2026 Predictions
aka "Turkey precap"
Juice the turşu fountain and crank Kenan’s Best of Turkey 2025 music list because it’s time to bring in the new year with our annual predictions issue.
We asked domain experts what they expect from Turkish domestic and foreign developments in 2026. Their bold proclamations are below and we hope you find them as valuable as we do.
Speaking of value, don’t miss our most-read reports of 2025:
Ayşe Barım’s ongoing trial is seen as a ‘warning’ to Turkey’s culture industry
Out of space: Lack of safe zones deepens Istanbul’s earthquake risks
Street clashes to continue in Turkey’s largest protests since Gezi
Priced out: Working-class families struggle to pay Istanbul’s rising rents
Syrians are leaving Turkey unsure of what awaits them
New here? Subscribe by Jan. 2 to lock in our holiday discount rate until 2027—or when everyone predicts Turkey’s next election cycle. Saddle up!
DOMESTIC POLITICS
Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute
For Turkey’s ruling bloc, 2026 will function less as a year of voter outreach than as a year of political design under autocratic conditions. Rather than preparing for elections through policy debate or social mobilization, the regime is shaping the political arena itself—through legal, institutional and coercive means.
The ongoing Istanbul municipality and Imamoğlu cases will remain central instruments through which the government seeks to discredit and paralyze the CHP. These judicial pressures are likely to intensify, serving the regime’s strategy to inflict reputational damage and organizational exhaustion on the CHP.
At the same time, debates surrounding a renewed Kurdish process, alongside possible legal and constitutional amendments, will continue to restructure the political field. The process has already fragmented the opposition into competing blocs.
Finally, recent operations targeting media figures, business circles and actors point to a broader strategy of internal regime consolidation. Through judicial control over both economic and political spheres, the government is managing factional discipline while denying space for autonomous power centers.
These dynamics suggest 2026 will be crisis-prone, conflictual and decisive.
Seda Demiralp, a professor of political science and chair of international relations at Işık University in Istanbul
The dominant force shaping domestic politics will be a deepening sense of cynicism, injustice and insecurity. The perception that “things are going badly” will no longer be limited to opposition voters, but it will be increasingly shared by government supporters, as well. Injustices will overtake economic problems, as the central political concern. Yet this shared pessimism will not produce a shared political direction.
Politics is likely to be framed less through a government-opposition divide and more through a contrast between a strong leader and an unreliable, fragmented society. On the government side, this may reinforce the belief that no one but a “strongman” like Erdoğan can be trusted. On the opposition side, a similar atmosphere of insecurity may fuel the search for its own strongman—figures seen as resilient and ready to confront power.
In 2026, debates over succession within AKP will also become more salient. While many AKP voters will initially reject the idea of Bilal Erdoğan or a dynastic transfer of power, resistance may soften over time if Erdoğan clearly signals his preference.
Berk Esen, an assoc. prof. of political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul
The government will continue efforts to shore up support by stabilizing the economy. We can also expect discussions on constitutional amendments that would enable Erdoğan to run for the presidency once again. Further changes within the ruling ranks are likely to ensure an orderly transition after Erdoğan, with power becoming even more concentrated at the top.
For the opposition, 2026 will be a year of preparation for potential early elections in the fall of 2027. Özel’s leadership is expected to become further consolidated following the most recent party convention. I don’t expect any major internal crisis within the CHP.
For the pro-Kurdish movement, 2026 will be a year of strategic ambivalence, as the party faces increasingly narrow choices. The ongoing deadlock in Syria and the lack of clear commitment from the government remain major risks for DEM party.
Given its vocal opposition to the negotiation process, the moderate nationalist IYI Party is likely to emerge as the main nationalist actor in Turkish politics and may regain some electoral support, particularly following its upcoming national convention.
PEACE PROCESS
Ezgi Başaran, a political science faculty member at Oxford, journalist and author of the Angle, Anchor, and Voice newsletter
Turkey’s Kurdish issue will continue to hinge less on developments inside Turkey than on what unfolds next door in Syria. Recent reporting suggests a deal between Damascus and the SDF is likely.
Under such an arrangement, the SDF would retain its administrative autonomy while integrating into the Syrian army through three separate divisions. The agreement would be shaped under pressure from both the US and Turkey. This will not fully satisfy Ankara.
The realities on the ground will continue to produce friction, and tensions are likely to flare intermittently through 2026. Yet the stakes are too high for all involved, who view open military confrontation as far costlier than managing an uneasy balance. Threats and recriminations will persist, but they are unlikely to translate into war.
Within this context, Öcalan is expected to move into freer conditions on Imralı, allowing broader communication with Kurdish actors across the region. The wider his influence becomes, the more actively Israel may seek to pull parts of the Kurdish movement in its own direction.
Roj Girasun, director of Rawest Research
For Turkey, 2026 will essentially be the year of foreign policy. Regional developments and security headings will also become the main determinants of domestic politics.
Within this framework, the Kurdish issue and the current resolution process will be handled largely through the axis of foreign policy in Syria. The regional equation and regional threat perceptions may serve as the primary reference points for these discussions.
It is likely that constitutional debates will become more visible as of 2026. This visibility will be shaped by the direction of the process and the political needs of the government rather than a direct constitution-making process.
The constitutional issue may move from the backchannels of the political agenda into the public eye. A post-Erdoğan era may be discussed more forcefully.
SYRIA POLICY
Sinem Adar, incoming head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies in the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Syria will remain Turkey’s most urgent and strategically consequential foreign policy dossier. Ankara prioritizes state building under Sharaa, whom it views as a favorable partner.
For Turkey, this entails preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and supporting Damascus’ efforts to gain control over the means of violence and key resources while reviving economic activity. Ankara’s seemingly close alignment with the Trump Administration in Syria, Damascus’ growing international recognition and the repeal of the Caesar Act, are all seen as steps in this direction. Still, 2026 is likely to remain turbulent.
For Ankara, the slow pace of negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, the disconnect between the SDF and the ongoing disarmament talks between Ankara and Öcalan, and the resulting uncertainty over the SDF’s future will remain the primary obstacles to consolidating central authority.
At the same time, the competing (yet essentially similar) security concerns of Israel and Turkey risk locking Syria’s transition in a potentially violent stalemate. While Assad’s fall initially helped Turkey widen its room for maneuver, 2026 will likely test Ankara’s ability to sustain it.
Aron Lund, senior analyst at Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and fellow at Century International
On March 10, Syria’s new ruler Sharaa struck a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It didn’t resolve much, instead setting an end-of-year deadline. Negotiators now work to avert conflict. Violence may flare, but I suspect they’ll end up with a deadline extension.
For the SDF, playing for time is the point—they like the status quo. Sharaa’s government also needs peace and stability but it can’t wait forever. It wants to prevent Syria’s partition and it needs the SDF’s oil wells. External actors loom large, too. Sharaa’s patron, Turkey, wants the SDF co-opted or crushed due to its PKK links, and a US troop withdrawal could prompt a crisis at any moment.
Domestically, Sharaa’s post-victory honeymoon will end in 2026 unless he delivers an economic miracle to match his political wizardry. As tensions rise, Islamist-populist agitation could destabilize his government and further inflame minority relations, undermining his foreign partnerships.
Navigating these pressures will be difficult. Then again, Sharaa has proven himself a superb tactician—maybe he’ll pull it off.
Amy Austin Holmes, author of a new report on Syria and professor at the Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government & Public Service in Washington DC
Having failed to unify Syria by force, Sharaa will likely focus on the economy in 2026. One overlooked solution to the staggering economic crisis is surprisingly simple: empowering women to join the workforce.
Today, only 13.3 percent of Syrian women participate in the labor force, compared to 62.8 percent of men. The World Bank estimates that if women worked at the same rate as men, Syria’s long-term GDP per capita could soar by up to 74 percent.
Regrettably, some officials in Damascus seem unaware of this potential, publicly discouraging women from working outside the home—exactly the opposite of what the country needs.
In contrast, the Kurdish-led AANES aspires to create a “Women’s Economy,” against all odds. It is known as Al Iktisad al Marra in Arabic and Aboriya Jin in Kurdish. The AANES still controls about 30 percent of Syria and are in ongoing negotiations with Damascus.
If Sharaa is willing to share power and learn from the Northeast, Syria could overcome both its crippling economic crisis and political fragmentation.
RUSSIA/UKRAINE POLICY
Evren Balta, a political science professor at Özyeğin Üniversitesi and visiting scholar at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
Turkey’s 2026 role in NATO will be defined by two imperatives. Stay indispensable to allied deterrence on the eastern flank, and prevent the Black Sea from becoming a standing NATO-Russia naval contact zone.
On Ukraine, expect continuity rather than a clean pivot. Turkey will keep backing Ukraine’s sovereignty and defense cooperation while maintaining channels with Moscow for deconfliction and any future talks. That balancing posture is not a slogan. It is risk management rooted in geography, trade, energy exposure and maritime security.
For Black Sea security, the most likely 2026 trajectory is sustained volatility with episodic spikes. If the war continues, maritime risk from drones, mines and electronic interference will remain high, and Turkey will prioritize incident management and safe navigation.
If there is a ceasefire, priorities shift to verification, mine clearance and protected shipping corridors, where regional NATO littoral cooperation can scale up. If escalation occurs, Turkey will tighten straits management, harden air and maritime defenses and push bounded regional missions. Across scenarios, Ankara’s success will depend on crisis communication with allies.
Yörük Işık, a geopolitical analyst based in Istanbul, where he runs the Bosphorus Observer
The Black Sea will remain a “contested zone”. Ukraine has used enhanced maritime capabilities to overturn Russia’s traditional naval dominance, but Russia will continue to pursue regional dominance, viewing the Black Sea as a strategic “civilizational center” essential for projecting global influence.
Russia will continue targeting Odesa area civilian ports with missiles, while Ukraine will disrupt seaborne trade in Russian oil. This will make Black Sea routes less reliable, with shipping insurance premiums at prohibitive levels.
The EU’s new Black Sea Strategy which requires a preemptive geopolitical approach will be challenged by Russia, and due to the Trump Administration’s misguided policies and misreading of the Kremlin, Russia will feel emboldened to expand its military operations into Moldova.
With control of the Bosphorus, Turkey will continue to play a pivotal role. NATO’s focus will shift from traditional engagement to protecting critical subsea infrastructure and trade routes against hybrid threats. Despite the risks, China and India will try to carve an economic space for themselves in the Black Sea region due to the diminishing US strategic presence.
Kerim Has, an independent analyst of Turkish-Russian relations based in Moscow
Until a peace accord is achieved in Ukraine, it won’t be a surprise to see the escalation of war in the Black Sea as well as stronger geopolitical solidarity between Turkey and the UK-led anti-Russia bloc in the West. On the other hand, Istanbul remains a convenient venue for Ukraine-Russia negotiations.
Meanwhile, Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus will continue to erode. The Azerbaijan-Turkey strategic alliance will deepen as Georgia remains to be Ankara’s strategic partner in the region, and Armenia has the potential to be a strategic neighbor of Turkey.
The Organization of Turkic States will also be a growing headache for Moscow in Central Asia. Joint military exercises within the bloc and Turkey’s increasing arms exports to member states will likely be a primary concern for Russia.
In Syria, Putin aims to keep Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Perhaps, Erdoğan wouldn’t be happy with this, but Israel and prominent Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE still wish to see Russians in Syria to balance Turkish influence and deter Iran.
REGIONAL POLICY
Nigar Goksel, project director for Türkiye/Cyprus for International Crisis Group
We enter 2026 with a set of promising yet fragile dynamics across three long-running conflicts that Ankara is tackling in parallel—seemingly as part of the same drive to reduce exploitable age-old problems. This is a steep challenge which is hard to grasp on a case-by-case basis.
To Turkey’s east, finalizing the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears within reach. Against this backdrop, Turkey is likely to accelerate its normalization with Armenia in 2026. Yet Baku’s preferred timeline constrains how far and how fast Ankara will move.
To the west, Ankara-Athens relations have stabilized through sustained communication channels and advance notification mechanisms. While a comprehensive settlement on Aegean disputes remains distant, improved engagement could support positive spillover into the Cyprus issue and Turkey-EU cooperation.
The most complex file remains the PKK conflict and its repercussions for Iraq and Syria. While the peace initiative faces serious obstacles, it marks the closest moment in years to a potentially durable settlement.
Taken together, distrust on all sides, and external spoilers, continue to cast obstacles in all three conflicts.
Mohammed A. Salih, non-resident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program
Iraq-Turkey relations will likely mirror the pattern of the past year: an uneasy blend of friction and pragmatic cooperation.
Water remains the single most consequential issue shaping the relationship, continuing to give Ankara decisive leverage. As the upstream power on the Tigris and Euphrates, Turkey has repeatedly shown its readiness to instrumentalize water flows, a reality that would continue to constrain Baghdad’s options, particularly amid worsening environmental degradation in Iraq.
A second fault line will be the continued Turkish military presence in northern Iraq. Expanded in scale and sophistication under the pretext of combating the PKK over the past decade, these deployments are likely to remain contentious. Even if Ankara and the PKK reach a peace arrangement in 2026, broader geopolitics—chiefly Turkey’s regional strategic calculus—could still preclude a full withdrawal.
At the same time, cooperation remains indispensable. The $17 billion Development Road project offers a powerful incentive for working together, provided fiscal pressures in Iraq do not derail it.
Finally, the Kurdistan Region’s oil exports via Turkey appear set to continue, benefiting all parties involved.
Nareg Seferian, an independent researcher of the geopolitics of Armenia, Turkey, and the Caucasus
The primary factor influencing Turkey-Armenia relations are the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ankara has explicitly noted that its policies will move in lockstep with Baku.
Turkey also has its own preconditions. Ankara has been reticent in the past about any openings with Yerevan because of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and campaigns related to the Armenian Genocide, among other issues. Recent additions to the list have included concessions over the “Zangezur Corridor” or “Trump Route”. More preconditions may yet be on the cards.
Armenia’s domestic politics play a role as well. Elections are slated for June, 2026. If the current administration of Nikol Pashinyan maintains power in Yerevan, the country’s foreign policy should stay the course. If some other party wins or a coalition forms, relations with Ankara and Baku might become less stable.
As for the broader geopolitical field, Western actors and Iran maintain their own leverage over regional dynamics. Turkey’s rooms for maneuver will be impacted, above all, by how closely Russia clings to its footholds in Armenia and the region.
ISRAEL/PALESTINE POLICY
Louis Fishman, an assoc. prof. at Brooklyn College who writes on Turkish and Israeli/Palestinian affairs
The key question for 2026 in Israel-Turkey relations is whether anything can pull the two countries off a collision course that threatens regional stability.
Turkey aims to preserve its influence in a newly liberated Syria, while Israel closely monitors this shifting balance. Ankara also watches Israel as it finalizes a $35 billion gas deal with Egypt and strengthens ties with Greece and Cyprus.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could also bring their existing rifts to the African continent. This maneuvering unfolds in the absence of a coherent American strategy, with Trump’s unpredictability leaving room for rivalry to deepen.
In this environment, any plan that would place Turkish troops in Gaza as part of future ceasefire phases must be avoided at all costs. With Israeli elections next year, there remains a sliver of hope that a more strategically minded government will emerge and help prevent escalation.
In short, while the multiple crises in the region simmer, it is the Turkish-Israeli front that is brewing to be something bigger if policymakers from all sides look the wrong way.
Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel
Unlike previous rounds of conflict in Gaza, the October ceasefire is not expected to trigger a rebound in Israel-Turkey relations in 2026.
This was already evident when, despite the ceasefire, Turkey tightened the measures to enforce its trade embargo and issued 37 arrest warrants against Israeli officials. Israel will remain persistent in its efforts to minimize Turkish involvement in Gaza, but will find it difficult to forestall such involvement in civilian reconstruction of the Strip.
While a potential Israel-Syria security agreement could ease certain tensions between Israel and Turkey, it is unlikely to be transformative for the relationship. Thus, the sides will still require the military hotline established following talks between the parties in April 2025 to avoid confrontation in the Syrian airspace.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, progress of Cyprus in its efforts to extract and export gas will likely elicit a Turkish response that could also impact Israel. Finally, while much needed US pressure to ease tensions between Israel and Turkey may narrow the diplomatic rift, a significant gap between the two states remains.
CYPRUS POLICY
Fiona Mullen, director of Sapienta Economics, a consultancy based in Cyprus
I think 2026 might be a year in which we have a delicate dance between Turkey and the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus, which might turn into something interesting if it doesn’t all fall apart before anything is achieved. If I am not reading too much into it there are some tiny hints of openings.
Towards the end of December Turkey’s FM Fidan made a proposal essentially to “park” the Cyprus problem and cooperate on energy and other issues instead. The Republic of Cyprus holds the EU rotating presidency between January and June and has invited both Erdoğan and Fidan for some summits.
And the Republic of Cyprus Defense Min. Vasilis Palmas quickly downplayed reports that the Greek Cypriots, Greece and Israel were going to create a joint rapid reaction force together. Meanwhile we have the US ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack encouraging regional economic cooperation.
The Turkish Cypriots are also talking of big new energy projects, which might also be related.
Erol Kaymak, a professor of political science and international relations at Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus
In 2026, Ankara will seek “functional” access to Europe’s rearmament without resolving Cyprus—prioritizing SAFE-adjacent co-production, subcontracting and EU-based manufacturing over formal entry. In practice, Turkish firms will deepen EU footprints (Baykar’s Piaggio Aerospace acquisition) and bilateral packages with key member states.
The political price shifts from grand settlement to mobility and governance. Cyprus, holding the EU Council Presidency (Jan-Jun 2026) and pushing Schengen accession, will harden its veto leverage while Brussels reopens stalled EU-Turkey visa liberalization. Christodoulides has also floated a step‑by‑step “PfP-for-EU cooperation” ladder—Turkey green-lights Cyprus into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, while Nicosia incrementally relaxes obstacles to closer EU-Turkey ties.
Ankara will answer with selective reciprocity on Cypriot travel and customs-union rhetoric, not constitutional leaps. Erhürman’s election in northern Cyprus lets Ankara point to renewed engagement and argue for practical cooperation with Europe. Erhürman seeks political equality within a federal settlement, which still constrains what Nicosia can accept.
Watch the 23-24 April informal European Council in Cyprus and the 7-8 July NATO summit in Ankara. Outcome: limited, deal-by-deal integration; Cyprus remains the choke point.
EU POLICY
Karol Wasilewski, head of the Turkey, Caucasus and Central Asia Department at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
In 2025 the European Union and Turkey rediscovered their mutual “strategic utility”. This has not yet translated into a breakthrough in key areas—accession negotiations, Turkey’s participation in European defense projects, the modernization of the customs union, or visa liberalization—but it was evident in the consolidation of Turkey’s security relations with several countries, notably Italy, Spain, and Poland.
The fact that Turkey’s deteriorating domestic situation, especially following the arrest of Imamoğlu, did not halt the thaw in EU-Turkey relations is perhaps the best evidence that this course will continue.
In 2026, relations between Turkey and the EU will undoubtedly focus on security. Resistance from some member states—primarily Greece and Cyprus—coupled with weakened German leadership within the EU, makes it difficult to expect Turkey’s broader inclusion in European programs, such as SAFE II.
However, I believe Turkey will consistently strive to strengthen ties in the fields of security and defense industries with selected European nations, aiming to build “islands of co-creation” that will make Turkey an indispensable element of European security.
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, managing director of the German Marshall Fund South and regional director in Ankara
The EU-Türkiye relationship is likely to remain transactional and selective in 2026. Accession talks will most probably stay frozen, and progress on positive agenda items such as Customs Union modernization and visa liberalization is unlikely.
Dialogue on foreign policy and security will remain open, given Türkiye’s growing importance for European security against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine and shifting US security priorities.
However, cooperation in these areas is likely to remain ad hoc due to persistent mutual distrust between Ankara and Brussels, as well as unresolved disputes between Türkiye and some EU Member States. For similar reasons, Türkiye will probably remain excluded from EU connectivity initiatives, with the Black Sea and Caucasus regions as possible exceptions.
Relations between Greece and Türkiye remain a wild card. Despite the current period of relative calm, growing coordination between Greece, Israel, and the Republic of Cyprus to contain Türkiye could trigger renewed tensions and quickly reverse this trajectory.
Riccardo Gasco, PhD researcher at Bologna University, visiting research fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center and foreign policy program coordinator at IstanPol
In 2026, Turkey-EU defense relations are likely to deepen in practice while remaining politically constrained. Europe’s rearmament drive, shaped by the war in Ukraine and growing doubts over long-term US security guarantees, will prioritize speed, scale and affordability. In this context, Turkey’s defense industry increasingly appears less as an outsider and more as a useful partner.
Cooperation will advance mainly through member-state-led partnerships, rather than formal EU-Turkey frameworks. Joint ventures such as the Baykar-Leonardo initiative point to selective integration, particularly in drones and other unmanned aircraft where Turkish firms have clear advantages. These arrangements allow European governments to address urgent capability gaps without reopening sensitive debates on accession or democratic standards.
Limits will remain. Political mistrust will continue to constrain cooperation and prevent broader political convergence. Yet in defense-industrial terms, the partnership is increasingly strategic. Once joint production and supply chains are in place, cooperation becomes hard to unwind. In 2026, Turkey-EU defense ties will reflect managed pragmatism: strategic in effect, selective in scope, and driven by necessity rather than trust.
László Szerencsés, an analyst at the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS)
Whether Hungary’s Orbán remains in power or a more pro-EU government under Péter Magyar emerges, three constants will shape Turkey-Hungary relations in 2026.
First, at least through the end of the year, Hungary will remain reliant on Russian natural gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline through Turkey. Although Ankara has begun diversifying its own supply, Budapest continues to benefit from a one-year US sanctions exemption, while EU energy sanctions on Russian gas are unlikely to fully enter into force in 2026.
Second, Turkey’s energy hub will shape Hungary’s gradual diversification. Azerbaijani gas already reaches Hungary, and longer-term infrastructure projects could eventually enable Turkmen gas to flow across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, onward to Turkey, and into Hungary.
Third, Hungary’s political utility for Ankara inside the EU will persist. Both Orbán and Magyar oppose EU migration policies, and Turkey’s role in externalizing migration control remains central.
A Magyar victory would likely soften rhetoric and rebalance relations with Brussels, but not fully unwind energy and political linkages with Ankara. An Orbán victory would deepen them.
ASIA POLICY
Selçuk Çolakoğlu, founding director of the Turkish Center for Asia-Pacific Studies and a faculty member at Beijing Normal-Hong Kong Baptist University in Zhuhai, China
Silk Road cooperation between Turkey and China is likely to hold significant potential, particularly amid disruptions to the Northern Corridor caused by the Russia-Ukraine War and EU sanctions on Russia.
The Middle Corridor has emerged as a more advantageous route for rail cargo between China and Europe. Efforts to improve the corridor’s infrastructure, including railways and ports, are expected to intensify, with the potential inclusion of Armenia if peace is achieved with Azerbaijan.
This route, linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey, could gain greater prominence as China prioritizes alternative trade routes. Iran remains an unattractive logistical option for China due to US sanctions and regional competition with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, China aims to strengthen economic ties with the European Union, particularly in the electric vehicle sector, creating opportunities for Turkey as a member of the Customs Union. If no unexpected geopolitical crisis arises between the United States and China, the economic partnership between Beijing and Ankara is expected to deepen further in 2026.
Daria Isachenko, an associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies in the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Turkey enjoys a privileged position in Central Asia, consistently strengthening its bilateral, trilateral and multilateral engagement, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States.
Although Ankara’s primary focus remains on the Middle East, it cannot afford to adopt an autopilot approach in Central Asia, given the region’s growing prominence on the international stage.
However, Ankara can rely on Azerbaijan as a co-pilot in Eurasian affairs, with Baku intensifying its relations with Central Asia, including by joining the regional Central Asian platform. Turkey’s priorities in Central Asia will be developing the Middle Corridor and improving energy cooperation (including green energy projects), as well as expanding business relations.
Ankara will probably try to make a new swap arrangement with Turkmenistan via Iran, and will continue to lobby Kazakhstan to increase oil transit via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Albeit, Ankara’s long-standing dream of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline is unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future.
AFRICA POLICY
Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, a visiting fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies in the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
As 2025 concludes, Turkey’s Africa policy reflects a consolidated presence, particularly in North Africa and the Horn, though deeper involvement in volatile conflicts has exposed structural constraints. Ankara has sought to rebalance its security-heavy posture by strengthening economic ties, leveraging mediation credibility and advancing normalization with former rivals.
In Libya, this translated into a hedging strategy engaging both western and eastern factions, while tactical alignment with Egypt enabled cooperation in Sudan and competitive coexistence in Libya’s economy.
In the Sahel, where relations remain security-dominated, future success depends on whether incoming mining and construction firms can diversify ties and help Ankara avoid a “security-for-resources” trap. In the Horn, doubling down on the Sudanese Army risks strategic entrapment, while a shift is underway in Somalia from training to operational embedding with naval deployments.
Next year, financial constraints and exposure to power struggles will push Ankara toward recalibration, with revisions to its Africa Action Plan in 2026 signaling an effort to align security activism with greater geoeconomic depth and possibly further geographic diversification towards more stable African economies.
Emadeddin Badi, a consultant and senior fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Turkey’s Libya file enters 2026 with Ankara no longer acting as Tripoli’s guarantor, but as a risk manager focused on protecting sunk costs. The May and June 2025 flare ups in Tripoli captured this pivot: Turkish leverage was used less to empower the GNU than to impose guardrails.
Since late 2022, Ankara has widened its aperture in Libya, cultivating an unprecedented channel to Haftar and his sons. The logic is cumulative rather than ideological: advance ratification of the maritime demarcation deal, secure access to eastern Libya’s reconstruction markets and hedge against uncertainty around Tripoli’s leadership.
In 2026, expect this hedging to harden. The Tripoli-based GNU’s legitimacy continues to erode, yet any political change still carries a high risk of intra-capital violence. In the east, Haftar’s succession remains unsettled as his children intensify internal competition, making Ankara’s new ties both valuable and structurally unstable.
Egypt’s increasing reliance on Turkey’s geopolitical leverage, and its selective security support as the Sudan conflict deepens, will further normalize this pivot even as Cairo watches Ankara’s moves warily.
Jalel Harchaoui, a political scientist specialising in North Africa, with a specific focus on Libya
Turkey is by far the most consequential interferer in Libya. While often viewed as a backer of PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba, Ankara has rendered this perception obsolete by assertively courting the Haftar family. Turkey’s ongoing charm offensive serves a singular strategic goal: securing parliamentary ratification of the maritime border memorandum of understanding signed with Tripoli in 2019.
Ankara’s courtship of the Haftar family—through arms sales and diplomatic flattery—implies a readiness to sacrifice Dabaiba’s premiership if needed to obtain the legislative assent only Benghazi can deliver. The push contradicts Egypt’s security doctrine in Cyrenaica and antagonizes not only Greece but also Israel.
Although the suspicious jet crash that killed western Libya’s military brass on Dec 23 tarnished Turkey’s image, Ankara’s resolve is undiminished. Bolstered by privileged access to US Pres. Donald Trump, Ankara remains selfishly laser-focused on turning its maritime MoU into proper Libyan law sometime in 2026. It will likely succeed—even if that must trigger a few crises.
US POLICY
Alan Makovsky, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who worked for the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs and State Department
Issues likely to dominate US-Turkish relations are familiar: F-35s, coordination on Syria and Gaza and growing Turkish-Israeli friction. These are interrelated, Israel being a factor in each, and Turkey is likely to fall short of its goals in each.
Establishing Turkish and Israeli operational arrangements in Syria will become particularly pressing, even as the Administration seeks a Syrian-Israeli non-belligerency deal. US partnership with the SDF will continue in the face of IS resurgence.
If Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire is implemented, Turkey may score construction contracts but, due to Israeli refusal to which Trump will reluctantly accede, not a military presence.
If Turkey relinquishes possession of S-400s, Trump could get the F-35 sale through Congress if he were willing to ride roughshod over Congressional objections and holds. It’s unlikely he would do that in an election year, but perhaps post-election (November/December)? Long-shot, but conceivable.
Where the administration can act without impediment—Halkbank and perhaps tariffs—Turkey may benefit, Trumpian whimsicality pending. On issues affected by Israel or Congress, or both, Ankara’s objectives face significant headwinds.
Howard Eissenstat, a Laurentian assoc. prof. of Middle East history and History Department chair at St. Lawrence University
The US and Turkey are enjoying something of a honeymoon. Erdoğan and Trump clearly see one another as effective partners, and the past year has demonstrated both the value of that cooperation and its limits. From Ankara’s perspective, the clearest gains have been Trump’s acceptance of a Turkish role in brokering the Gaza ceasefire and his support for Turkey’s vision for Syria.
Equally important, however, is what has not happened. Major defense deals—most notably Turkey’s acquisition of F-35s—remain blocked by statute and by the unresolved issue of the S-400s. This record highlights the constraints on the Trump-Erdoğan relationship. Congress continues to play a decisive role in arms sales, and despite optimistic rhetoric from both sides, no viable solution to the S-400 problem is in sight.
None of this is likely to change soon. Trump views US-Turkish relations favorably, but not enough to spend political capital on them, especially as his leverage is likely to decline after the 2026 midterms.
Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute
At home, Ankara’s dialogue to fully dissolve the PKK and its affiliates will move ahead. The PKK is pressed for peace by Ankara’s strong counterterrorism campaign, Turkey’s Kurds are tired of the conflict, and Ankara wants to prevent the YPG—the PKK’s Syrian franchise, now part of the SDF—from becoming an Israeli proxy.
Though the disarmament process will face strong opposition, and Erdoğan will lean on Ankara’s strength and his relationship with US Pres. Trump to dissolve both groups—in exchange for more political participation by Kurds in Turkey and Syria.
This strategy will usher in support by the pro-Kurdish DEM Party to Erdoğan, helping him with the country’s next presidential race. Keeping Ekrem Imamoğlu in jail—indefinitely—will clear Erdoğan’s path to that end.
Turkey-Israel competition in Syria notwithstanding, Turkey’s seasoned institutions will play a key role in stabilizing that country. Such contributions to Middle East peace and US policy will allow the US-Turkey relationship to flourish, helped along by the notable Erdoğan-Trump chemistry—watch for Trump’s July visit to Ankara for the NATO summit!
Selim Koru, author of the Kültürkampf newsletter and analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)
We’re going to see the relationship between Ankara and Washington hit its first speed bumps. The tension between Israel and Turkey is going to get worse, and since the Israelis still have superior influence in Washington, they can test Turkish regional outreach very aggressively. I think Turkey will continue to be very defensive on this front, but it won’t work like before.
What’s more worrying, however, are domestic developments. Here we are truly off the map. Since 1950, Turkey’s citizens have come to expect the right to vote governments out at some point, but this changed in 2025.
As living conditions continue to worsen in 2026, pressure is going to build up on the ruling elite in a way that it hasn’t before. They’ll try to soften that with signals of succession, but I think that’s just going to signal further weakness.
Overall, I think the Erdoğan palace has overextended itself, and 2026 is going to be a year when it experiences serious difficulties. They don’t have the juice to make this work.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Yıldız Tar, editor-in-chief at Kaos GL
In 2026, the trajectory for LGBTI+ rights in Turkey will likely be defined by the deepening of the government’s ‘protection of the family’ narrative. We anticipate this rhetoric will move beyond political discourse into concrete legal maneuvers, potentially through constitutional amendments or new judicial packages aimed at redefining civil rights to exclude queer existence.
The shrinking of civic space is expected to continue, manifesting in increased scrutiny on NGOs, censorship mechanisms, and arbitrary bans on public assembly. However, despite this systemic pressure, the LGBTI+ movement remains Turkey’s most dynamic and resilient opposition force.
Therefore, 2026 will not just be a year of increasing legislative constraints, but a critical test of endurance where the community’s visibility itself becomes a defiant act against state-sponsored hate campaigns and political violence.
Lisel Hintz, an assist. prof. of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS
Autocracy observers should pay closer attention to how Turkey’s media outlets function as sites of power consolidation. Watching how many court cases were used to try to undercut Imamoğlu’s oppositional potential in early 2025, I wasn’t surprised to see the arrest and sentencing of former Habertürk journalist Fatih Altaylı; his (now blocked) YouTube channel had nearly 1.7 million subscribers.
But it’s oppositional erasure in the entertainment sector I’ll be watching most closely. The AKP’s war on Turkey’s culture industry is far from over—which also means it’s far from won. I expect to see increased criminal charges, reputation smearing and professional blacklisting. 2025’s legal sagas of talent manager Ayşe Barım, LeMan magazine, and now Aleyna Tilki are portentous here. In addition, I expect more criminalization and erasure of queer media content, even after the “Year of the family” comes to a close.
I’ll also watch for how palace intrigues play out in news and entertainment media. If Resurrection: Ertuğrul was the Turkish Game of Thrones, maybe next up is some Bilal-friendly twist on Succession.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Elif Cansu Ilhan, Climate Action Network Europe climate and energy policies officer for Turkey
Being the COP31 president and host will put Türkiye climate policies in the spotlight.
The government should use this focus as an opportunity to catch up with the global trend of moving away from fossil fuels, especially coal and to plan for a just transition. Even though Türkiye has ambitious plans for renewable energy, it still lacks a just transition plan and continues to support new coal-plant investments, undermining the country’s climate ambition.
The ongoing environmental destruction all over the country, despite the resistance of local environmental protection movements, also creates a significant challenge for a justice-based climate agenda. Türkiye should establish transparent processes to incorporate the demands of people in the country and around the world into the COP process.
As the president of COP31, Türkiye should acknowledge the urgency of climate action and create a participatory process putting climate justice and equity at the center. To ensure a just and transparent process, the country should update its NDC and begin promoting immediate emission reductions.
ECONOMIC POLICY
Iris Cibre, financial executive and founder of Phoenix Consultancy
In 2026, the inflation fight will enter a more difficult phase, particularly after May, as the TL’s real appreciation narrows and the CB struggles with rate cuts. This implies 2026 won’t be easy for the real sector; credit access is unlikely to ease until at least H2.
Another risk involves the potential loosening of economic policies as we approach referendums and elections. Such a move would end the war on inflation.
Currency risk remains the most significant threat. Reserves bolstered by carry trade could evaporate quickly if investors exit. Unfortunately, we see no conversion into stable securities and limited inflows. Furthermore, money market funds nearing 2.5 trillion TL have overnight maturity—as the TL appreciates in real terms, their foreign currency demand increases daily.
Paradoxically, the CB’s high real interest rate policy has created self-feeding currency risk. Shallow securities markets remain unattractive to foreigners, while bond yields above 30 percent across all maturities signal inflation expectations—despite some improvement—remain insufficient.
Conversely, momentum in technology, defense, Zangezur developments, rare minerals and CAATSA could provide positive offsets.
Hacer Foggo, founder of the Deep Poverty Network
Turkey enters 2026 at a critical juncture marked by deepening poverty and inequality. According to TÜIK’s 2025 Income Distribution data, the highest-income group receives 48 percent of total income, while the lowest 20 percent receives only 6.4 percent, showing the burden of the crisis is not shared fairly among households.
In my work, I witness the most pronounced breakdowns in housing and food, with education increasingly deprioritized. The rising number of children who cannot afford school meals and struggle to concentrate due to hunger, signals an urgent risk of increased child labor, school dropouts and homelessness in 2026.
TÜIK data indicate labor force participation among children aged 15-17 has risen to 24.9 percent. Additionally, 31.5 percent of women and 23.3 percent of people aged 65 and over face the risk of poverty or social exclusion.
Poverty is no longer merely an income loss, it has become a structural inequality, threatening children’s development and the well-being of the elderly. Turkey must adopt a human rights-based economic approach that strengthens social protections.
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