilitate the coming reforms, Bahçeli called for the establishment of a “Peace Process and Politicization Coordination Office.” It’s worth noting this all comes after he met with Erdoğan last week (pictured above), and the president has yet to comment on the status updates.

What’s changing: The peace talks remain opaque and public information is sparse, but the trend lines above will need to intersect at Imralı island, where Öcalan is imprisoned and may soon oversee some form of coordination office, according to Roj Girasun, director of Rawest Research.

“The new ‘status’ concept most likely refers to the redefinition of conditions for communication, meetings, work and political dialogue,” Girasun told Turkey recap.

“In practice, this could mean the opening of contact channels with different actors, further formalizing Imralı as a regular negotiation center.”

He added improved living conditions for Öcalan may also come at later stages, possibly in the form of new house arrest parameters.

None of this is new to close followers of the peace process, but drafting policies and executing them are two separate and complicated tasks. For now, the main takeaway is that the process has not stalled completely amid ongoing negotiations.

“I think [Bahçeli’s] speech is one that can breathe new life into the process, ease it, and pave the way for its ​progress,” DEM Party deputy group chair Gülüstan Kılıç Koçyiğit told Reuters Tuesday.

What’s next: MHP officials continue to lay the rhetorical groundwork for reforms, most recently with this commentary by Bahçeli’s advisor — who sells it as a loss for the US and Israel.

Meanwhile, MHP lawmakers told Stüdyo recap they believed the process should not be tied to elections, arguing a lasting resolution requires a timeline independent of calculated political payoffs.

As for the AKP, some officials remain more cautious, telling the BBC they want confirmation and verification systems in place to track the disarmament. Intel chief Ibrahim Kalın, who’s been out of the spotlight for a while, is currently overseeing these preparations, according to Türkiye Gazetesi.

The rest remains to be seen. Looking at the broader picture, Rawest research director Girasun said the peace process “passed the Syria test”, where SDF-Damascus integration is underway. It’s also passing the Iran test, after initial concerns of Kurdish separatism across Turkey’s eastern border.

That said, Girasun said the main obstacles remain in Turkey’s domestic sphere.

“The greatest dilemma I have observed regarding the process … is the difference and the gap between Erdoğan and Bahçeli. This largely stems from Erdoğan’s cautiousness due to elections,” he told Turkey recap.

“As the window narrows toward the election, Erdoğan’s caution regarding taking deep-rooted and radical steps may increase, the pressure from the MHP may rise, and the impatience of Kurdish politics may grow,” he added. “Managing the tension within these three areas will be the new test of the process.”

Özgüerilla tactics: CHP plays offense, congress case looms

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In this week’s recap:

• AKP prepping for Nov. 2027 elections

• Yavaş in the spotlight, CHP shifts to fieldwork

• Horizon Europe debate further bruises Turkey-EU ties

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Göbeklitepe visitors are not impressed

Also from us this week:

• Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar on Turkey’s military and energy projects in Somalia

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped This Day In Turkey’s May edition for news tracking tools subscribers

Not a week goes by in Ankara without speculation over the next election date. It’s the local sport. It’s also a great conversation-starter when meeting strangers or when trying to revive a boring dinner date.

The heart beats faster for Turkish politics. Especially after Hürriyet reported Sunday the ruling AKP has already started preparing for elections in November 2027.

Turkey recap readers will know this was the most cited date for the next vote — slated for May 2028 at the latest — and the apparent confirmation by a leading pro-government newspaper serves to firm up the election date further.

Of course, other media outlets have made the case for election dates before and after Nov. 2027, including Turkey recap, so the following is a look at the current narratives and their merits.

What does the facts say: Turkey’s constitution allows two terms per president unless an early election is called or the constitution is changed.

For context, Pres. Erdoğan is currently serving his third term as president (elected in 2014, 2018 and 2023), but he is technically serving his second term under the executive presidential system that began in 2018, according to a Supreme Election Council decision.

Before that, he served as Prime Minister from 2003-2014, which also doesn’t count.

All that to say, Erdoğan is just facing his latest term limit dilemma, and it’s the AKP’s duty to fix it. But they don’t have the parliamentary votes to change the constitution again (at least for now), so calling an early election seems like the clearest path for a third Erdoğan term under the current legal system (subject to change).

What does the reporting say: Early elections can be held any time before May 2028. So, sources cited in the Hürriyet report said they want the next vote to coincide with the AKP’s 25^th anniversary in November 2027.

To read between the lines, this would be an emotional appeal to party supporters, who would need to take an extra psychological step to betray the AKP on such an occasion — regardless of the state of the economy. Think of it like a divorce on a wedding anniversary.

Yet, according to the BBC, an early election is not likely unless “absolutely necessary”, as might be the case if Erdoğan wants to secure the third term route. If so, the report states parliament could call for snap elections slightly before May 2028 to greenlight Erdoğan’s candidacy.

In a scenario where Turkey’s economy remains under pressure from the Iran war, other AKP sources told Türkiye Gazetesi that holding elections in the spring of 2028 would allow the party to “gain an extra 6-7 months” for economic mitigation policies.

Meanwhile, our team at Stüdyo recap reported, the AKP is publicly stating elections will be held in May 2028 as they prepare for elections in the second half of 2027. For their part, opposition sources told us they expect the AKP to introduce economic reforms, criminal justice reforms and other pre-election initiatives, though not until 2027.

Analysis: Seda Demiralp, a professor of political science and chair of international relations at Işık University in Istanbul, said the fact that both the incumbent bloc and the opposition are now openly entertaining early election scenarios makes the discussion more credible than before.

Given his mandate till May 2028, she said Erdoğan had little incentive to call for early elections, but the playing field is changing.

“Recent polling trends suggesting some recovery in support — possibly due to the rally around the flag effects of the Iran war — may be feeding a perception within the ruling camp that conditions are becoming more favorable,” Demiralp told Turkey recap.

She noted CHP chair Özgür Özel has also been calling for elections with greater frequency, adding pressure to the mix as the party’s presidential candidate and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu faces multiple trials.

“Early elections become more likely when both sides believe they have a viable path to victory,” Demiralp said. “We may be approaching such a moment.”

“That said,” she continued, “this window could be short-lived. If external factors — such as regional tensions involving Iran — subside and polling trends shift again, the current alignment of incentives could quickly dissolve.”

The Mansurian Candidate: Yavaş in the spotlight, CHP shifts to fieldwork

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47 years ago today: TRT’s first International Children’s Festival aired with great disco gyrations.

Happy National Sovereignty and Children’s Day from Ankara! (and Şanlıurfa!!)

In this week’s recap:

• Rutte visits Ankara, von der Leyen tests ties

• US envoy scorned for anti-democratic comments

• More CHP mayors removed from office

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Sheep joins wild goat herd, owner bids farewell

Also from us this week:

• Alan Makovsky gauges Ankara’s diplomacy pivot and US-Turkey ties on Recap radio

• Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu on ‘absolute nullity’ and possible developments for the CHP

EU leaders are supposed to praise Turkey publicly and exclude it privately. European Commission Pres. Ursula von der Leyen broke protocol and put the NATO chief in a rut during his visit to Ankara this week.

In a conversation with Germany’s Zeit newspaper published Sunday, Leyen said:

“We must succeed in completing the European continent so that it is not influenced by Russia, Turkey or China. We must think bigger and geostrategically.”

The unusual language for an official EU candidate country comes as European nations seek to deepen defense cooperation with Turkey to help deter Russian threats amid ambivalence from Washington on transatlantic security guarantees.

To call it awkward timing does not begin to describe the polarizing effects in Brussels, where the spotlight returned to the EU’s inconsistent messaging and lack of unity on Turkey as NATO Sec. Gen. Mark Rutte was in Ankara … to bolster the Western alliance with Turkey.

Reactions: Damage control duties first fell on Paula Pinho, von der Leyen’s chief spokesperson, who tried to clarify the remarks with variations of this quote:

The Turkey reference was a “recognition of its geopolitical clout, size and ambitions — not least in the Western Balkans — and not meant as a comparison with any other country,” Pinho told Bloomberg.

In response, AKP deputy chair and spox Ömer Çelik issued a long list of criticisms for EU leaders in this interview with Anadolu Agency Wednesday.

“Turkey’s Balkan vision is based on peace, opposed to the divisive policies we call Balkanization and is more based on values. For von der Leyen to include Turkey among the countries she positions as opposed to the EU is a truly grave mental and political contradiction,” Çelik said.

Von der Leyen’s comment also did not pair well with statements by Marta Kos, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, who Monday said: “We need Turkey in light of the changing geopolitical realities in Europe and the Middle East.”

Nacho Sánchez Amor, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey, was also critical. When asked if he thought the statements were intentional, he told Turkey recap:

“I don’t think von der Leyen purportedly wanted to depict Turkey as a threat on the same level as Russia and China, but if it is simply a misstep and not a mistake, it’s very enlightening about the attitude of von der Leyen — always dismissing and forgetting Turkey as a candidate country,” Amor said in a phone call Wednesday.

Rutte in Ankara: Local news channels covered the episode on a split screen as Rutte visited the Turkish capital this week in preparation for July’s NATO summit in Ankara — which got a new logo with the presidential palace on it, in what may be another unintended political message that offers deep insights on Turkey’s western partners.

While in town, Rutte met with Pres. Erdoğan, FM Hakan Fidan, Defense Min. Yaşar Güler and visited the facilities of Turkish defense giant Aselsan, where he praised the nation’s young engineers and ‘defense industry revolution’.

Analysis: Putting it all together, Turkey appears to be hedging on Europe by cooperating with Russia and China. Meanwhile, Europe is also hedging by both working with Turkey and taking precautions, said Dimitar Bechev, director of the Dahrendorf Programme at St. Antony’s College and author of the upcoming book The Scramble for Europe.

Bechev told Turkey recap that Ankara is pursuing “soft revisionism” with the end goal of having more power to modify the institutions and rules governing Europe. He noted this does not mean Ankara poses an existential threat to Europe.

“It [Turkey] seeks equal status and is against scrutiny into its domestic politics,” Bechev said, referring to the jailing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu and other political repression. “The EU’s response is to offer incentives for cooperation. Not fight back. Especially after Russia invaded Ukraine.”

He summed up the EU approach as an attempt to “Co-opt Erdoğan. Not contain him.”

Cooperation vs. candidacy: Asked to comment on what this all means for Turkey-EU defense cooperation, Nacho Sánchez Amor told Turkey recap:

A defense partnership “is convenient and could be important, but this idea that we need Turkey is exaggerated and it’s not depicting the real thing. Turkey has not been allowed to enter SAFE and nothing happened,” he said, referring to the EU defense program.

“Sometimes, we exaggerate … to compensate for the lack of commitment to the accession process,” Amor continued. “The more we underline the partnership … the less we underline the accession process and the status of Turkey as a candidate country.”

Show him the conquista-door: US envoy scorned for anti-democratic comments

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But why did he announce it with a picture from Greece? Email us wrong answers only.

In this week’s recap:

• Probes loom for CHP’s Ankara mayor

• Opposition playbook and election prospects

• Antalya to host security pact talks on Iran war

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• East Med broils over işkembe soup and halloumi

Also from us this week:

• László Szerencsés on the Hungary elections and takeaways for Turkey

• Ceren Bayar and Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu assess CHP’s by-election strategy on Stüdyo recap

There are many new readers here—Hoş geldin!—so here are four things you need to know about the judicial pressure on Turkey’s main opposition CHP:

1. After gains in the 2024 local elections, the CHP has faced sprawling corruption investigations for about 1.5 years.

2. Many elected CHP officials have been removed from office and/or jailed before standing trial.

3. Throughout, Erdoğan and the CHP have threatened to pull large turps out of bags (a Turkish vegetable idiom explained here).

4. The largest turp actually came out of Batman this week at just under 4 kilos.

Now that we’re all caught up, the next turp is taking shape with looming investigations into CHP Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş.

A popular figure with nationalist appeal, Yavaş is seen as a viable presidential contender after last year’s arrest of the CHP’s official candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu.

What happened: Interior Min. Mustafa Çiftçi authorized a second probe into Yavaş over the alleged misuse of Ankara Municipality vehicles for a 2023 election rally in Karabük. The Ankara mayor denied wrongdoing Tuesday, stating: “There is nothing to fear.”

“Granting permission for an investigation without concrete evidence is a violation of the law. This approach is nothing more than an attempt at intimidation and discrediting,” the Ankara municipality responded in a statement Tuesday.

CHP chair Özgür Özel added that Pres. Erdoğan has routinely made use of state vehicles and resources without similar inquiries.

For his part, Erdoğan criticized the CHP in a speech to AKP lawmakers Wednesday, saying:

“Turkey, which is experiencing a period of resurgence in global politics, is unfortunately experiencing a ‘period of decline’ in the municipalities run by the main opposition.”

Crackdown in context: The investigation into Turkey’s second-largest city comes amid a widening probe into its third largest, Izmir.

Former CHP Izmir mayor Tunç Soyer was re-arrested Wednesday after the party’s Ankara provincial chair Ümit Erkol was arrested after his detention last week. Both arrests are linked to bribery allegations involving IZBETON, a subsidiary of the Izmir municipality.

For the full picture, here’s a few more news items on the CHP this week:

• Bolu’s acting mayor was detained Friday and later arrested for an ongoing extortion investigation that jailed Bolu’s elected mayor in February.

• 31 people were detained Friday for a corruption probe into the CHP-led Yenişehir district municipality in Mersin.

• Bornova Mayor Ömer Eşki was released Friday though his municipality remains under investigation for alleged fraud.

• Former CHP chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was sentenced to nearly a year in prison for insulting the president. His lawyer vowed to appeal the verdict.

• And the European Court of Human Rights notified Turkey of a case brought by Ekrem Imamoğlu regarding his pre-trial detention and investigations.

Analysis: Commenting on the investigations into Yavaş and other CHP officials, Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute, said the key issue is “not so much their legal substance, but their political impact.”

“These cases function in two main ways. First, they damage the reputations of political figures, regardless of the eventual legal outcome,” Korkmaz told Turkey recap this morning.

“Second, even in the absence of a conviction, they can paralyze these actors—either by keeping them entangled in lengthy legal processes or, in some cases, through temporary detention. In this sense, the process itself becomes the punishment.”

She continued, stating the trajectory of the Yavaş investigation will be determined primarily through the government’s own “risk calculations.”

“More broadly, these judicial processes … constrain political actors by discouraging bold action, and they contribute to shaping public perception—reinforcing a narrative that no one within the CHP is ‘clean’,” Korkmaz added.

“In that sense, they operate as instruments of political control as much as legal proceedings.”

Process of alleviation: Opposition playbook and election prospects

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And more recently with the unfortunate 2007 film ‘300’, which had no links to the ‘War on Terror’, just like this newsletter has no links to the war on Iran.

Thank you to all our readers and contributors over the years. This is a shared milestone, reached through a shared dedication to balanced, trustworthy news—and puns.

In this week’s recap:

• 198 IS suspects detained over Israeli Consulate gunfight

• Ankara repositions itself amid regional turmoil

• CHP faces one court battle after another

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Police week brings flowers and fake fights

Also from us this week:

• Howard Eissenstat details the Turkey-Israel rivalry in a changing region on Recap radio

• Journalist Hilmi Hacaloğlu shares updates from the Istanbul Municipality trial on Stüdyo recap

Turkey’s recent experience with militant attacks is long, and another one got added to the list as regional turmoil appears to have played out in Istanbul once again this week.

Midday Tuesday, three armed militants in tactical gear attempted to attack a building housing the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul, resulting in a gun fight that left one attacker dead, the other two wounded and two police officers with minor injuries.

No motive has been publicized, and no Israeli staff were in the consulate, as they had been recalled in late 2023. Yet, initial reporting indicates the deceased attacker had Islamic State links.

Investigations ongoing: Turkish Justice Min. Akın Gürlek Wednesday announced a nationwide anti-IS operation, detaining 198 suspects in relation to the attack.

This comes as the two injured assailants remain in police custody, and new details emerge about the deceased attacker, who was identified as Yunus Emre Sarban.

Halk TV columnist Ismail Saymaz reported in detail about Sarban, who was charged with “IS membership” in 2019 on suspicion of preparing an attack, but was released after five months.

Sarban’s assets were later frozen in 2021 over links to IS financial networks and reactivated in August 2024 following his acquittal. The other two attackers were brothers and one had a criminal record for a drug offense, according to the interior minister.

Separately, Turkey’s personal care retail chain, Gratis, launched its own investigation and fired several employees for apparently ridiculing police responders during the attack and posting the video on social media. Eight Gratis staffers have been detained.

Responses: Like US envoy to Turkey Tom Barrack, Pres. Erdoğan quickly condemned the attack, adding: “We will not allow Turkey’s climate of security to be damaged by … provocations.”

Israel’s Foreign Ministry also condemned the event in a statement, while sharing appreciation for “Turkish security forces’ swift action in thwarting this attack.”

“The incident, coupled with Israel’s gratitude for the swift response of Turkish security forces, underscores a zero-tolerance policy regarding terrorist threats against Jewish or Israeli targets on Turkish soil,” Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told Turkey recap.

She added, “The incident also highlights that limited tactical cooperation between Israel and Turkey is still possible, and that ISIS remains a threat to Turkey.”

Advantage point: Ankara repositions itself amid regional turmoil

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No party like it’s 2002? You know those were different times.

In this week’s recap:

• CHP weighs options after detention wave

• Ankara works to mitigate Iran conflict

• MHP resignation spotlights power struggle

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Izmir serves olive oil on tap (bring your own bread)

Also from us this week:

• Sinan Ülgen outlined how Ankara views the Iran war on Recap radio

• Our April editions of This day in Turkey and the Events calendar are now available for News Tracking Tools subscribers

In theory, people vote for political representation. In practice, one in five votes has been misrepresented since the 2024 municipal elections in Turkey. Some stats:

• 30 elected mayors or co-mayors, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have been removed from office since the March 31, 2024 vote.

• 13 state-appointed trustees currently run municipalities in Turkey.

• 55 municipalities are run by parties not elected by voters due to party transfers and other changes.

In sum, the will of nearly 9 million voters in Turkey “has been disregarded”, the municipal and local government workers’ union (TÜM-BEL SEN) stated in their detailed analysis of “anti-labor and anti-democracy interventions”.

The figures come two years after the main opposition CHP led the 2024 vote. The party now faces its latest wave of corruption investigations, and CHP chair Özgür Özel is threatening to trigger early elections to safeguard Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş.

What’s happening: Yavaş, a popular nationalist and potential CHP presidential candidate, is expected to face a new corruption investigation as soon as this week. That’s what MPs from all parties were discussing in parliament this week and their evidence may be rumors, but they see a clear trend emerging in recent headlines.

1. CHP Uşak Mayor Özkan Yalım was arrested and removed from office Tuesday on bribery charges. Leaked police footage showed the mayor was detained while in a hotel room with a young municipal employee—which led to his suspension from the CHP and drew an apology from party leadership.

2. CHP Bursa Mayor Mustafa Bozbey was detained with 55 associates Tuesday in a corruption investigation on Bozbey’s term as mayor of Nilüfer—which ended in 2019. Bursa is Turkey’s 4th-largest city with about 2.5 million residents, some of whom protested the operation Tuesday night.

3. Ankara is back in the spotlight after 4 Etimesgut municipal workers were detained Monday on charges of “embezzlement” in the CHP-led district of Ankara. This comes as reports point to new evidence Yavaş misused public funds for concerts, fueling concerns of a looming operation on the Ankara municipality.

For those keeping score, this all comes as Imamoğlu notched a new investigation and Ankara’s Keçiören district mayor, who was elected under the CHP, is expected to join the AKP.

CHP response: In a presser Tuesday, Özel acknowledged pressure was growing on the opposition party and that western governments “tolerate” the AKP’s strategy of “eliminating its rivals” to maintain stable relations with Ankara amid regional instability.

Statements and reporting since then indicate the CHP may attempt to trigger elections through a coordinated resignation of its own MPs.

In theory, Turkish parliament must call snap elections if 5 percent of seats are vacant (30 MPs). Though again, in practice, MP resignations must be approved by the parliament, where the ruling AKP-MHP block holds the majority vote.

Speaking Wednesday, Pres. Erdoğan characterized Özel’s statements as “reckless” and the party as morally bankrupt before linking it to the nation’s long history with coups.

“Coup plotting is the character, spirit and identity of the CHP. Supporting coups and coup plotters is the CHP’s national sport,” Erdoğan said.

Analysis: Asked why the CHP is facing a new onslaught of investigations, Edgar Şar, co-founder and co-director at the IstanPol Institute, offered two possibilities:

1. The CHP, with its regular rallies and political activities, presents an “effective” opposition challenge that threatens the AKP’s “grip on power,” he said.

2. The new Justice Min. Akın Gürlek has expanded his previous work as Chief Public Prosecutor of Istanbul—where he initiated proceedings against Imamoğlu—and Gürlek is now targeting opposition figures nationwide, he added.

Moving forward, Şar suggested the CHP would need to be “much more creative” because “any popular objection” to the status quo is getting criminalized by the state.

“Many people really feel like they have no exits. They think that they are left with nothing to effectively object to what’s going on,” Şar told Turkey recap.

Speaking on the prospects of a snap election, he said: “The earlier the elections, the better for [the CHP].”

Though Şar underlined public opinion is difficult to measure, adding he believed that high polarization has “frozen” voter shares along party lines. And that was before the high uncertainty brought by the war in Iran.

“The more polarized the political atmosphere becomes, the more tolerant AKP voters will become towards the economic hardship and everything that’s going on,” Şar said.

“So, when you also take the Iran war into consideration—where I think it’s fair to expect a certain amount of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect—I think we will not see a very big margin in favor of CHP anytime soon in the polls.”

Done four: Ankara works to mitigate Iran conflict

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In this week’s recap:

• Turkey-Israel rivalry heats up again

• Migration and mediation top Ankara’s war response

• New messaging on the PKK peace talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Fat cats find a home in Turkish parliament

Also from us this week:

• Diego Cupolo and Emily Rice Johnson answered reader mail on Recap radio

The good news is that regional warfare mostly excluded Turkey this week—apart from a drone strike on a Turkish tanker in the Black Sea this morning and a stray naval drone washing up in Ordu Saturday.

The bad news is that Turkey remains highly exposed to regional instability as a growing rhetorical spat with Israel deepens anxieties.

As recap readers know, Israel-Turkey relations relapsed after Oct. 7 and the war in Gaza. In more recent weeks, leaders in both countries have exchanged threats, giving rise to phrases like “Turkey is the next Iran,” which it’s not, as Bobby Ghosh and most other analysts argue.

Still, the words are real even if AI-generated videos aren’t helping the situation.

What happened: Speaking on the first day of Eid al-Fitr Friday, Pres. Erdoğan said: “[May God,] in the name of his glorious name ‘Al-Kahhar’ [The Subduer] utterly destroy Israel.”

He added, “This Zionist Israel, as is known, has massacred hundreds, thousands of people … I have no doubt that it will pay the price for this.”

It’s nothing new for long-time Turkey watchers. Last Eid, Erdoğan shared a similar message and, in April 2024, he called for the utter destruction of “these Zionists, starting with Netanyahu.”

This may help explain Israel PM Netanyahu’s recent remarks about creating a “hexagon of alliances” to counter the “emerging radical Sunni axis,” which is understood to include Turkey. But the story goes back further and could extend much longer into the future.

Analysis: The Israeli sense that Erdoğan is “implacably anti-Israel” goes back to 2009, the year of the “one-minute” spat at Davos, explained Howard Eissenstat, Laurentian associate professor at St. Lawrence University.

Eissenstat, who published a new analysis on the Turkey-Israel rivalry, told Turkey recap that messaging on both sides is mostly for “domestic consumption” but underlined “the stories we tell ourselves matter.”

“In this case, we run the risk that Israeli and Turkish officials are cementing the idea that they are natural rivals in a zero sum game for power in the region,” he said.

“I don’t envision Israel and Turkey intentionally entering armed conflict,” Eissenstat continued. “But in the long term, we have two powers that see themselves as defining the region that have manifestly demonstrated their willingness to project power beyond their borders.”

He added that if both nations continue to see each other as rivals rather than partners, “then that points to a direction of potential conflict. And it could be indirect, it could be direct. For example, we already see the potential for proxy conflict in places like Syria.”

Regional reper-concussions: Migration and mediation top Ankara war response

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Ask us anything about Turkey and Turkey recap with this form or simply reply to this email. We’ll respond next week.

In this week’s recap:

• Opposition leader targets justice minister

• Turkey joins call on Iran to halt attacks

• Conflict alters peace process, election calendar

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Race horse served as mane course

Also from us this week:

• Yaman Akdeniz details the proposed social media regulations

• Lahib Higel on how the Iran war is reshaping Turkey-Iraq ties

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson recaps Turkey-Iraq pipeline news

After more than a year of judicial investigations into the CHP, the party’s chair did his own investigation into the justice minister, who then responded with more investigations.

That’s the plot of our lives here in Turkey, broadcast daily on a screen near you under the tentative title: Turnip the heat.

For reference, Turp means turnip or radish in Turkish. And the vegetable is the root of many CHP messages this week, the context of which you can read here.

The assets: In a presser Tuesday, CHP chair Özgür Özel alleged the justice minister acquired and/or sold properties with a total value of 452 million liras or about $10 million—a sum difficult to earn through a civil servant salary, he argued.

“There is an inexplicable accumulation of wealth,” Özel said while reviewing 12 property deeds allegedly held by the minister (available here).

Justice Min. Akın Gürlek quickly denied the claims on X, stating he would file a lawsuit for moral damages. The next day, Gürlek pushed back further, saying he owned four properties, and that as the former chief public prosecutor of Istanbul, he was required to declare his assets regularly.

The same day, reporting by Halk TV Wednesday indicated the public officials who conducted search queries on Gürlek’s properties had been identified and that legal action might be taken against them.

Berk Esen, an associate professor of political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul, said Özel’s allegations were significant, if accurate, and would be used by the opposition party to discredit ongoing investigations into the party.

“This is a strategy on the part of Özel to really hit hard at the government, to show that he still has some fight in him,” Esen told Turkey recap. “What that leads to remains to be seen. I don’t think the government is going to retreat.”

“Such allegations are risky in the sense that they are going to further harden the government to come after the CHP,” he continued. “We’re looking at constant fights between the two sides with no sign of any kind of moderation [ahead].”

The pressure: The news comes as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu marks one year in jail today, on a wide variety of charges detailed by Stüdyo recap. Also the CHP’s presidential candidate, Imamoğlu stood trial in the second week of the Istanbul Municipality case.

Özel led a rally at the city’s main municipality building Wednesday night, though the milestone week for the CHP crackdown was punctuated by the arrest of Kuşadası Mayor Ömer Günel, who was suspended from office on corruption charges Tuesday.

There’s also ongoing investigations in Antalya’s Manavgat district, where 12 of 36 affiliates detained last week were arrested. Speaking of Antalya, it’s worth noting an informant apologized this week for issuing false statements against that municipality.

The takeaway: Esen told Turkey recap the arrest of Imamoğlu and the ongoing targeting of CHP figures represents the “biggest authoritarian escalation that we’ve had from a civilian government since the 1950s.”

Characterizing the jailing of Imamoğlu as an attempted death blow to the opposition’s electoral prospects, Berk noted public opinion polls show mixed views on Imamoğlu’s case.

“Public opinion has not been swayed by any of these developments,” Esen said, referring to new corruption allegations against CHP figures.

“That may not mean much at this point … but in the medium to long term, this is going to be a huge problem [for the government] … and I don’t see how it can change this one year into the case because public opinion usually hardens, and it’s difficult to persuade people who think this is a political trial.”

Don’t withstand so close to me: Turkey joins call on Iran to halt attacks

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In this week’s recap:

• Turkey’s airspace violated again, NATO boosts defenses

• Calculations on Kurdish ground forces

• Istanbul municipality corruption trial underway

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Anti-war Sánchez sparks Turkey-Spain meme flood

Also from us:

• Help us prepare our first Q&A podcast: Submit any question about Turkey or Turkey recap by replying to this email or through this form

• Ezgi Başaran discussed how the Iran war impacts the Turkey-PKK peace talks on Recap radio

“S-400” was trending on social media in Ankara this morning, meaning it’s high time for air defense systems — as South Korea found out this week.

And while it may never be the right time to test the Russian-made missiles that caused a rift between Turkey and its allies, the Iran war has confirmed the Daft Punk maxim: Turkey is NATO after all.

What happened: NATO defense systems were deployed and strengthened in Turkey this week as the Iran war continues and a second missile was intercepted in approach of Turkish airspace Monday.

Some debris landed in Gaziantep without injury or damage, according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry. Falling fragments were also reported in Diyarbakır, also without injury, though with less details.

Like the first incident on March 4, this week’s missile may have targeted assets used by NATO forces in Turkey, namely the Incirlik air base in Adana and the Kürecik radar station in Malatya.

In response, NATO deployed a Patriot missile interceptor system in Malatya, the Turkish Defense Ministry announced Tuesday, following a NATO spox Allison Hart statement on X reading: “NATO stands firm in its readiness to defend all Allies against any threat.”

Prior to Monday’s missile incident, the US State Department ordered non-emergency US government employees and their family members to leave the Adana Consulate “out of an abundance of caution.”

Reactions: Turkish FM Fidan, who has worked to deescalate the conflict through diplomatic contacts with Iran, said the airspace violation was “unacceptable” in a phone call with Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi Monday.

For his part, Araghchi denied the missiles directed at Turkey airspace originated from Iran and said he would investigate the issue, according to Anadolu Agency.

Speaking to AKP lawmakers Wednesday, Pres. Erdoğan said Ankara continued efforts to reach diplomatic solutions through contact with Iran, the US and regional nations.

“This war must be stopped before it escalates and completely engulfs the region in flames,” Erdoğan said. “If diplomacy is given a chance, it is quite possible to achieve this.”

Analysis: Gönül Tol, director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, outlined four major concerns for Ankara in her latest analysis of the Iran conflict. Speaking to Turkey recap Wednesday, she said Turkish officials expect the war to “drag on for months” despite US Pres. Trump’s statements suggesting the end is near.

Tol said her sources in Ankara believe the attacks may create a “more belligerent, more militaristic regime” in Iran and that neither the US nor Israel have “achieved their aims in the war.”

The outcome is a “belt of chaos stretching from Syria to Afghanistan,” the sources said, which Tol characterized as a “grave danger and threat if you’re sitting in Ankara.”

Asked how Turkey’s government might be calibrating to fast-paced developments in its neighborhood, Tol responded: “I think they are banking on the prospect that Trump’s and Netanyahu’s goals might diverge.”

She added the mid-term question remains whether Israel can sustain the war without the current level of US involvement, stating there is potential for a protracted, low-intensity conflict across the region.

“All it takes is for Iran or Iranian proxies to just launch a drone or missile to disrupt traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. So, even a low-intensity conflict is going to be problematic,” Told said.

The Kurdish quest qualm: Calculations on Kurdish ground forces

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Announcement: Emily and I are hosting a Q&A podcast to mark the first anniversary of Recap radio! Send us questions using this anonymous form and we’ll respond soon.

In times of crisis, UNK principles advise us to talk it out.

In this week’s recap:

• Iran war impacts and scenarios for Ankara

• Defense concerns in Turkey

• Kurdish incursion may upend PKK talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Trump’s self-proclaimed Turkish daughter makes news again

Also from us this week:

• Report: Daniel Thorpe on how Iranians in Turkey are experiencing recent events

• Podcast: Hürcan Aslı Aksoy on the war’s implications for the Turkey-Israel rivalry

• Tomorrow: Emily Rice Johnson on the Turkish market effects in Economy recap

It’s been a while since we had this kind of war. The fog is real and social media—like high beams—can make things worse. Here’s a useful AP guide of what happened in each impacted country.

The following is a breakdown of Turkey-related news, prospects and implications stemming from the Iran war:

Official statements: Turkish Pres. Erdoğan Monday condemned US-Israel strikes as a “clear violation of ​international law”. The same day AKP spox Ömer Çelik offered more comments, stating recent US-Iran negotiations had been “completely abandoned” for a “ pre-planned attack.”

On Sunday, Erdoğan extended his condolences to the people of Iran following the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in airstrikes.

Border security: The three Turkey-Iran border gates have seen light traffic since the conflict began Saturday, according to news reports.

Noting there was “no extraordinary situation”, Trade Min. Ömer Bolat announced Monday that “same-day passenger crossings at all three customs gates have been mutually suspended.”

Speaking Tuesday, FM Hakan Fidan said Iran was not allowing its own citizens to cross the border. Then Wednesday, Interior Min. Mustafa Çiftçi repeated that claim, adding Turkish nationals in Iran—an estimated 20,000—and third-country citizens were allowed to exit Iran.

Çiftçi added that 5,010 people entered Turkey ​from March 1-3, and that tent camps would be prepared near the border if traffic increases in the coming period.

Airspace security: Unlike neighboring states, Turkey has reported just one near-airspace violation since Saturday. Analysts link this to the NATO umbrella, and the escalation risk carried by any strike on Turkey. (covered in detail below)

That said, an Iranian missile approaching Turkish airspace through Syria and Iraq was shot down by a US navy ship Wednesday, causing debris to fall in Turkey’s Hatay province without reported injuries.

A Turkish official told AFP the missile was “aimed at a base in Greek Cyprus but veered off course”. While a US official told the Wall Street Journal the missile was targeting Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which hosts US forces and nuclear weapons.

Before publication today, Iran’s military denied firing a missile at Turkey.

Analysis: Güney Yıldız, a senior advisor on geopolitics and strategic insights at Anthesis Group, has been covering developments for Forbes Magazine. In written responses to Turkey recap, he laid out three scenarios for Iran and Ankara:

1. Consolidation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which Yıldız said is Turkey’s preferred outcome though its probability decreases daily. In this scenario, surviving IRGC members form a pragmatic government, Fidan maintains intelligence contacts, Turkey maintains energy contracts with Iran and Kurdish-populated border areas are managed bilaterally. The problem: “Every additional day of strikes thins the [IRGC] bench further,” he said.

2. Extended conflict and a degraded but surviving state. This is the most likely medium-term outcome, according to Yıldız. “In this scenario, Turkey faces a more expensive version of the status quo. The bilateral relationship becomes harder to manage, not because Iran is hostile to Turkey, but because there’s no single counterpart to manage it with … Ankara’s balancing act [with NATO] becomes harder to sustain but not impossible … [while] energy exposure is the most concrete problem.”

3. State fragmentation, the low probability-high consequence outcome. Yıldız wrote: “Iran’s governance fractures along provincial, ethnic and institutional lines. No single authority controls the border regions. Kurdish armed organizations, Azeri ethnic movements and IRGC remnants operate independently. The refugee scenario escalates to millions.”
   

   “This is the scenario Turkey’s playbook was never designed for,” he continued. “It would require a fundamental rewrite of Turkish foreign policy from managing a rival state to managing a failing one. The Syrian template partially applies … but Iran is not Syria.”

In sum: Yıldız wrote Ankara plans for Scenario 2 while hoping for Scenario 1 and contingency-planning for elements of Scenario 3. Across all three: “Turkey’s interest in a coherent Iranian state doesn’t change.”

The writhing on the wall: Defense concerns in Turkey

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The best part is the beekeeper’s stated goal aligns with ours: To bring “a sweet taste to politics.” We’re open to a merch partnership if anyone has this guy’s contact info.

In this week’s recap:

• PKK peace process shifts gears

• US Turkey and Syria envoy busy in Iraq

• Ankara treads carefully amid US-Iran talks

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Scientists develop tomatoes for moon farms

Also from us this week:

• Amy Austin Holmes outlines post-ceasefire dynamics in Syria on Recap radio

• DEM’s Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit discusses the peace process on our Turkish podcast

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped our “This day in Turkey: March” edition, now available for news tracking tools subscribers

With its report filed and The Smurfs set to broadcast in Kurdish, the parliamentary peace commission mandate has come to an end. Now the real work begins.

But the next steps in the Turkey-PKK peace process* remain unclear after various hints at possible openings and obstacles for the road ahead—as is characteristic of most statements by MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli, including the one he delivered Tuesday.

*Disclosure: This is your regular reminder that my wife is a DEM Party MP.

What happened: In his party’s parliamentary group meeting, Bahçeli simultaneously introduced three areas for progress and three areas for problems in advancing the peace process. Here’s a breakdown of what he said:

1. Legal regulations should be implemented “swiftly and transparently.” Though only after a “criteria” for monitoring the PKK disarmament is established, which may not be so swift.

2. The “two Ahmets” should be reinstated after a “re-evaluation” of the trustee system—in reference to Mardin Mayor Ahmet Türk and Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer, who were removed from office on investigations that have since concluded.

3. The “status” of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan should be “addressed”. He did not define what this means, but added the Kurdish rights movement’s umbrella organization, the KCK, must also dissolve as part of the peace process.

Pres. Erdoğan also weighed in during his AKP group speech Wednesday, stating the parliament would take a driving role “in the new phase” of the process and that no nation should “give us a lesson in minority rights”. See above: The Smurfs.

Response: Clarifying some of the above, veteran DEM politician Ahmet Türk told the BBC that Öcalan doesn’t expect to be released from Imralı, but improved prison conditions such as increased contact with “his organization” would “contribute to a permanent peace.”

“The important thing is for the government’s thoughts on the solution to the Kurdish issue to come to light. There is no need to twist or bend this matter,” Türk said.

“The government has a majority in parliament. If they wish, legal arrangements can be made, brought to the parliament’s agenda and the appropriate steps can be taken.”

A Milliyet report Wednesday potentially offered more clarifications, citing draft legislation that would first redefine “effective repentance” laws for PKK members involved in crimes and, second, issue a new regulation on prison sentences that would apply to PKK members.

Analysis: Speaking to Turkey recap this morning, Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute, said the public has high expectations for tangible steps in the process, according to survey data and her own recent fieldwork in Diyarbakır.

“The initial cautious optimism has gradually shifted into cautious pessimism,” Korkmaz said. “What could restore trust are visible and implementable measures.”

Potential steps include the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Constitutional Court rulings, as highlighted in last week’s recap. Ending the trustee practices and reinstating elected mayors could also serve as “concrete actions” to strengthen public confidence in the process, she said.

“While broader legislative reforms or return mechanisms may follow, rebuilding trust through these immediate steps is the primary requirement for sustaining societal backing,” Korkmaz said.

Regarding Bahçeli’s role in the process, she added he tends to introduce “politically sensitive ideas” to test public reactions and “expand the boundaries of debate,” but:

“His statements should be read less as isolated provocations and more as calibrated signals—potentially preparing the ground for subsequent steps,” Korkmaz told Turkey recap, stating the moves suggest a deliberate “role-sharing” within the ruling bloc.

“However, this does not resemble a pluralistic or broadly participatory peace architecture. Instead, it appears to be a tightly managed process conducted primarily among Erdoğan, Bahçeli and Öcalan, with political recalibration unfolding accordingly.”

Up next: DEM Party will mark the one-year anniversary of Öcalan’s Feb. 27 disarmament call by releasing a new statement from the PKK leader tomorrow.

This follows a meeting Tuesday between Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş and DEM Party leaders. Kurtulmuş has now met with all major parties to discuss the next steps. More details on those next week, inshallah.

Barrack around Iraq: US Turkey and Syria envoy busy in Iraq

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And in Fatih, rose water joined the preparations. Ramadan Mubarak to all who celebrate.

In this week’s recap:

• Vague report advances PKK peace process

• Öcalan calls for “Democratic Integration”

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Turkey trades horses for horsepower

Also from us this week:

• Ioannis Grigoriadis joined Recap radio to review Turkey-Greece relations

• Wouter Massink explains Turkey’s cost of living crisis with seven charts

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Like your average Netflix series, the Turkey-PKK peace process released another episode with just enough content to keep us watching, but without delivering a sense of fulfillment or satisfaction for just about anyone.

The parliamentary peace commission voted Wednesday to approve a report laying the theoretical groundwork for legal reforms. The move advances a process seeking to end Turkey’s longest-running conflict, but the text falls short of addressing the causes and practical remedies for the nation’s so-called “Kurdish issue”.*

And let’s not forget the irony of debating democratic reforms while the nation’s main opposition candidate is in jail for a dozen-or-so investigations.

*Disclosure: Before we start, let me repeat that my wife is a DEM Party MP.

The report text begins by notably reframing the peace process not as an initiative brought to parliament by MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli on Oct. 1, 2024 —the common media narrative—but as one introduced a few days earlier by Pres. Erdoğan at Malazgirt.

Transferring credit to the Turkish leader alone increases the likelihood of success for the process. The question of what exactly the process aims to achieve, though, remains undefined by the report, which might be normal considering the sensitivity of the issue. Here’s a review of the text:

• Included: Many references to preserving the security and integrity of the Republic. The most concrete sections (5,6 and 7) establish the need to disarm and reintegrate PKK militants while also introducing legal and democratic reforms.

• Excluded: References to a “Kurdish issue” and the “right to hope”—or early release from life sentences—as well as peace process norms like international mediators, a truth and reconciliation commission, an implementation commission, missing persons units and references to mother tongue education, which is the core of the “Kurdish issue”.

Throughout, mentions of the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds are present, likely to avoid appearances of favoring one group over the other.

The text is a balancing act, and close observers will have heard much of it before, but one more point worth noting (section 7.1) is the emphasis on strengthening mechanisms “to ensure full compliance” with European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings, which has implications for jailed Kurdish politicians and many others.

A day prior, in a complicated X post, MHP deputy chair Feti Yıldız referenced compliance with ECHR rulings as a possible bridge to “conditional release” (a term he prefers over the “right to hope”) for certain prisoners in relation to the peace process. But everything depends on how legal frameworks are crafted and applied.

Reactions: Today’s Stüdyo recap has a comprehensive breakdown of the responses to the report, which was approved on a 47-2 vote with one abstention.

CHP MP Türkan Elçi said she abstained because the report did not include provisions for investigating unsolved murders. Meanwhile, TIP MP Ahmet Şık voted “no”, stating:

“There is a Kurdish issue in Turkey. A political mindset that denies this reality is now presenting us with claims of a solution.”

For their part, DEM Party released a statement Wednesday arguing the Kurdish issue cannot be defined through “terrorism”. Put more simply, their argument is that a political problem (denial of Kurdish rights and language) created a terrorism problem, and not the other way around.

PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s reply is analyzed in detail below, but to wrap this section, Erdoğan pointed to the road ahead in a statement Wednesday:

“Now, discussions on the legal aspects of the process will begin in our parliament,” the Turkish leader said. Lawmakers told AFP deliberations would likely begin after Ramadan.

Analysis: Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, a senior fellow at Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), said the next steps may involve legal measures to regulate the return of disarmed PKK members to Turkey as well as the release of sick and elderly prisoners.

Elected officials may also be reinstated in some Kurdish-led municipalities currently managed by state-appointed trustees. Though she noted the full implementation of civil liberties will be difficult.

“For the compliance with ECHR rulings, the implementations were applied arbitrarily, so isolated positive steps are insufficient,” Aksoy told Turkey recap. “What is required is a change in practice.”

As things stand, PKK militants anticipate reciprocity for disarmament while opponents of their reintegration hold doubts towards pledges for peace and democratization. Aksoy underlined the tension between the expectations and limitations of the government in the coming period.

“A lack of communication can fuel nationalist backlash on one side and disillusionment on the other, increasing the risk of renewed escalation,” she said. “For permanent progress, institutionalization, transparency, inclusion of civil society and a shift from conflict management to political transformation are needed.”

Regarding DEM Party’s role, Aksoy said politicians must “clearly explain” their expectations for cultural rights and democratic participation.

“This means, [in addition to] presenting the demands of the Kurdish people, explaining those to the rest of the society and establishing monitoring mechanisms,” she continued. “But it’s a very challenging task in the shrinking political space under an authoritarian governance.”

Go deeper: Öcalan calls for “Democratic Integration”

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In this week’s recap:

• Regional security concerns revive EU-Turkey talks

• New ministers signal more crackdowns ahead

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Canned comms chief heading to Vatican?

Also from us this week:

• Reha Ruhavioğlu outlines how Syria affects the PKK peace talks (in Turkish)

• Nimet Kıraç on how slow job growth is stalling earthquake recovery in Hatay

• It’s prime time to follow Turkish politics and, yes, we have a daily newsletter for that

EU-Turkey ties were defined by problems until larger problems took precedence. Meaning, Turkey’s stalled accession bid is getting compartmentalized into more manageable frameworks based on defense and trade cooperation as European leaders prioritize regional security.

The shift came Friday, personified in a meeting between Turkish FM Hakan Fidan and EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, and verbalized in a joint statement reading:

“Both sides recognized that enhancing collaboration in areas of mutual interest, including security and connectivity, is of strategic importance in light of ongoing regional and global developments.”

Considerations driving the new approach include but are not limited to:

1. Washington’s reduced or, at least, ambivalent role in EU security

2. Dangerous wargame projections for a hypothetical Russian invasion in the Baltics

3. Turkey’s significant contributions to ongoing NATO military exercises in Europe

4. Ankara’s perennial reminders that it has options and remains BRICS-curious

Urgency has arrived after 12 years of war in Ukraine and 12 months of Trump 2.0. And like any last-minute dinner, a quick fix involves defrosting EU-Turkey relations, not with a microwave, but with promises of Customs Union modernization, more multiple-entry Schengen visas plus increased trade and connectivity.

“Preparing for peace and stability in Europe implies preparing a strong partnership with Türkiye,” Kos told Politico before the meeting last week.

The imagery is impressive, too. NATO is holding Steadfast Dart 2026 drills in Germany with about 10,000 service personnel from 11 nations, including Turkey, which dispatched 2,000 forces and the TCG Anadolu navy ship with the 66th Mechanized Infantry Brigade inside.

Analysis: Taken together, the above developments signal the EU’s growing willingness to engage with Ankara beyond the accession framework, said Riccardo Gasco, foreign policy program coordinator at the IstanPol Institute and co-author of a recent report on just that.

“I think [accession] is being left out of the conversation on purpose right now because everyone knows that it doesn’t bring you anywhere,” Gasco told Turkey recap. “So they started to talk about different things.”

Those include bilateral defense deals instead of EU-wide initiatives like the SAFE program, he said, listing recent agreements between Turkish firms and Italy, Spain, Portugal and Poland. Yet, a potential downside of such fragmentation is the lack of an institutional mechanism to track bilateral deals, Gasco noted.

What happens next depends on the details of the current EU-Turkey thaw. Following the bloc’s recent trade agreements with Mercosur and India, Gasco said EU officials were almost obligated to visit Turkey and extend an offer focused on mutual needs.

“What I see [coming] is some small advancements in some select areas, which will maybe build a base to then open a serious discussion on the Customs Union,” he continued.

“But right now, this is a movie we have already watched, in a way. Whenever the European Union feels unable to deal with pressing issues, it reaches out to partners, right? And one of those partners is definitely Turkey.”

Clockwork Arraign: New ministers signal more crackdowns ahead

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And this Justin Bieber hairline gag is brought to you by the strongest Ryanair social media crew.

In this week’s recap:

• Ankara pushes for US-Iran diplomacy

• Syria ceasefire deal followed by energy deal

• Turkey-PKK peace talks to move on

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• What the Epstein files say about Turkey

Also from us this week:

• EP rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor discussed EU-Turkey ties on our podcast

• Diego Cupolo on how AI slop will create new jobs for young journalists

As we face another war, US Pres. Donald Trump’s threats sound a lot like that Jace Everett song. Indeed, Trump wants to do “bad things” to Iran if a deal is not reached soon, and Turkey is uncomfortably close to the action.

US ships are amassing in the Middle East. Military strikes are in the cards if Tehran doesn’t accept US demands. Also, the US downed an Iranian drone Tuesday, meaning the US and Tehran are well down the path to escalation. And Ankara wants none of this because of the potential repercussions for the region.

The view from Ankara: Turkey offered to moderate negotiations, and Istanbul was expected to host US-Iran talks Friday until they were moved to Oman. Top Ankara officials have been pushing for de-escalation for weeks, most notably FM Hakan Fidan, who hosted his Iranian counterpart last Friday while calling for diplomacy.

For his part, Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi appeared on CNN TÜRK the same day, delivering a message for peace in his own way:

“When I say we are prepared for war, it should not be interpreted as meaning we want war. On the contrary, our aim is to prevent war,” Araghchi said.

Speaking Wednesday from Cairo, Pres. Erdoğan made his anti-war stance clear, as well:

“Foreign interventions in our neighbor, Iran, will pose significant risks to the entire region. Solving the problems with Iran through diplomacy, including the nuclear dossier, will be the most accurate method,” Erdoğan said in a joint presser with Pres. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

Analysis: Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, recently published a comprehensive look at Turkey’s calculations with Iran amid regional tensions, and what a weakened government in Tehran might mean for the Turkey-Israeli rivalry.

He argues the Turkey-Iran modus vivendi is fragile and Ankara’s capacity to “shape outcomes in its immediate neighborhood” is limited.

In light of those dynamics, Grinberg told Turkey recap Ankara had sought to gain leverage to shape fast-moving developments by offering to host US-Iran negotiations, but that didn’t work. One reason, he said, might have been security concerns with Turkey’s participation and MIT, its intelligence agency.

“Iranians, they fear Turks … and Oman is way more comfortable for the Iranians because it’s their own backyard,” Grinberg said. “I also suspect that the Iranians understand that MIT is a very serious organization. They would find it more difficult to keep all their secrets, and MIT would know [them if the meeting] was in Istanbul.”

What’s next: In the event of war, Grinberg framed concerns about mass migration to Turkey and the mobilization of Kurdish separatists in Iran as propaganda campaigns designed to draw support for Tehran’s leadership.

Yet, he also expects the US to carry out strikes. Grinberg said US forces are probably not getting moved for a “bluff or joke.”

“I’m sure that Trump, better than anyone else, understands very well what it means if you threaten and don’t really put it into practice,” he told Turkey recap.

“Second,” Grinberg continued. “There’s no way Iran agrees to American demands, because it’s simply … political suicide. Because it will be automatically interpreted by friends and foes as a surrender, so there’s no way.”

Lease and desist: Syria ceasefire deal followed by energy deal

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If you’re reading this and within commuting range, you are personally invited.

In this week’s recap:

• Humanitarian crisis mounts on Turkish border

• Ömer Özkizilcik on IS transfers, border security

• Implications for the PKK peace talks

• Ankara mulls ‘buffer zone’ for refugees in Iran

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• Winter festivals for the rest of us

Also from us this week:

• Saadet Party’s Bülent Kaya told Ceren Bayar where the PKK peace talks stand now

• Bilge Yeşil outlines media strategy in the New Turkey on Recap radio

• Emily Rice Johnson dropped the February edition of This Day in Turkey for news tracking tool subscribers. Enjoy!

The ceasefire is holding, for now. On and off clashes rattled but have not shattered the temporary truce between Damascus and remnants of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after last week’s offensive.

Initiated on Jan. 20 and extended until Feb. 8, the ceasefire has seen violations from both sides, according to NGO reports, as negotiations keep everyone guessing what comes next.

In the meantime, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in SDF-held areas along the Turkey-Syria border, where a winter storm Monday exacerbated conditions.

On the ground: An estimated 173,000 people were displaced by recent conflicts in northern Syria, the International Organization for Migration reported Sunday. (scroll down for map)

Aid convoys have entered Hasakah from Iraqi Kurdistan (pictured above) though supply shipments have been more limited in the now isolated Kobani enclave, according to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an analyst and journalist who co-authored two books on Kurds in Syria.

“Despite the humanitarian corridor, not a lot of aid that has come and there’s thousands of people [in Kobani], so it’s difficult,” Wilgenburg told Turkey recap.

He was in northern Syria during the offensive and published his observations here. In his discussions with locals, Wilgenburg noted two points: Many feel betrayed by the US and many are considering their next move if the ceasefire collapses.

“Everybody’s really afraid and a lot of civilians want to flee,” he said. “They want to go to Iraqi Kurdistan, but the thing is there’s not really a road and also I don’t think that Iraqi Kurdistan wants the demography of the area to change.”

Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Tuesday said Turkish state agencies and humanitarian agencies were “reaching out to those in need in northern Syria and delivering aid.” In a joint statement the same day, CHP and DEM leaders called for Turkey-Syria border crossings to remain open for more aid deliveries.

On the politics: The situation remains fluid, though Ankara views a weakened SDF as a positive development for its regional security interests. The withdrawal of Russian forces from the northeast Syria base in Qamishli may also be viewed as positive for US regional interests.

Reporting by the Wall Street Journal suggests Syrian Pres. Ahmed al-Sharaa and his forces swept further into SDF areas than envisioned by negotiators, including US envoy Thomas Barrack, who originally sought SDF withdrawals west of the Euphrates as a “gesture of good faith”, according to WSJ’s Lara Seligman.

US officials are now debating measures to help protect Kurdish forces in Syria—who allied with Washington in anti-ISIS campaigns. Most notably, US Sen. Lindsey Graham Tuesday said he would propose a “Save the Kurds Act” that would “impose crippling sanctions on any government or group engaged in hostilities against the Kurds.”

Meanwhile, Washington’s stance remains ambiguous. In her analysis, Gönül Tol reported “Ankara coordinated with Barrack ahead of the offensive to ensure Israel would not intervene to protect the SDF,” according to a Turkish official.

What comes next in Syria, Tol wrote, leaves the SDF with several “grim choices”:

“If, after the two-week cease-fire deadline expires, it opts to resume fighting, Syrian forces are likely to overrun the remaining SDF-held territory, with Kurdish civilians caught in the crossfire and little prospect of meaningful international protection. If the SDF instead accepts Damascus’s terms, it will effectively be acquiescing to the end of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy in Syria.”

Interview: Ömer Özkizilcik on IS transfers, border security

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In this week’s recap:

• Syria clashes redraw map, threaten mass migration

• US regional policy centers on IS containment

• Greek marine park and Israeli ties test Ankara

• Domestic and diplomatic wraps

• ‘Marylin Monroe of Mardin’ arrested

Also from us this week:

• Henri Barkey joined our podcast to discuss events in Syria and the PKK talks

• Daniel Thorpe reports on the trust deficit behind the peace process in Turkey

• Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu interviewed IYI Party deputy chair Selcan Taşçı on Stüdyo recap

You know it’s bad when SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi gets called the Kurdish Kılıçdaroğlu.

The end of 2025 deadline for Damascus-SDF integration talks has passed. The Syrian Army and its proxies have taken control of 90 percent of land once held by the SDF, resulting in an estimated 1,000 deaths on both sides of the clashes.

And according to some analysts, the SDF has ceased to exist as affiliated Arab tribes have splintered off, leaving a core Kurdish fighting force to defend Kurdish-majority areas in Kobani, Hasakah and Qamishli—which constitute a “red line” Abdi has vowed to defend.

For context, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is/was a mixed force of mostly Kurds and Arabs led by the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia with ideological ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), though most people in Ankara would just call all of the above ‘terrorists’.

For more than a decade, the SDF allied with the US to defeat and contain Islamic State militants, a relationship that has now “largely expired” and is covered in detail below.

Views from Turkey: With the prospects fading for an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria, aka the “Rojava project”, a four-day ceasefire (effective Jan. 20) is mostly holding as Damascus and the SDF return to the negotiation table.

Pres. Erdoğan and coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli met Wednesday, issuing no press statement, though they likely discussed developments in Syria. Earlier that day, Erdoğan reiterated support for a centralized state in Syria that would be free of terror.

“With the recent developments in Syria, the future will be brighter than snow for Turks, Turkmens, Kurds, Arabs and all our other friends,” Erdoğan said at the AKP parliamentary group meeting.

Speaking Tuesday, Bahçeli said last week’s presidential decree on Kurdish rights in Syria was “in line with our thoughts and suggestions.” He added the roots of SDF and YPG forces must be “eradicated” from areas east of the Euphrates river.

“The security of Damascus is the security of Ankara,” Bahçeli told MHP lawmakers Tuesday.

Meanwhile, DEM Party officials framed recent events as attempts to remove Kurdish nationals and cultures from ancestral homelands. DEM led several protests in southeast Turkey and near the Syrian border, where demonstrators clashed with riot police.

A delegation led by DEM Party co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları entered northeast Syria Wednesday for consultation meetings amid ongoing negotiations.

Analysis: Speaking to Turkey recap, Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), said a ceasefire collapse could trigger a humanitarian crisis and a mass migration out of remaining SDF pockets in Syria.

“A full-scale war would lead to tens of thousands of local Kurds being displaced, a lot of them probably moving toward Iraqi Kurdistan or some toward Turkey, if Turkey opens up the border crossings for them,” Salih said.

He underlined Kurdish civilians do not feel safe in jurisdictions held by government-aligned militias, some of which have been publishing graphic videos online of dead, decapitated, tortured or apparently kidnapped Kurdish fighters.

“People see this stuff and they have seen what has happened in Sweida and in the Alawite areas. So, they are very much justifiably and understandably fearful of what could unfold,” Salih told Turkey recap.

He added Kurdish nationals across the Middle East have mobilized to protest clashes in northeast Syria, adding there is potential for heavier fighting and casualties in the days ahead.

“There is a unanimous consensus among the Kurds in Rojava, across the region and in the diaspora, that this is an existential war … and that it is not going to stop there. It will most probably go to other places, like Iraqi Kurdistan,” Salih said.

This IS the end: US regional policy centers on IS containment

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