ANKARA – Years ago, the relationship between Turkey and Syria was characterized by the phrase: “My brother Assad”. This is how Turkish Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan often referred to his Syrian counterpart, Pres. Bashar Assad.
Though with the onset of the 2011 Arab uprisings, affectionate sentiments quickly shifted to hostility. Ankara detested the brutal treatment of Sunni Muslims and would, over time, become the greatest ally of Syrian opposition groups, enraging the Assad regime.
Despite ongoing tensions in recent years, Erdoğan stated in July 2023 that he was open to talks with Assad – but with conditions. Meetings have since been held at the ministry level. However, no significant progress has been made yet.
Experts attribute the slow pace of the “normalization” process to high expectations and incompatible objectives. At the same time, they think it is too early to lose hope for a positive outcome.
While Ankara and Damascus continue to face obstacles in aligning their priorities, specifically on how to address Kurdish groups, opportunities for cooperation may still be possible. Experts believe common threat perceptions posed by Kurdish fighters and regional conditions may eventually incentivize Ankara and Damascus to collaborate.
In spite of the previous “normalization” meetings at the defense ministry level, the two governments remain at odds. While the Syrian administration criticizes Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria, calling it an “illegal occupation”, Ankara says the pre-condition of Turkish troop withdrawal before higher level talks is “unacceptable”.
Another point of contention for Damascus is Ankara’s support for the Syrian National Army (SNA), formerly known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which Ankara trains and supplies with arms in exchange for the group's participation in Turkish military operations along border areas with Syria.
One thing the two sides do seem to agree on is both view Kurdish-led political and military structures in northern Syria as threats, even if they differ on the degree of severity they assign threats.
Common threat
Speaking to Turkey recap, Serhat Erkmen, professor of international relations at Altınbaş University, said Turkey's threat perception in Syria has changed as the cooperation between the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria has become "open and institutionalized".
The SDF was established in 2015 with the backing of US support and is a mixed force of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and a small number of Turkmen in the region. It is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
For this reason, Turkey regards the YPG as a terrorist organization and as the Syrian extension of the PKK, a Kurdish militia group created in the late 1970s that has engaged in an insurgency against Turkish authorities.
The US, however, does not include the YPG on its list of terrorist organizations and has been providing political and military support to the YPG for years to fight against the Islamic State (IS) in northeast Syria. The Damascus administration also does not consider the YPG as a terrorist group, but it continues to criticize the presence of armed groups in its territories.
As far as the normalization process with Ankara is concerned, Erkmen said Turkey has focused on security-centered policies since 2017, adding progress can be made in bilateral relations if Ankara sees Damascus as a “partner” in how it handles the YPG.
“Not only common interests but also common threat perceptions bring states together,” Erkmen told Turkey recap. “It becomes inevitable for two states that perceive the same problem as a threat to cooperate around this common security threat.”
In May 2023, a much-anticipated meeting between foreign affairs ministers from Turkey, Russia, Syria and Iran took place in Moscow to discuss Syria.
The meeting was interpreted to move the Ankara–Damascus normalization process, previously carried out at the level of defense ministers and heads of intelligence, to more political grounds. While there appeared to be a “positive and constructive atmosphere” between the parties, little progress ensued in the following months.
Good neighbor, bad neighbor
Syrian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission head Pierre Marjane attributes the lack of progress in bilateral normalization to Turkey’s failure to change its policies on Syria.
Marjane accused Turkey of “not taking good neighborly relations seriously”, and argued that Turkey is not legitimizing the common interests of the two countries.
"Turkey is still occupying and Turkifying territory in Syria, harboring, and financially, politically and militarily supporting groups classified as terrorists under various [UN] Security Council resolutions,” Marjane told Turkey recap.
Marjane described the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces in the north of the country as a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and said that no normalization could be expected unless Ankara meets Damascus’ condition of complete withdrawal.
A diplomatic source from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Turkey recap in a written response that Ankara’s main expectations are based on “making progress in the war against terrorism, creating the necessary conditions for safe and dignified returns [of Syrian refugees], and taking steps to revitalize the political process, which is of critical importance in resolving the Syrian crisis.”
The Turkish diplomat noted it is "important that Ankara's demands are advanced simultaneously and without a hierarchy of timetables," adding that the way forward is for "Damascus to make a realistic analysis of its circumstances and develop a course of action in line with the conditions on the ground."
Discordant expectations
Taking developments across the region into consideration, Oytun Orhan, Levant Studies Coordinator at ORSAM, an Ankara-based think-tank, said normalization efforts throughout the Middle East have accelerated efforts for a Ankara-Damascus rapprochement.
According to Orhan, the presence of military and political structures in northern Syria and US cooperation with these structures were among the developments that triggered Ankara’s attempted reconciliation with Damascus.
He said the pivotal developments that helped initialize the process include continued US support for the SDF inside Syria, pressure and encouragement exerted by Russia – especially regarding direct talks between Ankara and Damascus – as well as Turkey’s deepening coordination with Russia in Syria.
Stating that Ankara-Damascus negotiations are progressing, even if there have yet to produce tangible developments, Orhan said he believes the main reason for the lack of results so far lies in the discord between the parties’ expectations.
“The Assad administration stated that diplomatic relations would not be established unless Turkey withdraws its military from Syria,” Orhan said. “Although Turkey stated that it had no long-term goals or intentions to remain in Syrian territory, it put forward a gradual withdrawal on the grounds that the Syrian administration is not yet able to establish authority in the border region, and the power vacuum can further invite terrorist groups.”
Orhan went on, saying he does not find it realistic to talk about Turkey’s withdrawal before the threat of the YPG is eliminated. However, Sarkis Kassarjian, a Damascus-based journalist specializing in Turkish affairs, stated that Damascus differs from Ankara on this point.
"Damascus has never explicitly said that the structure there [in northeast Syria] is an extension of the PKK, unlike Ankara's rhetoric, so far."
Kassarjian added that Ankara sees the SDF, YPG and PKK as one organization. In contrast, Damascus sees them as separate organizations, but does not approve of the former’s cooperation with the US.
According to Kassarjian, Damascus describes the cooperation as “separatist activities”, though it sees the YPG and SDF as less dangerous than “the terrorists in Idlib, and the terrorists supported by Turkey in northern Syria.”
He added the order of Damascus' threat perception is as follows: Idlib, Turkish-controlled areas, and then SDF regions of operation.
Looking back on Ankara-Damascus normalization efforts more broadly, Prof. Erkmen of Altınbaş University, said: “Expectations were set very high in the beginning.”
“However, expecting a swift resolution for a problem that has become a part of the national politics of both countries is setting expectations too high," Erkmen continued. “Everyone should realize that this is a gradual process. We are still in the phase of setting the negotiating table for a possible agreement.”
This article was translated by Oğul Köseoğlu and edited by Emily Johnson.
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