
The Gaza war has unleashed colossal shifts in the Middle East, including the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria in December. In Damascus, a new administration, headed by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which led Assad’s overthrow, is transitioning from revolution to governing a diverse, traumatised country. Turkey, with its ties to victorious rebel groups, its long border with Syria and economic and political clout, is the regional country best placed to influence and benefit from the changes. But nothing is assured, and crucial to success will be calming the northeast, where Ankara and Washington back rival groups intermittently fighting each other.
Ankara’s priority in the new Syria seems to be to debilitate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who control large chunks of the northeast. As most of Syria basks in the glimmer of hope that Assad’s fall has brought, clashes between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed local rebel groups threaten to escalate, benefiting no one. The new leaders in Damascus are in talks with the SDF, but if these falter, violence could jeopardise both Syria’s prospects for stability and Turkey’s chance to benefit from peace. As President Donald Trump settles into the White House, the US and Turkey, as two NATO allies, should work together to calm Syria’s war-weary northeast, where they have long been at odds.
An unexpected windfall
The risks and potential rewards for Ankara are immense. Assad fell as his main backers, Russia and Iran (and the latter’s proxies such as Hezbollah), effectively washed their hands of him as they were too stretched by other conflicts, with Ukraine and Israel. Turkey hopes many of the over three million Syrian refugees it has hosted at great expense for over a decade might now go home. Turkish construction companies and other businesses also hope to pile in to help with Syria’s rebuilding. Many Ankara officials regard this as a unique chance to boost their influence in Syria and the wider Middle East – all the more so with Moscow and Tehran distracted, at least for now.
Ankara sought Assad’s fall after Syria’s civil war began in 2011, but by the time it happened thirteen years later, it had come to terms with his seemingly iron grip on power and hoped at best to keep the heat on him to win more concessions in talks. Like some Gulf and many Western countries, it backed the armed opposition in 2011, and expected Assad to go swiftly. But he held on, with help first from Iran and its allies and, since 2015, from Russia. Aware that their conflicting interests in Syria could cause trouble, Ankara, Tehran and Moscow launched the so-called Astana talks process in 2017. Its 20 or so rounds of meetings failed to end the conflict but have helped the three avoid escalation on the ground. From 2022, Ankara even explored normalising relations with Assad, but this ran aground when the latter insisted that any progress must wait until Turkish troops left Syria’s north, where thousands had been gradually garrisoned to ward off threats to national security that Ankara feared.
The regime’s sudden collapse, a week after rebels began a march on Aleppo and then Damascus, surprised most officials and observers in Turkey, as elsewhere. On several occasions in the past, Ankara had opposed any such rebel moves. And when the rebels defied Turkish warnings and advanced towards Aleppo, Ankara saw it mainly as a chance to bring Assad back to the negotiating table. Turkish officials said at the time they wanted a weakened but not toppled regime, fearing a chaotic power vacuum.
Caution gave way to optimism as the rebels snatched victory. Four days later, Turkey’s intelligence chief, İbrahim Kalın, made an elated public appearance in Damascus, and Ankara swiftly reopened its embassy. Turkey’s Hakan Fidan became the first foreign minister to visit the new leaders in Damascus on 22 December, and three weeks later his Syrian counterpart, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, returned the visit to Ankara. Turkish diplomacy now focuses on helping an orderly transition and convincing Western states to take more steps to ease draconian economic sanctions imposed against Assad’s Syria so that aid and investment can flow in.
Turkey holds key cards
Ankara and others will ultimately judge the fledgling administration by its success in stabilising Syria which will likely require sharing power and a degree of inclusive governance.
Turkey’s complex relationship with HTS balances national security and geopolitics. The group had long benefitted from a Turkish military cordon, agreed between Ankara and Moscow to prevent any regime offensive triggering a new wave of refugees into Turkey. Despite officially classifying HTS as terrorists, due to their previous affiliation to al Qaeda, Turkey chose to deal with the group pragmatically as it dominated Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib which held out against Assad.
The relationship remains prickly but Turkey’s geographical position as a critical lifeline and its economic strength should give it useful leverage over the group. Its southern neighbour is also looking to diversify its relations. Syria’s new foreign minister made his first official foreign visit to Saudi Arabia, followed by a trip to the United Arab Emirates, signalling Damascus’s intent to strengthen ties with other regional powers.
The northeast is the thorn
Turkey-Syria ties may well be determined mainly by the precarious northeast. For a decade, this corner of Syria has been controlled by the SDF, which the US has backed in its continuing fight against the Islamic State group. Turkey, however, views the SDF as a direct extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known by its Kurdish initials PKK, which it has fiercely fought in Turkey and northern Iraq for 40 years. Turkey, the US and the European Union designate the PKK as terrorist. Ankara fears its arch enemy dominates what amounts to a statelet that could threaten its national security. It opposes US support for the SDF and has armed other forces who contest its control.
Turkey’s air force has itself struck SDF positions, as have its troops in Syria, to weaken its hold over an area whose lucrative oil fields make up 80-90 percent of Syria’s output, and to protect Turkey from possible incursions or infiltrations.
The SDF and rival rebels fight intermittently. Since December Turkish-backed factions have driven the SDF out of Tal Rifaat town near Aleppo and parts of Manbij further east, and have tried to push into Kobani on the Turkish border, a town where Kurdish forces, backed by the US, famously repelled an Islamic State siege in 2015.
If talks since December between the new administration in Damascus and the SDF progress, they could pave the way for stability, but Ankara is looking over their shoulders.
After Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan visited Damascus, Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa said Ankara supported efforts for a negotiated settlement with Kurdish-led forces, and would halt further military actions that could undermine this. However, the SDF and Turkey-backed rebels are still clashing. It is unclear what outcome Turkey might accept, short of the surrender and disarmament of the SDF and the departure of all PKK-trained non-Syrian figures who have played a role in the fight against Islamic State over the last decade.
Washington’s leverage
Turkey feels unable to launch an all-out ground offensive against the SDF while US-led anti-Islamic State coalition forces remain in the area. American support for the SDF strains US-Turkish relations. If Turkey now seems emboldened by Assad’s fall to step up attacks, the US response – which is uncertain under its new president – will be critical.
When Kurdish-led and Turkey-backed forces clashed in Manbij on 8-9 December, the US reportedly told the SDF to pull back from the west bank of the Euphrates or lose overall Pentagon protection. The group complied. To deter advances into Kobani, the US sent troops to patrol the area. But it is unclear if these moves will stop Ankara and its local partners. US senator, Lindsey Graham, a close Trump ally, threatened on 10 December to push for sanctions on Turkey if it expanded its operations against the SDF, and just before taking office, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed support for the group.
Washington supports the SDF primarily for fear that the Islamic State may try to regroup in post-Assad Syria. On 8 December, the Pentagon said US forces carried out 75 airstrikes against Islamic State targets, mostly in central Syria. US officials also worry about the security of detention facilities run by the Kurdish-led forces, which house former Islamic State militants and their families, including some 50,000 people in al-Hol camp near the Iraqi border.
In his first days in office, Trump had little to say about Syria. In 2019, during his first term, he ordered US forces away from the Turkish border in northeast Syria, tacitly enabling Ankara to send in troops to expel the SDF from some areas. Despite this, the US joined many European capitals in imposing economic sanctions and defence export restrictions on Ankara after this operation. Trump may resume his first-term efforts to withdraw some 2,000 US troops in Syria, which Ankara would rejoice at. Despite Senator Graham’s comments, Trump’s statements just before resuming office suggest he may be warmer to Ankara that his predecessor Joe Biden, but then again he also suggested US troops might stay in Syria as they were no longer in harm’s way.
Seizing the moment
An escalating conflict in the northeast would probably displace civilians and derail fragile efforts to build a new cohesive state, undermining hopes across Syria for lasting peace and progress. The country would be helped enormously by at least a détente between Ankara and the SDF. This could involve the US and Ankara brokering an immediate ceasefire between rival armed groups and committing to two parallel engagement tracks.
The first track would be part of Syria’s broader political transition talks, bringing a wide range of representatives to Damascus for an intra-Syrian dialogue with the goal of moving towards peace in the northeast as part of efforts to shape a new Syrian state.
The second would be direct US-Turkey talks to define their roles and cooperation in the northeast, including the scope of Ankara’s access to border areas, regular patrolling, and creating demilitarised zones as needed, while ensuring that gains against the Islamic State are preserved. This needs the backing of both Damascus and Kurdish-led forces. Progress could open the door to discussions of a gradual withdrawal of non-Syrian fighters within the SDF – one of Ankara’s key demands.
Developments outside Syria also give cause for some hope. Ankara is showing willingness for a new process to end its 40-year-old conflict with the PKK. On 28 December, for a first time in over a decade, the government allowed a delegation from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (which has about a tenth of the seats in Turkey’s parliament) to visit imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation visited Öcalan for a second time on 22 January and subsequent visits are planned with some Turkish pundits expecting Öcalan to soon call on the PKK to move towards ending its armed struggle. Such a breakthrough, though still uncertain, would boost chances of a deal in Syria.
As the dust settles following Assad’s surprise departure, an end to the quagmire in the northeast would remove a major hurdle for the new government in Damascus on its path of bringing effective and legitimate governance to all of Syria. It would boost chances of stability and prosperity for Syria and its partners, including Turkey, and remove a painful thorn in long-strained Turkey-US ties. Turkey’s leadership and constructive engagement in such a process would, moreover, demonstrate to the new Syrian government and other parties that it has a genuine desire for a peaceful Syria, laying the groundwork for a closer and more mutually beneficial relationship.
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