Over the last few weeks, up and down the east coast of the United States, I’ve had the privilege of meeting with officials, think tanks, colleagues and—most of all—journalism students.

Trend lines appear bleak for the profession, but the sheer determination of these journalists-in-training gave me hope not just for better business models, but also for better methods to distribute, curate and verify information, which is the core purpose of journalism.

This post outlines five opportunities for young journalists who are ready and willing to carry the profession into the future.

Rewind: My +20-year career in journalism spanned the early internet, when news outlets didn’t really know what to do with web pages, and the resulting mass layoffs and buyouts, which turned my editors’ hair gray as they mulled career options in the newsroom, with family portraits on their desks.

A great dispersion of information sources followed. Social media produced new voices, venues and revenue models, Substack included, allowing some people to succeed and innovate where legacy media had not. This came with mixed results for the quality of information produced, but it was the least bad option for many reporters and expanded the range of news coverage globally.

Fast-forward: We’re now entering an era I’ll call the “great reconvergence”, in which the innovations of the last two decades get reapplied by journalism institutions to great effect, and create new jobs.

I may be wrong, but the collapse of a so-called “town square” social media, the growth of information silos (like WhatsApp group chats) and the spread of AI-generated content, will make news institutions more valuable than ever because the one-person news brands of the 2010s simply cannot handle what’s coming.

Only trained teams and/or news agencies can really verify AI-produced videos, photos and content. I know, because I struggle with this issue when operating alone and just faced it during recent clashes in northern Syria. How can I verify videos in real time of Islamic State fighters escaping prisons? That requires a team.

Opportunities: The above is one example of a big problem in our information environment, and one that needs fixing. People are willing to pay for that. They’re also willing to pay for curation and distribution methods that fit their needs and interests.

Counter to common narratives about the news industry crumbling, the coming period is packed with opportunities for young journalists, who will need entry-level jobs—and they will exist if you know where to look. Here are some leads:

1. An AI verification industry is coming: As mentioned above, no single person can verify AI content at the speed it’s being produced. This will spawn or expand existing verification teams in news agencies and surviving legacy media outlets.

If they don’t have in-house staff, they’ll outsource to digital forensics companies offering similar services. Both groups will need entry-level hires and will provide excellent training grounds for young journalists. View it as fact-checking for new media.

2. Newsletters as the front page of niche topics: This one is from our playbook at Turkey recap, but it can be replicated with any subject. People have many interests and there is too much information online. Add to that social media streams and now flood the zone with sh…AI-generated content. Someone needs to curate, and that’s a job.

I partially link rising political apathy and declining news engagement to information overload. The front page of newspapers used to show people what was important and invite them to the inside pages if they wanted more details. Newsletters with links to articles can provide the same service—along with sustainable business models for their teams.

3. Rethink the article: Different people want information in different ways, and the centuries-old news article is not always the most efficient medium for relaying what readers need.

Examples: Newcomers to a subject need context. Experts in a subject need just the latest update or quote. Many others need to know what the news means for them or their area of interest. Meanwhile, decision-makers need all the viewpoints on a subject to, yup, make decisions.

These components of a news report can be remixed and shuffled. That applies to text, video and audio news. At Turkey recap, we label some sections with headers like “What happened”, “Analysis” and “What comes next”, allowing readers to spot what they want and get on with the day. Journalism is a service industry. Serve people what they want, how they want it.

4. Rebuild trust with radical transparency: Semafor has also experimented with separating the components of articles, at times presenting the news, expert arguments and counterarguments—as well as the reporter’s opinion on the matter.

The argument-counterargument sections help to foster honest debate on polarizing subjects, trusting readers to judge the viewpoints on their own terms. Adding the reporter’s point of view goes a step further because, despite what we’re told to do or say in journalism school, everyone is biased.

Acknowledging that we have viewpoints allows readers to know where we stand, builds trust and makes us human. Same for conflicts of interest. Disclose them. Many journalists have strong opinions and deliver balanced news. These realities can coexist.

But no one believes journalists are unbiased as individuals and even hinting at it or taking “professional distance” in heated debates just feels disingenuous. Public trust is vital to the future of the media profession. Be genuine, not god-like, and remember journalists can show bias through what they don’t cover.

5. Report, report, report … on new subject areas: Until AI-powered drones can observe events, interview people and spit out accurate news stories, the world is going to need human reporters. The issue for young reporters is finding the stories older reporters are not already covering. There are always opportunities and the best path to a full-time job runs through the coverage gaps.

I got my start as an environmental journalist at the Newark Star-Ledger when interest was high following Al Gore’s 2006 movie, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, and no one in the newsroom was covering the beat at the time. I was interested in the topic, pitched the editors and soon after got my first front page clips—which I laminated and still keep today.

After climate news took off, other young reporters made careers in covering social media, which many established journalists didn’t touch, leaving a wide gap for newcomers. The same happened later with the crypto boom and it’s happening now with AI-related news and drone warfare.

Editors know that people engaged with new topics and new technologies are better suited to cover them. But don’t expect them to find you. Instead, you have to find them, call out their coverage gaps and fill them. Report, report, report. Same as always.

I hope this is helpful. I told the young journalists I met in the US that I want them to succeed, and I meant it.

The consolidation of power erodes societies. The consolidation of information is equally corrosive to the worlds we know and don’t know. Journalists can continue to bridge information landscapes by focusing on distribution, curation and verification in the coming period.

The students above showed real initiative. They’ll build the infrastructure of 21st-century journalism and they left me inspired. This post is my attempt to relay that inspiration to you, the reader, and hopefully other young journalists, too.

Someone’s going to need to report the news. So, as we like to say at Turkey recap: Meet the momentum.

Support us

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Contact us: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to produce balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Ceren Bayar, Parliament correspondent

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Günsu Durak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

When we look back at Turkish foreign policy in 2025, what stands out is not a major shift or a sudden change of direction. Instead, it is a sense of consolidation. The way Ankara engages with the world has become more structured, more predictable in its logic, even if outcomes remain uncertain.

Turkey operated in an international environment defined by fragmentation rather than clear blocs. The war in Ukraine continued to reshape European security. US commitments felt less certain and more transactional. Regional crises increasingly overlapped.

In this setting, Turkish foreign policy was less about choosing sides and more about managing risk exposure, preserving flexibility and maintaining relevance across multiple theaters. This approach is often described by concepts like strategic autonomy or hedging.

In 2025, these were not just slogans, they were methods of operation. Looking ahead, however, the space may narrow for the type of hedging displayed by Ankara. As conflicts harden, alignments become more demanding and expectations for consistency grow.

These dynamics unfolded against the backdrop of continued NATO commitments and an increasingly transactional relationship with Washington, further narrowing the space for ambiguity.

This means maintaining flexibility without clear positioning may become increasingly difficult for Turkey in 2026.

Europe’s security debate and Turkey’s awkward centrality

One of the most important developments this year was the acceleration of Europe’s security debate. Rearmament, defense production and new cooperation tools moved from abstract discussions to concrete planning. As Europe sought partners, Turkey appeared both central and politically uncomfortable.

On the one hand, Turkey brings military capabilities, operational experience and a growing defense industry. On the other hand, political tensions, concerns about the rule of law, the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu and Turkey’s stalled EU accession process continue to limit deeper integration.

Turkey’s response was pragmatism. Rather than seeking political reintegration, Ankara focused on functional cooperation, often through bilateral rather than multilateral platforms. Defense and security were major entry points. The message was clear: Turkey wants to be part of Europe’s security conversation, but on practical terms rather than through a broader political framework.

In this sense, Turkey’s position felt “peripheral” only on paper. In practice, it was increasingly central.

Defense partnerships as tools, not symbols

Another clear trend in 2025 was the evolution of industrial defense cooperation as a foreign policy tool.

This is not unique to Turkey, but for Ankara, such ties have become a central instrument for advancing pragmatic engagement in the absence of deeper political alignment. They no longer just represent a sale of equipment; they create long-term interdependence and signal strategic intent.

This dynamic was especially visible in Turkey’s defense cooperation with European partners. The Italy-Turkey relationship, in particular, stands out as a telling example of how pragmatic, interest-driven engagement can translate into deeper integration in practice, even as broader Turkey-EU relations remain politically constrained.

Similar patterns emerge in Turkey’s defense ties with other EU countries, suggesting that functional cooperation can advance despite unresolved normative and political questions—a tension that may become more consequential over time.

Beyond Europe, Turkey’s expanding defense cooperation with Egypt illustrates how strategic pragmatism is reshaping regional relationships. Joint production and technology development mark a significant shift from years of political tension toward a more interest-based partnership—one that also intersects with wider regional files, including Gaza and Eastern Mediterranean security.

Here too, defense cooperation operates as both a confidence-building tool and a platform for broader strategic coordination.

This approach is mirrored in Turkey’s cooperation with Gulf partners, where defense projects are closely linked to efforts to diversify partnerships, localize production and reduce reliance on a single external provider.

Across different geographies, defense cooperation has become a key instrument through which Turkey manages autonomy and navigates a fragmented strategic environment.

These partnerships are not only about ideology or bloc politics. At the same time, they carry risks. Interdependence can support autonomy, but it can also create new vulnerabilities if politics enter the equation.

Mediation, Ukraine and the limits of balance

Turkey’s role as a diplomatic actor, particularly in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war, remained important in 2025. Ankara’s ability to maintain open channels with Moscow while engaging Western partners continues to lend it visibility and relevance.

Beyond mediation, Turkey has also positioned itself with an eye to the post-war phase, signaling interest in reconstruction and economic recovery efforts when conditions allow.

Yet, this role is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Mediation requires credibility, not just access. As the war continues and positions harden, Turkey’s balancing act is increasingly scrutinized. Flexibility still matters, but ambiguity has limits, especially in a polarized environment where expectations of alignment are rising.

How Turkey translates diplomatic access into a meaningful role in reconstruction will be a key test once the war eventually enters its endgame.

Gaza, regional escalation and Turkey’s stabilization aims

The Gaza war and its regional repercussions also shaped Turkey’s foreign policy in 2025. Ankara played an active role in diplomatic ceasefire efforts and signaled its intentions to participate in post-conflict stabilization arrangements.

This posture reflects a familiar Turkish approach: combining strong political positioning with initiatives to take part in diplomatic and security mechanisms on the ground. Gaza reinforced Turkey’s drive for recognition not only as a vocal regional actor, but also as a contributor to stabilization and crisis management.

At the same time, the Gaza crisis exposed the constraints of Ankara’s influence in a highly polarized environment. Relations between Turkey and Israel remained tense in 2025, limiting direct coordination and narrowing diplomatic space.

How this tension evolves will matter well beyond Gaza, particularly in Syria, where overlapping security concerns, military presence and post-conflict arrangements require some degree of indirect or mediated coordination.

Turkey’s regional role, therefore, remains visible and politically resonant. However, its ability to shape outcomes increasingly depends on managing strained relationships and working through multilateral or third-party frameworks rather than relying solely on bilateral channels.

Syria, domestic peace efforts and the Kurdish question

Syria remained one of the clearest stress tests for Turkish foreign policy this year. The post-Assad context highlights the gap between influence and capacity. Military presence alone does not produce stability. Governance, legitimacy and coordination matter just as much.

What became more apparent in 2025 was the growing link between regional developments and domestic politics. The Kurdish question is central to this connection. Developments in Syria have a direct impact on Turkey’s internal debate, not only in security terms but also politically.

Against this backdrop, renewed domestic discussions on a possible peace process are not occurring in a vacuum. They are closely related to changing dynamics in Syria and the broader region. In this sense, domestic peace efforts and regional strategy are increasingly intertwined. Progress or failure in one arena will shape the other.

The Caucasus, peace talks and connectivity

Another file likely to gain prominence in 2026 is the South Caucasus. The evolving peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as discussions surrounding new connectivity routes linking Turkey and Azerbaijan through Armenian territory, carry significant strategic implications.

For Turkey, this is not only about its close partnership with Baku. It is also about regional integration, trade corridors and long-term stability in a space where Russia’s role is changing and other actors, mainly the EU and China, are seeking greater influence. If managed carefully, the Armenia-Azerbaijan track could become a rare example of conflict de-escalation producing tangible regional connectivity.

At the same time, the process remains fragile. Political will, domestic constraints and external pressures will determine whether this opportunity translates into durable outcomes. This will be a crucial test case for Turkey’s ability to translate diplomatic leverage into lasting regional benefits.

Europe’s dilemma, Turkey’s leverage

Looking back, a recurring theme in 2025 was the tension between Europe’s growing security needs and its discomfort with Turkey as a political partner. Cooperation is increasingly felt to be necessary, but trust remains limited. The result is a relationship that works in practice but struggles politically.

This transactional dynamic sets clear limits. For Turkey, it creates leverage but also a ceiling. For Europe, it creates dependence without clear influence. Neither side seems fully satisfied, yet both continue to engage.

What sustains this relationship is strategic necessity rather than a shared vision. Security cooperation, migration management and economic interdependence keep channels open, even as democratic backsliding and misalignment in foreign policy have narrowed EU-Turkey relations to a largely transactional space, leaving the accession framework formally intact but politically hollow.

Fragmentation within the EU further complicates this dynamic. Diverging priorities among institutions and member states produce uneven signals, especially on defense cooperation and Turkey’s role in Europe’s security architecture.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition that sidelining Turkey may be counterproductive, given its role in Black Sea security and regional diplomacy. The result is a form of managed pragmatism: necessary, functional and structurally limited.

Domestic politics and foreign policy sustainability

Underlying many of these dynamics is a domestic reality that cannot be separated from foreign policy. Economic pressures, electoral competition and governance challenges shape the space in which Turkish diplomacy operates.

Pragmatism abroad is, in part, a response to constraints at home: limited economic room to maneuver, growing social pressures and a political environment in which foreign policy often functions as a tool for managing risk and projecting control.

Foreign policy activism helps signal strength and agency in an uncertain international environment, but it also raises expectations, both externally and domestically. Diplomatic visibility and regional engagement can generate short-term leverage, yet they also require follow-through.

Over time, sustaining credibility abroad depends increasingly on coherence, institutional capacity and political legitimacy at home.

In 2025, this connection, and at times disconnection, between domestic politics and foreign policy became more visible. External partners paid closer attention to internal developments not only as a normative concern, but as an indicator of Turkey’s ability to deliver and sustain long-term cooperation. Even if rarely stated openly, domestic dynamics are an integral part of how Turkey’s foreign policy credibility is assessed.

Looking ahead to 2026

If 2026 continues along similar lines, the key question will not be whether Turkey remains relevant. Geography and capability ensure that it will.

The real question is sustainability. Can Turkey continue to turn flexibility into influence without eroding credibility? Can pragmatic or strategic autonomy deliver long-term outcomes, not just short-term relevance across multiple theaters?

Last year clarified the logic of Turkish foreign policy. The next will test how far that logic can go—and at what cost.

Support us

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Contact us: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to produce balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Ceren Bayar, Parliament correspondent

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Günsu Durak, Stüdyo recap editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

Dear reader: If you’ve ever found value in our work, if you’ve ever shared our articles or puns, if you’ve ever saved time with our news monitoring services — consider becoming a paid subscriber.

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It’s our gift to you—or your gift to a fellow Turkey news enthusiast—and we remain forever thankful to our subscribers because you fund this anomaly of a newsletter.

Anomaly because we exist, despite it all, and because we are one of few remaining middle grounds between local and international media.

That means we not only fill the gaps for English-language news on Turkey, but in the process, we also provide reporters a place to publish and develop their skills, in turn fostering future coverage of Turkey and its region.

Honestly, I don’t think I’d survive as a freelance journalist now, and I’m grateful for the opportunities we can provide here.

No joke. For two years, we’ve hosted fellows through International Journalists’ Programmes (IJP). Over six years, we’ve published about 60 reporters based in Turkey, and their work remains free-to-read, racking up millions of views from around the globe—and in different languages.

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Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Contact us: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to create balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Ceren Bayar, Parliament correspondent

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Günsu Durak, Turkish language editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

Our friends thought we’d run out of puns by now. But where there’s a will, there’s a wordplay.

Turkey recap turns six this week and, as the head editor over the years, I can proudly say we’ve published the work of about 60 journalists for readers across more than 107 countries and 49 US states … looking at you, North Dakota.

Prairie state aside, we remain grateful to everyone who supported or contributed to this newsletter since 2019.

It’s been a real learning experience, and we are now applying those lessons with Stüdyo recap, creating the one-stop shop for politics in Ankara. (more on that below)

I didn’t know it at the start, but everyone struggles to understand what’s happening in Turkey. And this is more true today, as international news outlets focus their limited resources on developments in Gaza, Israel, Syria and Ukraine.

It’s not a glitch in your news feed. There’s definitely less Turkey news in English. We’ve tried to fill that void, but it’s not always easy. Publishers in Turkey face the one-two punch of repression from above and dispossession from AI, like everyone ever.

And the forecast is dark. As media researcher Emre Kızılkaya has noted, Google search results heavily favor pro-government media in Turkey. Should we assume AI assistants are doing the same now? Also, how do we keep our curated media diet balanced?

What does the facts say: A big part of the problem in monitoring Turkey news is the lack of facts. Information is sparse when primary sources don’t talk to the press, so many journalists (myself included) end up playing some form of "Minesweeper” by quoting adjacent sources.

This can result in conspiracy theories, or worse, in discourse about discourse, all of which is based on nothing. Garbage in, garbage out, as they say, and the same is true for AI.

Our goal with Stüdyo recap is to create some foundational facts about Turkish politics for us all to stand on. This is done with balanced reporting from parliament, as our correspondents do, and I hope their work allows everyone to build narratives that better reflect the reality here in Ankara.

Call it too simple. Call it naive. Turkey recap was called both those things when we launched. Since then, we’ve informed many thousands of readers with organized, easy-to-follow news about this country.

Now, we’re doing the same with Turkish politics for Turkish audiences.

Thank you again for reading us. If you don’t already, please consider supporting our work because none of this would exist without you.

Support us

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Contact us: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for discount options). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to create balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Ceren Bayar, Parliament correspondent

Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu, Parliament correspondent

Günsu Durak, Turkish language editor

Demet Şöhret, Social media and content manager

The March 23rd imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu is a defining moment, even in a country that has become a global shorthand for autocratization. With the most popular rival of Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan now in prison, the arrest of hundreds of others in investigations against the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and rumors circulating that the government may seek to even take over the party, Turkey is on the cusp of a transition to a consolidated dictatorship. This would mark a profound transformation in governance in Turkey. It would also have global implications for thinking about this next phase of the post-Cold War order, confirming that we have entered a new era in which hybrid forms of governance like “competitive authoritarianism” are replaced with more repressive models.

Turkey, in the last 15 years, is an exemplary case for understanding competitive authoritarianism. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way developed the concept in the early 2000s to describe a specific regime type that has more democratic features than a fully authoritarian regime, but still should not be understood as a democracy. Turkey has been autocratizing for at least 12 years; already in 2018 we at Freedom House rated it “Not Free,” a status it has kept ever since—albeit at the upper bound of that category. Yet despite the rampant repression in Turkey against the media and civil society, and the consolidation of Erdoğan’s control over the judiciary, the security services, the military, and every other arm of the state, İmamoğlu was able to win repeated elections in Turkey’s largest city. Not only that, but he had emerged as a plausible contender to Erdoğan—a fact confirmed not just by public polling, but by the risk Erdoğan has now taken in imprisoning him.

Ever since İmamoğlu and other opposition candidates swept municipal offices a year ago, Erdoğan recognized the current configuration of political forces was running against him. And just as he did in 2015 after his party lost its majority in parliamentary elections, when he turned against his previous policies of peacemaking with the Kurdish movement to ally himself with the nationalist far right, Erdoğan has been trying to redraw the country’s political map to ensure he remains in power.

The first move was to paint the Kurdish opposition into a corner. After years of raids, arrests, and the replacement of elected mayors with government-appointed “trustees,” the civilian arm of the movement is resilient but clearly exhausted from fighting a one-sided battle against the state with little support from other segments of society. Meanwhile, the armed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been hounded in its bases in Iraq by Turkish drone strikes and assassinations. The stunning revolution in Syria in December brought to power a close ally of Ankara and left the PKK’s ally in the north of the country, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), isolated and forced to withdraw from certain areas. At the same time, after the inauguration of Donald Trump, expectations have risen that the US will soon withdraw its troops from the SDF’s territory, leaving the SDF vulnerable to a final overwhelming incursion from Turkish proxies or the military itself.

With the movement on its back foot, Erdoğan and his far-right nationalist ally in parliament, Devlet Bahçeli, launched a new “peace process” through the imprisoned and isolated PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The outreach produced results at the end of February with the release of the first official letter in years from the leader, in which he called for the PKK to dissolve itself—without any meaningful concessions from the Turkish state. After Öcalan’s letter, the Kurdish movement is trying to salvage any leverage vis-à-vis the state that would ensure democratization and rights for Kurdish people in Turkey, while still advancing a peace process to end a war that has cost Kurds more than anyone else in Turkey. One much-discussed scenario entails the movement supporting Erdoğan in changing the constitution so he can remain president indefinitely, in exchange for freedom for Öcalan and Kurdish opposition leader Selahattin Demirtaş.

Now with İmamoğlu’s arrest, the pincer movement of Erdoğan’s strategy is clear. The charges against İmamoğlu span the usual grab-bag of corruption and malfeasance that Turkish prosecutors habitually drop on dissenters, including İmamoğlu. They also add a twist, however: an allegation that by coordinating with the Kurdish movement in the local elections last year, İmamoğlu formed a terrorist organization (though İmamoğlu was not formally charged with this over the weekend, prosecutors have said essentially they reserve the right to charge him with it later). It is no small irony that even as Erdoğan seeks to cut a deal with the Kurdish movement, his opponents can be threatened with prosecution for doing it. Combined with rumors that the state would impose a trustee on the CHP if it does not drop İmamoğlu, the purpose appears to be to tear apart the party by splitting it between its Turkish nationalist and progressive factions.

Amidst the escalating police violence and growing repression of the media as protesters express their dissent against İmamoğlu’s arrest, it can be easy to lose sight of Erdoğan’s fundamental claim: that only he can decide who will represent the Turkish people. This claim was already evident in the arrest of Demirtaş eight years ago, in which the CHP was shamefully complicit. It has now encompassed not only the Kurdish movement, which always existed at the edges of what the Turkish state deemed permissible, but the CHP itself. This claim abandons any pretense of democracy.

It therefore erases the competition in competitive authoritarianism, leaving only the unmodified regime type. Authoritarian rule is something many leaders are no longer attempting to disguise or seeking to explain away; they view their right to do as they please as inherent to their office. This evolution away from even nominal compliance with norms restraining impunity marks a dangerous threshold that the world will regret crossing, again.

The second administration of Donald Trump in the United States, with its even more pronounced America-first isolationism, pivot away from traditional allies, and cooperation with authoritarians like Russian President Vladimir Putin, has made it unlikely there will be meaningful support for Turkish democracy in Washington. The United States’ overt shift to short-term deal-making—as indicated by the agenda for this week’s visit of Turkish Foreign Min. Hakan Fidan to Washington—means there will likely be one less voice that will be urging Erdoğan to back away from the precipice. That makes the engagement of other democratic allies even more important, particularly as Europe considers how to strengthen its security and resilience in the face of a weakening transatlantic alliance. There will be a strong temptation to look the other way in order to advance Europe’s other priorities with Ankara. But European leaders should keep in mind a lesson of the last two decades: that a more openly authoritarian regime in Turkey, like in other states on the borders of the continent, will lead to far less security, and far more risk.

Support us

Turkey recap is an independent, reader-supported newsletter that helps people make sense of the fast-paced Turkey news cycle. Contact us: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Subscribe here on Substack (or on Patreon for a student discount). Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only chat and news tracking tools.

Turkey recap is produced by our staff’s non-profit association, KMD. We are an affiliate of the Global Forum for Media Development and aim to create balanced news that strengthens local media by supporting journalists in Turkey.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief

Emily Rice Johnson, Deputy editor

Azra Ceylan, Economy reporter

The Gaza war has unleashed colossal shifts in the Middle East, including the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria in December. In Damascus, a new administration, headed by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which led Assad’s overthrow, is transitioning from revolution to governing a diverse, traumatised country. Turkey, with its ties to victorious rebel groups, its long border with Syria and economic and political clout, is the regional country best placed to influence and benefit from the changes. But nothing is assured, and crucial to success will be calming the northeast, where Ankara and Washington back rival groups intermittently fighting each other.

Ankara’s priority in the new Syria seems to be to debilitate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who control large chunks of the northeast. As most of Syria basks in the glimmer of hope that Assad’s fall has brought, clashes between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed local rebel groups threaten to escalate, benefiting no one. The new leaders in Damascus are in talks with the SDF, but if these falter, violence could jeopardise both Syria’s prospects for stability and Turkey’s chance to benefit from peace. As President Donald Trump settles into the White House, the US and Turkey, as two NATO allies, should work together to calm Syria’s war-weary northeast, where they have long been at odds.

An unexpected windfall

The risks and potential rewards for Ankara are immense. Assad fell as his main backers, Russia and Iran (and the latter’s proxies such as Hezbollah), effectively washed their hands of him as they were too stretched by other conflicts, with Ukraine and Israel. Turkey hopes many of the over three million Syrian refugees it has hosted at great expense for over a decade might now go home. Turkish construction companies and other businesses also hope to pile in to help with Syria’s rebuilding. Many Ankara officials regard this as a unique chance to boost their influence in Syria and the wider Middle East – all the more so with Moscow and Tehran distracted, at least for now.

Ankara sought Assad’s fall after Syria’s civil war began in 2011, but by the time it happened thirteen years later, it had come to terms with his seemingly iron grip on power and hoped at best to keep the heat on him to win more concessions in talks. Like some Gulf and many Western countries, it backed the armed opposition in 2011, and expected Assad to go swiftly. But he held on, with help first from Iran and its allies and, since 2015, from Russia. Aware that their conflicting interests in Syria could cause trouble, Ankara, Tehran and Moscow launched the so-called Astana talks process in 2017. Its 20 or so rounds of meetings failed to end the conflict but have helped the three avoid escalation on the ground. From 2022, Ankara even explored normalising relations with Assad, but this ran aground when the latter insisted that any progress must wait until Turkish troops left Syria’s north, where thousands had been gradually garrisoned to ward off threats to national security that Ankara feared.

The regime’s sudden collapse, a week after rebels began a march on Aleppo and then Damascus, surprised most officials and observers in Turkey, as elsewhere. On several occasions in the past, Ankara had opposed any such rebel moves. And when the rebels defied Turkish warnings and advanced towards Aleppo, Ankara saw it mainly as a chance to bring Assad back to the negotiating table. Turkish officials said at the time they wanted a weakened but not toppled regime, fearing a chaotic power vacuum.

Caution gave way to optimism as the rebels snatched victory. Four days later, Turkey’s intelligence chief, İbrahim Kalın, made an elated public appearance in Damascus, and Ankara swiftly reopened its embassy. Turkey’s Hakan Fidan became the first foreign minister to visit the new leaders in Damascus on 22 December, and three weeks later his Syrian counterpart, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, returned the visit to Ankara. Turkish diplomacy now focuses on helping an orderly transition and convincing Western states to take more steps to ease draconian economic sanctions imposed against Assad’s Syria so that aid and investment can flow in.

Turkey holds key cards

Ankara and others will ultimately judge the fledgling administration by its success in stabilising Syria which will likely require sharing power and a degree of inclusive governance.

Turkey’s complex relationship with HTS balances national security and geopolitics. The group had long benefitted from a Turkish military cordon, agreed between Ankara and Moscow to prevent any regime offensive triggering a new wave of refugees into Turkey. Despite officially classifying HTS as terrorists, due to their previous affiliation to al Qaeda, Turkey chose to deal with the group pragmatically as it dominated Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib which held out against Assad.

The relationship remains prickly but Turkey’s geographical position as a critical lifeline and its economic strength should give it useful leverage over the group. Its southern neighbour is also looking to diversify its relations. Syria’s new foreign minister made his first official foreign visit to Saudi Arabia, followed by a trip to the United Arab Emirates, signalling Damascus’s intent to strengthen ties with other regional powers.

The northeast is the thorn

Turkey-Syria ties may well be determined mainly by the precarious northeast. For a decade, this corner of Syria has been controlled by the SDF, which the US has backed in its continuing fight against the Islamic State group. Turkey, however, views the SDF as a direct extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known by its Kurdish initials PKK, which it has fiercely fought in Turkey and northern Iraq for 40 years. Turkey, the US and the European Union designate the PKK as terrorist. Ankara fears its arch enemy dominates what amounts to a statelet that could threaten its national security. It opposes US support for the SDF and has armed other forces who contest its control.

Turkey’s air force has itself struck SDF positions, as have its troops in Syria, to weaken its hold over an area whose lucrative oil fields make up 80-90 percent of Syria’s output, and to protect Turkey from possible incursions or infiltrations.

The SDF and rival rebels fight intermittently. Since December Turkish-backed factions have driven the SDF out of Tal Rifaat town near Aleppo and parts of Manbij further east, and have tried to push into Kobani on the Turkish border, a town where Kurdish forces, backed by the US, famously repelled an Islamic State siege in 2015.

If talks since December between the new administration in Damascus and the SDF progress, they could pave the way for stability, but Ankara is looking over their shoulders.

After Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan visited Damascus, Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa said Ankara supported efforts for a negotiated settlement with Kurdish-led forces, and would halt further military actions that could undermine this. However, the SDF and Turkey-backed rebels are still clashing. It is unclear what outcome Turkey might accept, short of the surrender and disarmament of the SDF and the departure of all PKK-trained non-Syrian figures who have played a role in the fight against Islamic State over the last decade.

Washington’s leverage

Turkey feels unable to launch an all-out ground offensive against the SDF while US-led anti-Islamic State coalition forces remain in the area. American support for the SDF strains US-Turkish relations. If Turkey now seems emboldened by Assad’s fall to step up attacks, the US response – which is uncertain under its new president – will be critical.

When Kurdish-led and Turkey-backed forces clashed in Manbij on 8-9 December, the US reportedly told the SDF to pull back from the west bank of the Euphrates or lose overall Pentagon protection. The group complied. To deter advances into Kobani, the US sent troops to patrol the area. But it is unclear if these moves will stop Ankara and its local partners. US senator, Lindsey Graham, a close Trump ally, threatened on 10 December to push for sanctions on Turkey if it expanded its operations against the SDF, and just before taking office, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed support for the group.

Washington supports the SDF primarily for fear that the Islamic State may try to regroup in post-Assad Syria. On 8 December, the Pentagon said US forces carried out 75 airstrikes against Islamic State targets, mostly in central Syria. US officials also worry about the security of detention facilities run by the Kurdish-led forces, which house former Islamic State militants and their families, including some 50,000 people in al-Hol camp near the Iraqi border.

In his first days in office, Trump had little to say about Syria. In 2019, during his first term, he ordered US forces away from the Turkish border in northeast Syria, tacitly enabling Ankara to send in troops to expel the SDF from some areas. Despite this, the US joined many European capitals in imposing economic sanctions and defence export restrictions on Ankara after this operation. Trump may resume his first-term efforts to withdraw some 2,000 US troops in Syria, which Ankara would rejoice at. Despite Senator Graham’s comments, Trump’s statements just before resuming office suggest he may be warmer to Ankara that his predecessor Joe Biden, but then again he also suggested US troops might stay in Syria as they were no longer in harm’s way.

Seizing the moment

An escalating conflict in the northeast would probably displace civilians and derail fragile efforts to build a new cohesive state, undermining hopes across Syria for lasting peace and progress. The country would be helped enormously by at least a détente between Ankara and the SDF. This could involve the US and Ankara brokering an immediate ceasefire between rival armed groups and committing to two parallel engagement tracks.

The first track would be part of Syria’s broader political transition talks, bringing a wide range of representatives to Damascus for an intra-Syrian dialogue with the goal of moving towards peace in the northeast as part of efforts to shape a new Syrian state.

The second would be direct US-Turkey talks to define their roles and cooperation in the northeast, including the scope of Ankara’s access to border areas, regular patrolling, and creating demilitarised zones as needed, while ensuring that gains against the Islamic State are preserved. This needs the backing of both Damascus and Kurdish-led forces. Progress could open the door to discussions of a gradual withdrawal of non-Syrian fighters within the SDF – one of Ankara’s key demands.

Developments outside Syria also give cause for some hope. Ankara is showing willingness for a new process to end its 40-year-old conflict with the PKK. On 28 December, for a first time in over a decade, the government allowed a delegation from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (which has about a tenth of the seats in Turkey’s parliament) to visit imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation visited Öcalan for a second time on 22 January and subsequent visits are planned with some Turkish pundits expecting Öcalan to soon call on the PKK to move towards ending its armed struggle. Such a breakthrough, though still uncertain, would boost chances of a deal in Syria.

As the dust settles following Assad’s surprise departure, an end to the quagmire in the northeast would remove a major hurdle for the new government in Damascus on its path of bringing effective and legitimate governance to all of Syria. It would boost chances of stability and prosperity for Syria and its partners, including Turkey, and remove a painful thorn in long-strained Turkey-US ties. Turkey’s leadership and constructive engagement in such a process would, moreover, demonstrate to the new Syrian government and other parties that it has a genuine desire for a peaceful Syria, laying the groundwork for a closer and more mutually beneficial relationship.

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Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP) experienced its first major defeat in 22 years with the March 31 elections, various signs indicate Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is determined to seek another term.

But since Turkey’s constitution prohibits this, his candidacy will require the opposition’s support. And so, Erdoğan is attempting to amend the constitution, dangling the possibility of collaboration in this endeavor as a carrot for opposition parties.

Put another way, recent negotiations on constitutional amendments are intricately linked to Erdoğan's effort to secure another term as president. The content of the amendments could take various forms as discussions progress, ranging from political openings to alterations in the presidential regime.

Currently, the main scenario appears to be changing the electoral victory threshold from the current majority requirement of 50 percent + 1 vote to a plurality of 40 percent + 1 vote.

This strategy seems to be accompanied by a messaging tactic aimed at portraying a rift between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is intentionally designed to mislead and play on the opposition’s wishful thinking.

Erdoğan candidacy without constitutional loopholes

A new candidacy for Erdoğan would de facto represent a fourth term and de jure a third term, despite the Turkish constitution limiting the presidency to two terms.

Because of this, his candidacy in 2023 sparked controversy. After having served as president in 2014 and 2018, it appeared Erdoğan had already completed two terms. However, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) ruled the shift to the executive presidential system in 2017 reset the term count, meaning the 2023 term would only be his second and complied with the constitution.

Unlike in 2023, Erdoğan appears to have no constitutional loopholes at his disposal for the next elections. However, there are alternative methods to enable his candidacy.

One often considered scenario is a presidential call for early elections, as allowed by the constitution. This, nevertheless, is not a viable option. Such a move would cause excessive controversy, not only domestically but also internationally – especially at a time when Turkey's economy desperately needs foreign investment and international support.

The likely scenario ahead and the 40+1 trick

Another scenario requires amending the constitution to enable a third term.

This could be achieved through either a referendum, requiring 360 parliamentary votes, or through direct enactment in parliament, necessitating at least 400 votes with significant support from the opposition.

Opting for the latter option appears more viable considering a public referendum carries the risk of turning into a vote of confidence in the current political and economic climate.

To succeed with a direct parliamentary vote, Erdoğan would need to offer incentives to the opposition. Ongoing negotiations seem to focus on other constitutional amendments, the specifics of which may encompass a range of changes, from alterations to the political system to broader political reforms.

Within this context, lowering the presidential election threshold to 40+1 appears to be one such incentive offered at the negotiation table. The appeal for the opposition is obvious, as a reduced threshold would make it easier for them to win. It also signals the AKP may have been weakened and can no longer rely on the MHP’s electoral support.

Here is the trick though. The proposal for 40+1 is being subtly pitched to the opposition as if there is a rift or conflict between the AKP and MHP. The ruling party has been dropping hints that it’s trying to end its alliance with the MHP, a party that is generally perceived to be associated with mafia-like entities, the deep state and is often scrutinized for its militaristic and ultra-statist approach.

Such a scenario is enticing to the opposition and could possibly lead them to support constitutional changes. However, there is no evidence to suggest the AKP and MHP will not form an even closer alliance after constitutional amendments are passed.

In fact, a genuine split between the AKP and MHP would be unlikely. They have jointly established the new presidential regime. If the alliance were to end, it would likely signify the end of this regime or the result of its collapse.

Sure, there are apparent tensions between the two parties, but they are not between the leaders and seem to be primarily among lower ranking members and the bureaucracy’s cadres, who are individually pursuing their own agendas.

The most recent example of these tensions is the situation within the Ankara Police Department, where an operation against a mafia organization – allegedly associated with former Interior Min. Süleyman Soylu, a politician with strong MHP support – purportedly involved the wiretapping of high-level AKP executives.

Many view these developments as evidence of an emerging crack in the MHP-AKP alliance. However, it is also likely these events are caused by infighting between subgroups who aim to position themselves by influencing higher-ranking officials.

Essentially, the latest conflict between the MHP and AKP factions resembles a squabble between children as their parents watch from a distance, stepping in only when necessary.

CHP’s response to Erdoğan’s maneuvers

Apart from the 40+1 proposal, an additional scenario that could open Erdoğan’s way to another term is a modified presidential system that grants more power to the parliament. There may also be other options based on a system reset akin to 2023. Could this happen? Why not?

But whatever the scenario, the question remains: Is Erdoğan likely to win if he runs again? The answer depends on various factors, most prominently on the performance of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

By performance, I mean both the political discourse the CHP will articulate as the next general elections loom (set for 2028, but likely in 2027) and their management of the 35 municipalities the party won in this year’s local elections.

I would also add the CHP’s ability to counter the incumbent's Byzantine-style strategic maneuvers.

Budget cuts and CHP municipalities

One such maneuver could be applied through the recently announced austerity measures in the government’s “Public Savings and Efficiency Package”. Among its objectives, the package strategically aims to portray Turkey as a credible country that “will not waste your money” as evinced by self-imposed IMF-like measures.

However, another aim of the package, which many have overlooked, may be to limit the capacity of CHP municipalities and hinder their performance before the next general elections.

On May 15, Erdoğan announced in a social media post that the package would encompass the entire public sector, including local governments. He also highlighted recent instances of nepotism in various CHP municipalities, where several mayors appointed their relatives to key positions.

“After March 31, we all see how the appointments of spouses, friends, relatives and relatives in the opposition municipalities have caused wounds in the public conscience. We expect the opposition to take responsibility for both the implementation of public austerity measures and the prevention of nepotism,” the post text stated.

Indeed, the controversy surrounding the hiring of relatives of CHP mayors presents Erdoğan with a golden opportunity. By linking potential financial restrictions with scandals of nepotism, Erdoğan would be able to address public outcry for imposing such restrictions on CHP mayors, while also undermining CHP’s governing performance.

We have entered an era of fast-paced politics where strategies can change by the minute. In this dynamic landscape, Erdoğan's adeptness at political maneuvering could once again come to the forefront and shape the future of Turkish politics.

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On Feb. 21, Somalia ratified a 10-year maritime security agreement with Turkey, enabling Ankara to act as a security provider in Somalia’s waters. The news came after Somaliland, an unrecognized state looking to secede from Somalia, agreed to lease a part of its coast to Ethiopia.

Turkey’s involvement in Somalia increased during Ankara’s “zero problems with neighbors” era, which was spearheaded by former Foreign Min. Ahmet Davutoğlu. Once a successful foreign policy, it stumbled in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings.

The resulting isolation in its immediate neighborhood prompted Ankara to use military muscle to assert itself as a global middle power.

Particularly in Somalia, Turkey increased military and humanitarian aid assistance, in turn raising tensions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), another influential actor in the region that has since pursued a rapprochement with Ankara. Today, the latest Ankara-Mogadishu deal could revive regional tensions if Turkey and the UAE don’t coordinate their foreign policies.

The developments come amid broader instability linked to the Israel-Gaza war, which has seen attacks by Houthis in Yemen threaten shipping routes through the Red Sea. Between the shockwaves of violence, state and non-state actors are advancing their own interests to maximize gains and harden defense lines.

With its Ethiopia deal, Somaliland aims for international recognition as a separate state. For its part, Ethiopia seeks to regain direct water access after Eritrea broke away in 1991. Both are long-standing goals and not directly related to recent Houthi attacks.

Still, Turkey’s new mandate to defend Somalian sea borders could pave the way to a low-intensity naval conflict with Houthi rebels in the near future and further expand regional tensions. Such a scenario is not in Ankara’s interest and could be best avoided through coordination with the UAE.

Zero problems

The “zero problems” policy came as one of the lynchpins of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after it was elected in 2002. It envisaged extending Turkey’s influence in its neighborhood and beyond through cooperation instead of competition.

In this vein, Turkey invested heavily in economic and development initiatives, as well as softer cultural diplomacy policies. Though after the general failure of the Arab popular uprisings, sitting regimes quickly froze their relations with Turkey and teamed up to counter its weight in the region.

The final nail in the “zero problems” coffin was the 2013 military coup in Egypt, which suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. From then onwards, Turkey’s external politics became increasingly securitized and Ankara’s growing interest in Somalia came in the context of this series of events.

Ankara has since become a key international presence in Somalia despite initiating its projects when Mogadishu was isolated due to internal chaos and instability caused by the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab militant group.

Turkey-UAE competition

In August 2011, then-Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia’s besieged capital. Soon after, Turkey launched a fast-growing humanitarian aid operation, which in time facilitated significant economic investments.

Notably, Turkish companies obtained the operating rights to Mogadishu’s port and its international airport. Expanding Turkish presence in the following years also drew threats from the jihadist group and, in response, Turkey initiated military support for Somalia, eventually opening a large military base there in 2017 to train officers in the Somali National Army.

Turkey’s military involvement has since fueled geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa and beyond. It particularly alarmed the UAE, which was also heavily invested in the region and was competing with Turkey for influence in Libya, the eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere.

The two countries diverged significantly on their relations with Somalia, including defense cooperation, development and humanitarian aid, control over economic assets and thorny questions regarding Somalia’s federal states, such as Somaliland.

The UAE was actively engaging with these states, while Turkey took a more cautious approach because of its proximity to Mogadishu, which does not want to see these entities empowered.

The Emirates increased its support to Somaliland and initially planned to open its own military base in the territory. It likewise stepped up military and economic support for Puntland, a quasi-autonomous region in eastern Somalia, where it had been funding the Maritime Police Force and, in 2017, obtained development rights to its main port.

Vice versa, Somalia’s federal member states were alarmed by Turkey’s increased partnership with Mogadishu after 2017. Somaliland has long-feared Mogadishu may reverse its de facto independence and this sentiment has grown after the lifting of a UN arms embargo on the federal government of Somalia on Dec. 1, 2023.

Throughout, Puntland and smaller states have pushed for Turkey to pursue a more evenly balanced aid and development program in its dealings with Somalia and the federal member states.

Regional thaw

Since 2022, a thaw in Turkey’s relations with the Emirates has helped reduce geopolitical and domestic tensions in Somalia. As recently as 2021, the two sides were sparring as part of a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the gulf states. At the time, Turkey had backed its blockaded ally by increasing supply deliveries and Turkish Airlines flights.

But ties have improved dramatically since early 2021. Turkey and the UAE signed several economic cooperation agreements, and the Emirates purchased Turkish drones for its military. As a result, the Somali government elected in 2022 was able to take a more balanced approach in its relations with the UAE and Qatar, breaking from the immediate past.

Yet it is clear that Ethiopia and Somalia are taking bellicose action against each other, which once again increases the risk of conflict in the region.

On Jan. 1, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced they signed a memorandum of understanding, stating Ethiopia would open dialogue to recognize Somaliland, in exchange for the 50-year lease of a coastal strip of land near the Red Sea port of Berbera.

In response, Somalia this month ratified a treaty giving Turkey rights to protect its maritime territory in exchange for 30 percent of revenues from Somalia’s offshore areas, which host prime fishing waters as well as oil and natural gas resources.

The treaty gives Turkey a massive advantage in exerting influence over the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean. It may also be read as a move to balance Ethiopia’s influence.

The Emirates, which is currently on good terms with all actors – Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland and Turkey – is now forced to make a hard choice.

Given the competitive nature of UAE relations with Turkey in Somalia, these steps could further exacerbate divisions in the country, especially if the UAE decides to support Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Still, if Turkey and the UAE could work closely in Somalia, they may eventually help the nation become a more resilient state. This, in turn, would enhance Mogadishu’s ability to counter Al-Shabab militants.

As the two most involved external actors, Turkey and the UAE should build on their recently improved relations to coordinate interests in Somalia and encourage dialogue between Mogadishu and the federal member states, rather than deepening divides.

This could help prevent further geopolitical tensions, and return a modicum of stability to the sub-region, where Yemeni Houthis threaten to upend global trade.

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Two days before the May 14 elections, Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled the government might take steps toward a constitutional amendment to change the 50+1 rule in presidential elections.

The topic has since prompted constant behind-the-scenes discussions in the capital, and more so since Erdoğan revived it last month.

Yet to pass such an amendment, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) would need votes from other parties, and its largest partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), declared it wasn’t open to discussing such a change.

This stance can be expected since the amendment would reduce the AKP’s need for MHP support in the future. But to get there, the AKP will need MHP support in the present, as well as additional support from smaller right-wing parties – both in the ruling and opposition blocs.

Such dynamics have created a moment of “Constitution arithmetics” in the capital, where parties are leveraging and rearranging their positions in the political arena, and nearly every move is calibrated to maximize power.

Constitution arithmetics

Erdoğan and his AKP believe the current situation could help them achieve their long-sought goal of changing the constitution. They also hope it will ensure the continuation of their two-decade reign in power, which requires strong results in the March 2024 elections.

To guarantee electoral victories in Ankara and İstanbul, the AKP and Erdoğan may need to confine themselves to smaller constitutional ambitions in the form of a partial amendment package. 

According to political sources in the ruling People’s Alliance, the AKP is currently seeking a positive signal from the MHP to advance a limited package – which would include constitutional rights on headscarf usage.

If passed before the March vote, such a move could bolster both parties’ performance at the polls. But getting enough votes will require some smart calculations.

To break down the math, the Turkish parliament has 600 seats. A constitutional amendment can be accepted with 400 votes or put to public referendum with 360 votes. Here are the number of seats each party holds:

People's Alliance = 324 

• AKP = 264

• MHP =50 

• YRP = 5

• HÜDA PAR = 4

• DSP = 1 

Opposition (not allied) = 276

• CHP = 130 

• HEDEP = 57

• İYİ = 40** 

• Saadet = 10

• Gelecek = 10

• DEVA = 15

• TİP = 4

• DP = 3

• EMEP = 2

• DBP = 2

• Independent MPs = 3

** Subject to change amid ongoing resignations

The math shows, that even if the AKP manages to secure all the People’s Alliance votes, they will still need at least 36 votes to put the amendments to a referendum. 

The left-wing parties in the opposition – CHP, HEDEP, DBP, TİP and EMEP – have 195 MPs. With DP, which mostly follows CHP’s lead, they have 198 MPs. In the eyes of AKP officials, collaborating with these parties while maintaining an alliance with MHP might prove difficult.

Among the right-wing opposition parties, İYİ Party’s position could be particularly decisive as İYİ Party support alone would cross the 360 threshold. If this formula does not work, the joint support of DEVA, Saadet, and Gelecek might be needed.

Although Erdoğan did not bring up the 50+1 issue again after MHP chair Devlet Bahçeli rejected the proposal, there is no reason to think the Turkish leader – who always plans for the next election – has shelved his constitutional change ambitions. 

AKP sources told Turkey recap the atmosphere at the party’s headquarters indicates constitutional debates are continuing.

Erdoğan, who wants to reclaim İstanbul at all costs in the local elections, will take new steps regarding the constitution by closely monitoring both the balances within the alliance and opinion polls. 

Putting the headscarf card and a partial constitutional package on the table before the local elections will require concessions for MHP and other right-wing parties, but the end result leads to AKP gains in the polls and history books. 

Erdoğan and after

For context, Turkey uses a constitution adopted in 1982, which was drafted following a coup and under military rule. Many amendments have been applied over the years, but the core principles and laws are still in force.

Political leaders have wanted to replace this constitution for decades, and the AKP is no exception. The party has made several attempts and prepared several drafts yet hasn’t been able to succeed in its main goal beyond holding several referendums.

However, even though the AKP’s vote share declined to 35 percent, the increased representation of right-wing parties in parliament after the May 2023 elections gave the ruling party a new chance to start another round of constitutional talks.

There are several reasons for the AKP's desire to change the constitution.

First, AKP wants to institutionalize the legal changes it has achieved with a new constitution and make them permanent. For that, their goal is to revise some provisions – including the framework of secularism in education as well as the definitions of citizenship, fundamental rights and freedoms. 

The AKP also wants to change the “maximum two-term” rule for presidents. Under the current constitution, it’s not possible for Erdoğan to run for another term if the parliament does not vote for snap elections.

And as previously mentioned, the president is not happy with the 50+1 rule that he introduced six years ago. After not being able to secure the absolute majority vote in the May 14 presidential elections, Erdoğan does not want to risk losing a possible third term for himself or a first term for other AKP candidates that will succeed him. 

Even though the AKP remains Turkey’s biggest party, senior AKP officials told Turkey recap that they want to change the 50+1 rule because it has created a de-facto coalition period for them. 

Some officials believe that the current system involves constant compromises with smaller parties – which, for them, makes the system a mistake from the beginning.

On the other hand, the MHP wants to use this opportunity to strengthen the security paradigms that are currently in place. Additionally, changing the structure of the Constitutional Court has long been stated as one of the party’s main objectives. 

After the 2024 local elections, Turkey may potentially enter a period without elections for four years. 

In this perspective, the ongoing constitutional debates in Ankara are more of a power struggle than a legal discussion, and the strategies formed in this period will lay out the future for not only the AKP, but also other right-wing parties.

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This newsletter is supported by readers via Substack and Patreon. Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only Slack and more. We also have pun-tastic merch. All proceeds go towards sustaining our journalism.

Turkey recap is an independent news platform produced by the Kolektif Medya Derneği, an İstanbul-based non-profit association founded by our editorial team to support and elevate news media and journalists in Turkey.

Get in touch: send pitches, queries and feedback to info@turkeyrecap.com.

Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief @diegocupolo

Gonca Tokyol, Editor-at-large @goncatokyol

Ingrid Woudwijk, Managing editor @deingrid

Verda Uyar, Digital growth manager @verdauyar

Sema Beşevli, Editorial intern @ssemab_

Onur Hasip, Editorial intern @onurhasip

The Aegean waters dividing Turkey and Greece have seen unusual calm for a year, a welcome turnaround after a long, threatening row over maritime sovereignty claims exacerbated by hydrocarbon finds in the eastern Mediterranean.

Now, Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Turkish Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are to hold a summit in Athens on Dec. 7; it is the best chance since 2016 for the two NATO allies to improve relations and look into relaunching talks on the Aegean dispute.

Despite other disagreements over military build-ups in the region and over Cyprus, they should seize this rare opportunity, not least as their shared neighborhood’s fate – troubled by wars in Ukraine and Gaza – is ever more uncertain.

The tide turned

The summit itself is a triumph of intense diplomacy, which revived the bilateral High Level Cooperation Council from a seven-year sleep. Established in 2010, this aims to boost cooperation in trade, tourism and other areas. The diplomacy leading here was a silver lining born of tragedy. Turkish earthquakes killed over 50,000 people in February 2023, then wildfires and floods swept Greece, prompting mutual offers of help and a diplomatic thaw.

In mid-2023, Erdoğan and Mitsotakis were re-elected. With campaigning out of the way, both have sought better relations. They appointed pragmatist foreign ministers, Hakan Fidan in Turkey and Giorgos Gerapetritis in Greece, who officials say get on well. This, a need to reduce tensions after Russia invaded Ukraine and a desire to improve relations with other neighbors, appears to have nudged the sides closer.

“Remaining locked in the previous cycle of tensions will only produce lose-lose outcomes,” a senior Turkish official said. “We want to make a clean break from frictional ties with Greece.”

Climbing out of a hole

This progress to a summit followed years of reverses, with relations sinking to a rock-bottom for recent decades in summer 2020. Both countries put their militaries on high alert when Turkey sent a hydrocarbon exploration ship into disputed waters near Greek islands. Ankara had just struck a maritime delimitation deal with Libya’s UN-recognized government, through which it claimed southern Aegean waters that Greece also claims. In response, Athens signed its own maritime deal with Egypt, formed a trilateral partnership with Israel and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and rallied European Union partners to impose limited sanctions on Ankara.

The sides stepped back (encouraged by NATO and Germany) when two of their naval vessels collided in 2020, heightening the risk of military confrontation. Fitful diplomacy followed and in 2021, Greece and Turkey resumed “exploratory talks” about the Aegean dispute.

Then came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With war on their doorstep, Erdoğan and Mitsotakis wanted to ease tensions, met in İstanbul in March 2022 and acknowledged their “special responsibility in the changing European security architecture.” They vowed to keep communication channels open and foster ties, and have in principle kept to that since, despite another setback weeks later.

This time, tensions flared over weapons sales. On a US visit in May 2022, Mitsotakis lobbied for Greece to buy F-35 jets and reportedly for Ankara not to be sold more F-16 jets. An enraged Erdoğan said Mitsotakis “no longer exists” for him, and the Aegean talks collapsed. Exacerbated by nationalist hype on electoral trails in both countries, a war of words and military maneuvers ensued – until the earthquakes struck.

Step-by-step

Today, with general elections out of the way, Greece and Turkey can more easily keep hardliners at arm’s length. Pragmatist officials agree talks should focus first on areas of mutual interest unrelated to national security.

“We have a window of two to three years when we can achieve real progress in our bilateral relations,” a Turkish official said. Greek officials made similar noises, but say they were stung by Ankara’s hostile rhetoric and military posturing in the past, so overcoming doubt will not be easy. “We hope Erdoğan will not change his mind again,” a senior Greek diplomat noted.

The summit – which also brings together government ministers – will focus on trade, tourism, migration, energy, and transport. The sides have, for instance, considered a “visa at the door” scheme letting Turkish nationals visit nearby eastern Aegean Greek islands more easily. Work next year on border crossing upgrades including a second bridge should also improve the main Thessaloniki-İstanbul route. Other initiatives are to extend electricity links and natural-disaster response.

Whether all that will lead to negotiations on the Aegean dispute is unclear. “It is an opportunity to try and establish a long-term relationship of calmness and tranquillity in our neighborhood,” Greece’s Gerapetritis said in mid-November. “We are going to take this step by step.” Similarly, a senior Turkish official told Crisis Group: “We are not rushing into discussing thorny issues, but first will focus on areas of mutual benefit. … We will see where that gets us.” The influence of hardliners still limits the two leaders’ room to maneuvre, particularly over substantial concessions.

Ahead of the summit, Erdoğan, Mitsotakis and their foreign ministers – as well as their deputies – met several times, and discussed the so-called “positive agenda” about better cooperation. In May, both sides cancelled military exercises to show good faith. They relaunched military-to-military talks and agreed in November to revive military confidence-building measures along with a monitoring mechanism.

A seasoned Greek analyst said they could extend such measures to other areas, by addressing the needs of minorities and protecting cultural sites. “They could work on restoring Greek Orthodox churches in Turkey and mosques in Greece, initiatives the EU could fund,” he said. “This would not only carry strong symbolism but also generate more public buy-in for what otherwise is a diplomatic process rather detached from people’s daily lives.”

The trickier issues

Those would be the easy wins. More trickily, the countries have argued for decades over the Aegean Sea that separates them, with competing sovereignty claims for seas and skies. Cyprus is another enormous obstacle, joined more recently by an arms build-up and now the Gaza war, where Athens strongly backs Israel while Ankara has been a vocal critic.

Years of tension have spurred an arms race. Greece has gradually raised defense spending, bought new ships and warplanes, and expanded military bases. Its US and French arms deals have irked Ankara, which has faced some Western arms restrictions. “Mr. Prime Minister [Mitsotakis] it is time to halt the armament efforts. Where do you intend to go with these armaments?” Erdoğan asked in June. Some Turkish officials fear proliferating arms deals between Greece and other NATO members may upset the Aegean security balance.

Ankara says Greece has gradually stationed troops and military equipment on eastern Aegean islands. “We are seeing a weaponization of islands a few kilometers from our coast,” a senior Turkish official said. Ankara argues Athens should have demilitarized these islands under 20th-century international treaties.

Greece disputes this, considering its military presence a deterrence against Turkey. Ankara holds that Greece’s potential extension of territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles would be a cause for war and worries that large continental shelf areas claimed by Greece could box it in. Athens says it is its “sovereign right” to extend under international law, but has so far not done so.

The conflict over divided Cyprus still looms. Tensions soared over hydrocarbon prospecting by the RoC, without Turkish Cypriots having a say. Attempts to relaunch formal negotiations between the sides are stuck. The RoC (admitted as an EU member in 2004 despite rejecting a UN-brokered plan to reunify the island which Turkish Cypriots had approved) insists talks must lead to a federation. Ankara and the de facto Turkish Cypriot government want negotiations around a two-state solution. Talks continue, without consensus yet, on appointing a UN envoy to explore resuming formal negotiations.

Greek and Turkish officials keen for progress in bilateral ties would like Cyprus to be somehow put to one side, but hardliners on both sides are unlikely to agree. “The Greek public is sensitive to what happens in Cyprus,” a Greek diplomat said. “It’s not easy to imagine substantial progress in the Aegean dispute while tensions on the island fester.” In August, skirmishes briefly flared over Turkish Cypriot roadworks in the UN buffer zone.

The war in Gaza adds unpredictability to rapprochement. Turkey condemned as disproportionate Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas (which Turkey – unlike Greece and most Western countries – does not designate a terrorist organization). Turkish-Israeli normalization is now on ice. Ankara had pursued this, not least to break out of its regional isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, and full diplomatic relations were restored last year after a five-year suspension. In one of many scenarios, a growing rift with Israel may heighten Ankara’s fears of regional isolation once again and in turn strain ties with Greece, which has strongly backed Israel. Greece and Israel are both members of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a Western-backed platform, and of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, a new trade initiative. Both exclude Turkey.

Where there’s a will

These differences need not impede progress, as long as the Aegean neighbors are committed. The summit is a chance for them to reaffirm that, build trust and pave the way to tackling thornier issues. They should keep at it. Should diplomacy falter again, they may face a riskier deadlock in an increasingly volatile region. Especially with wars in Gaza and Ukraine, neither Turkey nor Greece – nor the EU or the US, seeking to calm the eastern Mediterranean – want a repeat of the 2020 crisis, still less a worse one. The reassuring news: such a possibility is still distant.

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Today, at the main entrance of Gezi Park, up the stairs from Taksim Square, an area is fenced off and packed with buses used to transport riot police. Along its perimeter, officers stand guard, semi-automatic weapons in hand.

This police presence has been a fixture of İstanbul's central plaza since mass protests broke out in May 2013, initially to protect Gezi Park from development and later as a broader anti-government movement. Known as the Gezi protests, they prompted a harsh state response that has set the precedent for how even the smallest of demonstrations have been treated ever since.

Most point to May 28, 2013, as the anniversary of the protests, when citizens first clashed with police in the park after several trees were cut down in preparation for the construction of a mall complex sought by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's and his Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Ten years later to the day, Erdoğan was re-elected to his third term as president after three terms as prime minister, likely extending his rule to a quarter century. As journalist Izzy Finkel recently pointed out, Erdoğan valorizes significant dates both in distant and recent history, so it is no coincidence that the run-off elections – and Erdoğan's victory – aligned with the 10th anniversary of the Gezi protests.

The elections and their disappointing results for the opposition overshadowed Gezi's decennial, but for those who were there, every year when late spring rolls into summer, the memories come back.

At the time, I was a graduate student completing an MA in Turkish Studies, and my thesis featured a chapter on the Gezi debacle before protests actually broke out. The development project had been a topic of contestation since it was announced a few months earlier, with environmentalists and activists opposing any efforts that would threaten the park.

The following weeks, I spent long days and nights at Gezi, updating my thesis accordingly so I could include all that transpired before handing it in and preparing for my defense. No one could have imagined it at the time, but a similar anti-government movement would not take shape over the next ten years, and Turkey has been through a lot since then.

Terror attacks in major cities, war in parts of the Kurdish-majority southeast, a failed military coup, still ongoing purges, crackdowns on dissidents, severe limits on free speech, an economic crisis marked by eye-watering inflation and most recently devastating earthquakes that killed at least 50,000 people. None of these developments interrupted Erdoğan’s dominance over Turkish politics and daily life.

The president’s main setback in this period were the opposition victories in major cities, including İstanbul and Ankara, during the 2019 municipal elections, which resulted in a wave of optimism that the government's tenure was waning.

Such hopes proved to be misplaced in the latest elections. At the same time, new mass movements have lacked the oxygen to develop. Yet despite the constraints on government critics – or perhaps because of them – Gezi remains a visceral symbol of the desire for change among large parts of Turkey’s society, and the protest’s annual commemorations serve as reminders that an opposition does exist and it can have impacts if its latent potential is guided appropriately.

For example, Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, associate professor of History at the College of William & Mary, argues the 2019 municipal victories for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) can be linked to the persistent energy generated by the commemorations of the Gezi protests.

“Gezi served as a significant morale boost for the democratic opposition in the country, demonstrating that people who desired a truly democratic, pluralistic, and egalitarian society were not few and far between by any means,” said Karakaya-Stump, who penned an article on how pro-government media tried to disingenuously portray the nature of the protests.

Gezi Park pales in comparison in terms of well-known hangout spots in İstanbul like the more popular and nearby Maçka Park or the Moda Coastal Park on the Anatolian side of the city.

That said, the Gezi Park protests were symbolic in nature: they challenged an increasingly authoritarian government that issued decisions without consulting the public. A government that had been decimating the city's green spaces and forests in pursuit of rapid, lucrative development because the construction sector formed an integral part of the AKP's economic engine.

The protests

Over the 13 years that I’ve lived in İstanbul, I think I've only socialized in Gezi Park once or twice, but every time I walk through it I'm keenly reminded of the importance it carries, namely that it still exists.

Many mark the anniversary of the Gezi Park demonstrations as May 31, 2013, a Friday evening when the protest took on a new dimension. In the early hours of the morning, police tear-gassed protestors camped out in their tents in the park, prompting outrage that led tens of thousands of people out into the streets with the goal of assembling in the park while chanting slogans for the government to resign.

On the main pedestrian İstiklal Avenue, riot police fired endless canisters of tear gas and plastic bullets at sardine-packed crowds as they tried to make their way toward Taksim. A group of half a dozen friends and I made it closer and closer to the front line when several gas canisters hit the ground near us. Immediately, we were engulfed by thick cloud of gas that filled my lungs and left me unable to breathe.

We spotted a building with an open door and crawled up the stairs to the top floor. After being deprived of oxygen for what felt like an eternity and thinking I wasn't going to make it, I was finally able to take a breath and found that my friends were all safe as well.

We spent the next several hours resting at a friend's studio in a backstreet just off İstiklal. Neighbors banged pots and pans outside their windows in solidarity with the demonstrators.

Well after midnight, as protestors again tried to reach Taksim Square and Gezi Park from the Cihangir neighborhood, armored vehicles sprayed pressurized water laced with chemicals that made people collapse to the ground and vomit. I was among those people and I'll never forget the image of demonstrators running in the opposite direction, many stumbling and dropping like flies amid the mayhem.

I felt a pain running from my head to my toes that was unlike anything I had experienced before. My body was shaking, and my friends were worried. The bandana that was covering my face was remarkably insufficient and I had inhaled a heavy dose of God knows what they were spraying. After an hour or so of extreme discomfort, I drank a liter and a half of water, promptly threw up most of it, and my body felt somewhat normal again. By morning, I was surprised to wake up no worse for the wear.

The next week and a half, protestors blocked off the area surrounding the park with barricades at its various entrances, and it became something of a utopian festival with volunteers distributing food, cleaning up trash, providing medical assistance, and even holding concerts, yoga classes, and a host of other activities.

Taksim Square was buzzing with activity while a throng of leftist groups had entered the vacant Atatürk Cultural Center and covered its facade with various banners and flags. Many people climbed to the building’s roof and gazed over the crowds in the square and park.

Though while things at Gezi Park remained both jubilant and peaceful, skirmishes raged on not far in the distance. On June 5, from the terrace historic Taşkışla building of İstanbul Technical University, I watched surreal scenes of protestors shooting fireworks at armored vehicles, which returned the favor with bursts of pressurized water and tear gas. In the neighboring quarter of Gümüşsuyu, more rounds of tear gas and sound bombs were fired, and the gas clouds wafted their way up into the park.

The response

Allowing Gezi to remain occupied was most certainly a tactical move by security forces to let things cool down before they ultimately stormed back in and forced demonstrators out. For the rest of the summer, street protests continued in waves throughout country and were consistently met with police brutality.

Erdoğan was quick to call the protestors “looters” and spread the falsehood that they drank alcohol inside İstanbul's Dolmabahçe Mosque, which was refuted by mosque's muezzin. Though he paid the price for that when he was transferred to another mosque outside the city.

Notably, that year the annual Pride Parade went off without a hinge, but the march was then banned in the ensuing years.

Since Gezi, it has become routine for police to cordon off large sections of central İstanbul to prevent May 1st International Workers' Day protestors from assembling in Taksim Square as well as the March 8th International Women's Demonstrations, though the latter still occur every year in some capacity with large participation, owing to the fact that the women's movement is one of the most resilient opposition forces in the country.

Noting these reactions, Karakaya-Stump said the government apparently remains deeply apprehensive about pluralistic mass demonstrations.

“They are employing various measures to prevent the reoccurrence of another movement similar to Gezi,” Karakaya-Stump told Turkey recap. “These tactics include maintaining oppressive police state policies, manipulating court decisions, supporting the pro-government military contractor company SADAT, and establishing an alliance in Kurdish regions with the Islamist Hüda-Par, a party known to have links to [Turkish] Hizbullah.”

She continued, “These actions, among other things, aim to instill fear in people regarding potential police or mob violence and discourage them from engaging in street protests, even though peaceful protest is still a constitutional right in Turkey.”

Sure enough, on the first anniversary of the protests in 2014, an extensive area of central İstanbul was essentially shut down, and the area was packed with hundreds if not thousands of police that extended from the Beyoğlu district, where the park is located, into the neighboring district of Şişli, where I was living at the time.

I remember the eerie feeling of wandering the mostly empty streets, where the number of police on patrol seemed to outnumber civilians.

The symbol

Gezi has remained on the agenda ever since, with prominent civil society leaders receiving 18-year prison sentences for allegedly assisting an attempt to topple the government, charges built on ludicrous indictments.

Among them are Mücella Yapıcı, an architect and activist, Çiğdem Mater, an award-winning filmmaker, and Osman Kavala, a philanthropist that was handed an aggravated life sentence as the supposed mastermind of the Gezi 'coup'. Lawyer Can Atalay was also among those convicted, though he was recently elected to parliament for the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP). As such, Atalay is legally entitled to be released from prison, though the courts have so far refused to set him free.

Following the May 2023 elections, in which Erdoğan and his ruling parliamentary coalition retained power, the symbolic meaning of Gezi continues to resonate.

On May 31, one of the few remaining opposition newspapers in Turkey, Birgün published a front-page headline reading: “Don't give up hope, remember Gezi.” The same day, members of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) assembled on İstiklal Avenue for the occasion, only to be swiftly met by police who took at least 35 participants into custody.

“Both opposition parties and the general population have been hesitant to engage in street demonstrations, despite the higher levels of oppression and corruption in Turkey today,” Karakaya-Stump said.

“Given these circumstances, I currently see the likelihood of spontaneous mass demonstrations similar to Gezi to be quite low, even in situations where significant projects like Kanal İstanbul severely threaten the environment and overall quality of life in the city,” she added.

All things considered, an optimist would deem the Gezi Park protests a victory, as they ultimately saved the park. Though the government picked several prominent figures to be scapegoats and saddled them with lengthy sentences, developers never went ahead with their initial plans to bulldoze the green space.

Still, it remains to be seen if Gezi Park remains as it is today.

“There is certainly no guarantee that Erdoğan will not once again try to implement his plans to build over Gezi Park,” Karakaya-Stump said. “Also keep in mind that the new Turkish parliament is the most conservative and right-wing in the history of modern Turkey, in large part thanks to the coalition Erdoğan formed with parties even further right than the AKP.”

“Such symbolic gestures,” like razing Gezi Park, Karakaya-Stump explained, “may come very handy to keep this extreme right coalition together especially at times of internal crisis. I am afraid the situation in Turkey will deteriorate further and become even more disheartening before it starts getting better. I hope time proves me wrong.”

Throughout the years, Gezi has remained a source of hope even for those most deeply affected by the police brutality that occurred during the protests.

On June 16, 2013, a 14-year-old teen named Berkin Elvan was going to the market to buy bread in İstanbul's Okmeydanı neighborhood when he was struck in the head with a tear gas canister and ultimately succumbed to his injuries nearly nine months later. The youngster became the most visible symbol of the protests, and his death is also commemorated every year.

“We will stay in this country and continue our struggle until the end. In the future, we will shout out again in the name of democracy and humanity,” Elvan's father Sami told Birgün on May 31. “Therefore, one should not be pessimistic. If I am still hopeful, no one should lose hope.”

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As Turkey’s critical elections near, many are asking critical questions about Turkish polling companies. Some pollsters are respected, others require more scrutiny, but which ones?

Below, I give a brief rundown on Turkey’s top polling companies and compare their past data with official results from previous elections to get a sense of their record for accuracy.

In the process, you’ll see many key figures in this sector have clear ties with political parties. For example, some of them ran office with party ties and then returned to polling after they failed. This obviously creates some trust issues. 

A good number of pollsters are credible, but when they’re not, their data can both mislead the public and public officials. Inaccurate surveys can not only dissuade voters from casting ballots due to overconfidence, but can also keep voters from supporting parties they perceive as destined to lose.

In both cases, a false sense of voting trends can splash into the minds of party executives, as well, making them believe a campaign is successful, when it’s actually failing.

Overview: Survey of the land

Looking at Turkey’s public polling sector, Bekir Ağırdır, former general director of KONDA research, said there have been positive developments in recent years, but a diverse set of problems remain, which are not necessarily the fault of pollsters alone. 

He said parties and politicians often want public opinion polls to prove their own points, and not to reflect voter opinions. 

“They don’t want to know the truth. If their campaigns don’t give the positive results they seek, they’ll need to explain themselves to their executives,” Ağırdır told Turkey recap. “Unfortunately, some polling companies accept their demands.”

Noting polling is a science, Ağırdır also said its techniques and methods are key to producing useful results. Sampling sizes along with the inclusion of different age groups and political affiliations are essential to creating surveys that reflect reality.

Ağırdır said some pollsters, past and present, have found participants through Twitter, which is not a representative sampling pool. Timing is also important, he added.

“Think of a public opinion poll like a blood test,” Ağırdır said. “If you check your blood pressure right after climbing a flight of stairs, it will give you different results than when you check it while you are sitting down.”

He maintained traditional field work remains essential to accurate polling, but this comes with added financial costs, saying: “Nobody wants to pay for it. They want real information for cheap.”

That said, let the guides begin:

MetroPOLL

MetroPOLL is one of the most popular public opinion research companies. It was founded by Özer Sencar in December 2004. The company owes its popularity to frequent research on a wide range of topics concerning daily political discussions. 

Director Sencar uses social media actively, and shares results in both Turkish and English, making MetroPOLL one of the most commonly mentioned public opinion companies. 

MetroPOLL is thought to be ideologically closer to opposition parties. Columnist Abdülkadir Selvi, who is known for his close ties with the AKP, labeled Sencar as the “dissident pollster.” 

On Sept. 3, 2016, Sencar was briefly detained in Ankara as a part of a post-coup attempt investigation into the Gülenist movement, but was released a couple of days later.

The fact MetroPOLL releases survey results frequently is another topic of contention, but a source who requested anonymity told Turkey recap MetroPOLL is among the companies that does the most field work. 

On their website, MetroPOLL also mentions 1,250 people are surveyed on average for their political surveys.

• MetroPOLL’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 49.2 percent
  İnce: 26.2 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent

• Parliamentary elections
  People’s Alliance: 46 percent
  Official result: 53.7 percent

Konda

Another reputable research firm is Konda, which was founded by Tarhan Erdem in 1986. In 2005, Bekir Ağırdır joined Konda and became the general director. 

Ağırdır quit as the general director in June 2022, and Tarhan Erdem’s son Aydın Erdem took the position. Ağırdır continues his role as board member. 

In 1977, Tarhan Erdem served a brief tenure as Minister of Industry and Technology in the cabinet of former PM Bülent Ecevit (CHP). Later, he took the role of general secretary of the CHP in 1999. 

Erdem, who passed away last year, was never shy about sharing his opinions on political matters and was thought to be closely aligned with the AKP for a short while in 2002, during the party's initial rise to power. 

Notably, Konda was able to get close results on its polls in the 2015 June general elections. For many, this was one of the hardest elections to predict in recent history. In contrast, Konda’s polls for 2014 presidential elections were far off the mark, for which the company issued a public apology. 

According to its website, Konda usually polls between 1,800 and 3,600 people per survey, and the results are distributed to subscribers only. The company normally doesn’t issue comment or confirmation when its research is allegedly leaked on social media.

However, Konda usually publicizes its election surveys the last Thursday before voting day. 

Apart from near accurate 2018 polling, Konda was also able to accurately forecast the results of the 2017 Constitutional Referendum and the 2019 redo of the İstanbul elections. 

• Konda’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 51.9 percent
  İnce: 28 percent
  Akşener: 10.2 percent
  Demirtaş: 9 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent
  Akşener: 7.29 percent
  Demirtaş: 8.40 percent

Optimar

Optimar was founded in 1994 and its current chairman is Hilmi Daşdemir.

In Turkey, it's not uncommon for public opinion company directors to voice their political opinions, or make their political ties clear, but chairman Daşdemir took it to the next level during a televised HaberTürk interview in March 2023, when he said: “Your chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is the candidate of HDP and PKK.”

He then got so angry that he left the studio.

Optimar polls are regularly featured in columns by pro-AKP commentators and Daşdemir is a regular guest on pro-government TV channels. According to Birgün, Daşdemir also got 16 tenders from the government. 

A source who requested to be unnamed told Turkey recap the AKP has been working with Optimar, and the company has been conducting public opinion polls for the ruling party.

Currently, Optimar is among the public opinion companies publishing the most optimistic results for the AKP. Their latest polls for the presidential election show Erdoğan leading both in the first round and the run-offs. 

The same poll also forecasts that Muharrem İnce will get 4.3 percent of the votes in the first round. 

Worth noting that in the 2019 municipal elections, the company put the Ankara race as neck-and-neck, with Mansur Yavaş having a slight edge. Yavaş ended up beating the AKP candidate with more than a 3 point difference.

• Optimar’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 51.6 percent
  İnce: 28 percent
  Akşener: 8.5 percent
  Demirtaş: 10.3 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent
  Akşener: 7.29 percent
  Demirtaş: 8.40 percent

ORC

ORC was founded in 2009 and its current general director is Mehmet Pösteki. 

For a long time, ORC was accused of announcing public opinion polls that heavily favored AKP. However, lately they have been releasing some polls that are less favorable for Beştepe. 

ORC polls predicted the AKP would win municipal elections both in İstanbul and Ankara. Both cities are now held by CHP. In the 2017 referendum, ORC polls also showed that almost 60 percent of the voters would vote “Yes”, though official results were 51.41 percent in favor. 

This led to popular jokes that cast ORC as conducting its research inside AKP offices.

However, more recently ORC has been releasing public opinion polls that show Kılıçdaroğlu beating Erdoğan by a landslide. Their public opinion polls also forecast the People’s Alliance gaining a majority in parliament. 

This led hardline Islamist Yeni Akit newspaper to accuse Pösteki of taking money from the opposition to produce these polls.

• ORC’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 52.7 percent
  İnce: 29.2 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent

MAK

MAK Consultancy is one of those public opinion companies that has always been surrounded by controversy. It takes its name from the initials of its owner, Mehmet Ali Kulat.

In its earlier years, leading up to the 2018 elections, MAK was accused of showing AKP votes as disproportionally high. 

The company predicted that in the 2017 referendum, more than 56 percent would vote “Yes”. Again, 51.41 percent voted “Yes” in official results. 

Also, when the 2019 İstanbul municipal elections were repeated, MAK’s surveys showed İmamoğlu beating the AKP candidate by 2 percent. In reality, İmamoğlu won by a landslide, getting almost 10 percent.

According to many different sources, MAK was supported by the AKP and has conducted public opinion research for the party. However, it seems MAK has changed sides since then, and it currently publishes results that would make opposition leaders smile.

• MAK’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 51.5 percent
  İnce: 24.4 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent

Avrasya

Avrasya Research is another public opinion research company that has been accused of bias.

Avrasya is founded and led by Kemal Özkiraz, who attempted to run as a CHP candidate for Antalya this year, but his bid was unsuccessful. 

Having openly shared his party affiliation, Özkiraz’s Twitter bio reads: “Not impartial, but honest.” He also tends to retweet news stories that focus on the AKP’s failings.

Turkey recap asked Özkiraz, why Avrasya Research was so far off on 2018 election polling.

Özkiraz said the company conducts polls with its own resources, which are limited, so it’s possible their sampling size was inadequate. He also said that 6.5 percent of the people they contacted refused to share their vote, and he believed around 75 percent of those people voted for AKP or MHP.

• Avrasya’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 44.5 percent
  İnce: 28.3 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent

• Parliamentary elections polling
  People’s Alliance: 45.9 percent
  Nation Alliance: 40.4 percent
  HDP: 13.4 percent.

• Official parliamentary results
  People’s Alliance: 53.7 percent
  Nation Alliance: 40.4 percent
  HDP: 11.7 percent

SONAR 

SONAR’s founder and chairman, Hakan Bayrakçı, is a regular guest on government-friendly TV channels, like HaberTürk and CNN Türk.

Founded in 1988, SONAR was one of the first public opinion research companies that foresaw the end of ANAP’s seven-year domination in 1990. As the years passed, SONAR started to be seen as a company with ideological leanings that were closer to the AKP. 

SONAR sends its subscribers a report every three months on contemporary political discussions.

• SONAR’s last poll before 2018 elections
  Erdoğan: 48.3 percent
  İnce: 31.4 percent

• Official results
  Erdoğan: 52.59 percent
  İnce: 30.64 percent

Yöneylem

Yöneylem is one of the newest members of the public opinion landscape. Founded in 2019 by Veysi Fidan, the company is known for its ‘Turkish Political Panels’, in which it randomly selects 2,400 people over the age of 18 to vote at 215 ballot boxes in 27 provinces. 

The results of these panels are released every month. Yöneylem argues that it shows how the voters' tendencies and thoughts change over time.

As Yöneylem gained popularity, media outlets closely aligned with the AKP have started bringing up Fidan’s anti-AKP social media posts from the past. CHP is said to have had a contract with Yöneylem until a little while ago. 

Yöneylem is currently led by Derya Kömürcü, who has a PhD in political science and worked as an academic before joining the company. 

Türkiye Raporu

Türkiye Raporu has been doing public opinion research since 2019 and its current director is Can Selçuki. 

It is one of the newer public opinion research companies and has gained popularity (also on YouTube) due to research on a wide range of topics. For example, their research questions have been: “If you had 100,000 liras how would you spend it?” and “Should politics have a place in football stadiums?”

Türkiye Raporu is also one of the few Turkish public opinion organizations that releases approval ratings for leaders on a regular basis. It releases at least two reports every month and states all their research surveys at least 200 people.

Disclosure: Türkiye Raporu conducted a brief ad campaign through Turkey recap in the past.

Aksoy

Aksoy Research is owned and led by Ertan Aksoy, whose Twitter bio reads “CHP’li”, or ‘supporter of the CHP’. He was also a parliamentary candidate for the CHP in 2018 elections in İstanbul, but was not elected. 

The polling company was founded in 2006, with the motto: “The customer is not always right.”

Apart from being perceived as pro-CHP, the company also tends to do polling on problems caused by AKP policies, namely the nation’s current economic hardships.

Aksoy didn’t conduct public opinion polling for the 2018 elections, however they were one of the companies that foresaw İmamoğlu breaking through 54 percent in the 2019 İstanbul re-run elections.

SAROS

SAROS was founded by Burhan Eptemli in 2005. Beyond Turkey, the company also conducts research in Northern Cyprus and Middle Eastern nations. 

SAROS has been accused of showing AKP and Vatan Party votes to be higher than they are in reality.

On its websites, SAROS also notes it has conducted past research for both the AKP and CHP. Public opinion institutions usually tend to keep this information about political parties on a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ basis.

SAROS’ polling results were not publicized in recent elections.

For further reading, we recommend visiting 600vekil.com, which has comprehensive polling data and forecasts.

Support us

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We also invite you to visit our merch store, but if you simply liked what you read, subscribe here or share it with a friend. Feedback and pitches: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Diego Cupolo, co-founder + editor @diegocupolo

Gonca Tokyol, freelance journalist @goncatokyol

Ingrid Woudwijk, freelance journalist @deingrid

Verda Uyar, freelance journalist @verdauyar

Gökalp Badak, editorial intern @gklpbdk

For at least 20 years, I’ve spent the first day of bayram (aka Eid al-Fitr) with my extended family. This means coming together with several generations of Bayrams under the same roof and talking.

We covered many topics Friday, which began with a long breakfast and continued with never-ending rounds of tea and börek, like all bayrams. This 10-hour 'bayram sohbeti' ritual touched on everything from the current status of the shoe business in Ankara to former US Pres. Donald Trump's hairstyle and world politics.

Normally, I get bored after hearing the same old stories and remembering I have little common ground with my family members. But this wasn’t the case this year. 

The upcoming elections were on everyone's mind, and for the first time in Bayram family history, some members were hesitant to vote for the AKP, which they have been supporting since its establishment.

As you know, Turkey will hold presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, and recent opinion polls indicate its a neck-and-neck race, giving undecided voters significant importance. 

"Some of those undecided voters are actually disgruntled ones," Ulaş Tol, from the İstanbul-based Social Impact Research Center, recently told Al-Monitor. "They support one side, but they are not happy about it. They are ready to break off."

This is exactly what I observed with many of my family members during bayram. They used to be committed AKP supporters and now they’re set to depart, but don’t know where to go yet.

As far as I know, as a Turkish-Sunni family with central Anatolian origins (Kayseri) and nationalist-conservative tendencies, the Bayrams have never voted for the CHP or any other leftist parties. On the contrary, most of them have been fierce backers of Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 

Over the years, the family's political stances oscillated between the AKP, MHP, BBP, and Milli Görüş. My relatives hold different professions. Among them is a shoemaker, an auto mechanic, a cleaner, a security guard, and a civil servant, all of them making an average monthly salary of, let’s say, 12,000 Turkish liras, or about $615 USD.

That’s our background. Now back to the present …

This bayram, as we all talked about elections, my father and my aunt's husband (enişte), were alone in supporting Erdoğan and his party. The others were not openly praising the main opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu or supporting the Millet İttifakı, but their fatigue and disapproval of the current government was evident in the air. 

As homemade baklava – a point of pride for the women chefs in our family – was added to my plate, my father said: "We need Erdoğan for at least five more years. After that, even if he's not there, no one will be able to do anything to our country." 

Others were unconvinced, including my uncle, other enişte, elder brother and sister-in-law. Again, it wasn't an open criticism against the president, but it was obvious that they weren't happy with the status quo. 

They were immune to the arguments coming from the AKP-supporting side of the Bayrams.

"Yes, salaries increased, but our purchasing power decreased," the disgruntled side said. They also didn't care about Kılıçdaroğlu’s lack of charisma compared to Erdoğan, who they didn’t directly accuse of anything, but believed the president needed to be replaced after two decades in power.

"The coalition between Millet İttifakı and HDP will affect the country's integrity badly," the AKP front argued, noting they were losing ground. 

"There is no such thing as Alevi-Sunni, Turkish-Kurdish [discrimination] anymore," the disgruntled undecideds answered. "People worried about their livelihood don’t need to engage in identity politics. That issue has been thoroughly eroded, and the tension must be dropped from the agenda."

At this point, the family's youngsters excused themselves to a separate room and began an 8-hour round of the video game, PUBG. 

My dad stayed on course. He defined former AKP members-turned-rivals Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu as "ungrateful." Then he claimed Kılıçdaroğlu wouldn't be able to run the country with other party leaders as his vice presidents. 

But the disgruntled members of the Bayram family – who all voted for the AKP before, remember – dismissed that point, as well.

"The real crisis is not caused by seven [VPs], but by one [man]," they said. 

The Bayrams’ AKP front responded by noting shopping malls were full of people and streets were full of cars and that pensions were increased, saying these were all signs of a good economy. But still, the other side complained about the rising number of workers earning minimum wage and the skyrocketing prices.

In past bayrams under the Bayram roof, support for Erdoğan and AKP was unquestionable. I know almost everyone in that house had voted for Erdoğan up until today. But with the exception of my father, no relatives defended him with enthusiasm this holiday. 

What I witnessed was a serious atmosphere of indecision among the Bayrams. The default reflex to vote for Erdoğan has become rusty, it seems, but they were still not convinced to vote for a change in power. 

Like in the Bayram family, there are many unhappy voters in Turkey this election season, which is noteworthy in itself, according to Ulaş Tol. Presidential candidates and their political parties might want to directly address these disgruntled voters if they want to win.

Support us

Turkey recap is an independent news platform supported by readers via Patreon and Substack. Members get access to our Slack channel, timelines, calendar and more.

We also invite you to visit our merch store, but if you simply liked what you read, subscribe here or share it with a friend. Feedback and pitches: info@turkeyrecap.com.

Diego Cupolo, co-founder + editor @diegocupolo

Gonca Tokyol, freelance journalist @goncatokyol

Ingrid Woudwijk, freelance journalist @deingrid

Verda Uyar, freelance journalist @verdauyar

Gökalp Badak, editorial intern @gklpbdk